Environmental health work methods and procedures for the surveillance and control of avian influenza in the Eastern Cape Province, South Africa by Elie, Sammy Abraham
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH WORK METHODS AND - PROCEDURES 
FOR THE SURVEILLANCE AND CONTROL OF AVIAN INFLUENZA IN 
THE EASTERN CAPE PROVINCE, SOUTH AFRICA 
 
By 
 
SAMMY ABRAHAM ELIE 
 
 
Submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
MAGISTER TECHNOLOGIAE: ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH 
in the 
FACULTY OF HEALTH SCIENCES 
at the 
NELSON MANDELA METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
December 2008 
 
Supervisor: Dr H.J. Maarschalk 
 
 
 
 ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
This dissertation could not have been completed without the contributions of a 
number of persons. It is a pleasant task to acknowledge all those individuals. 
 
• Dr. H.J. Maarschalk, my supervisor, who provided proficient research 
guidance, suggestions and constructive criticism; 
• The respondents: Mr. N.J. Oliphant, Mr. P. Dreyer, Mr. M. Agenbag, Mrs. N. 
Crisp, Mrs. J. Mnyaluza, Dr. U. Nagpal, Mrs. C. Sibideki, Mrs. A. Gouws, and 
Mr. S. Titus for their willingness to participate in the study; 
• Dr. P. Goldstone, for his highly regarded linguistic recommendations and 
guidance; and 
• My wife Rachel, children Samantha and Chivago, as well as my extended 
family for their endless support, motivation, understanding and tolerance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS      ................................................................................ ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS     ................................................................................... iii 
LIST OF ANNEXURES      .................................................................................... x 
LIST OF TABLES      ............................................................................................ xii 
LIST OF FIGURES      .......................................................................................... xiii 
ABSTRACT      .....................................................................................................     xiv 
KEY WORDS      ................................................................................................... xv 
 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Literature review     .................................................................................... 1 
1.2. Problem statement      ................................................................................ 8 
 1.2.1. Sub problems      ........................................................................... 8 
  1.2.1.1. The organisational arrangements of avian surveillance 
   and control in South Africa      ...................................... 8 
  1.2.1.2. The epidemiology of avian influenza      ....................... 9 
  1.2.1.3.  Work  methods  and - procedures  for the surveillance 
   and control of avian influenza.      ................................. 9 
1.3.  Purpose of the study      ............................................................................. 10 
1.4.  Significance of the study      ....................................................................... 10 
1.5.  Theoretical framework      ........................................................................... 11 
1.6.  Research methodology and design      ....................................................... 13 
 1.6.1. Research methodology     ............................................................. 13 
 1.6.2. Research design      ...................................................................... 14 
  1.6.2.1. Exploratory research      ............................................... 14            
  1.6.2.2.  Descriptive research      ................................................ 14      
  1.6.2.3.  Inductive research      ................................................... 15 
  1.6.2.4. Deductive research      .................................................. 16 
 1.6.3. Study population      ....................................................................... 16 
1.6.4. Sampling      .................................................................................. 16 
1.6.5. Data collection      .......................................................................... 18 
 iv 
1.6.5.1. Documentary research      ............................................ 18 
1.6.5.2. Group of experts      ...................................................... 19 
1.6.5.3. Telephonic questionnaire     ......................................... 20  
1.6.5.4. Personal interviews      ................................................. 20 
1.6.6. Entry to workplaces of participants      ........................................... 22 
1.6.7. Data analysis      ............................................................................ 23  
1.7.  Trustworthiness      ..................................................................................... 24 
1.7.1. Credibility      .................................................................................. 25 
1.7.2. Transferability      ........................................................................... 25 
1.7.3. Dependability      ............................................................................ 26 
1.7.4. Conformability      .......................................................................... 26 
1.8. Ethical considerations      ........................................................................... 26 
1.9. Pilot study      ............................................................................................. 27 
1.10.  Plan of the study    ..................................................................................... 27 
1.11.  Clarification of key concepts ...................................................................... 29 
1.11.1. Municipal health services      ......................................................... 29 
1.11.2. Avian influenza     .......................................................................... 30 
1.11.3. A human avian influenza outbreak      ........................................... 30 
1.11.4. Avian influenza surveillance      ..................................................... 31 
1.11.5. Avian influenza control      ............................................................. 31 
1.11.6. Work methods      .......................................................................... 31 
1.11.7 Work procedures      ...................................................................... 31 
 
CHAPTER TWO: AVIAN INFLUENZA: THE PLACE AND ROLE OF ENVIRON- 
  MENTAL  HEALTH IN  THE  NATIONAL,  PROVINCIAL AND 
  MUNICIPAL SPHERES OF GOVERNMENT 
2.1. Introduction      ........................................................................................... 33 
2.2.  The Environmental Health profession      ................................................... 33 
2.2.1. Environmental Health defined      .................................................. 34 
2.2.2. The functional areas of environmental health service delivery     .. 36 
2.2.3. Professional regulatory framework and requirements      .............. 39 
 
 v 
2.3. The  place  and  role  of environmental  health  within  the organisational    
 structure of the health care system in South Africa      ............................... 41 
2.3.1. Legislation    relevant   to    health    care   service    delivery    in 
 South Africa. .................................................................................. 42 
2.3.1.1. Constitutional  imperatives  relevant   to   health   care 
 service delivery in South Africa     ................................ 42 
2.3.1.2. The  significance  of  the  National  Health   Act,  2004 
 (Act 61 of 2003)     ........................................................ 43 
2.3.1.3. Legislation relevant to avian influenza in South Africa.  45 
2.3.2. The   organisational   structure   of  the  National  Department  of  
 Health      ....................................................................................... 47 
2.3.2.1. The Minister of Health and the Cabinet      ................... 48 
2.3.2.2. The National Health Council      .................................... 49 
2.3.2.3. The Director-General of Health     ................................ 50 
2.3.2.4. National Consultative Health Forum      ........................ 51 
2.3.2.5. The Deputy Director-General of Health      ................... 52 
2.3.3. The  place  and  role  of environmental health within the National 
  Department of Health      ............................................................... 53 
2.3.4. The organisational structure of the Provincial Health Departments 55 
2.3.4.1. A Provincial Health Department     ............................... 56 
2.3.4.2. Member of the provincial executive committee respon- 
 sible for health and the provincial legislature      ........... 56 
2.3.4.3. Provincial Health Council      ......................................... 57 
2.3.4.4. Chief Directorate: District Health Services      ............... 59 
2.3.5. The  place  and role of environmental health within the Provincial 
 Health Departments      ................................................................. 61 
2.3.6. The organisational structure of the District Health System      ....... 63 
2.3.6.1. The District Health System      ...................................... 63 
2.3.6.2. Health District      .......................................................... 65 
2.3.6.3. District Health Council      ............................................. 66 
2.3.6.4. A Health Sub- district      ............................................... 67 
2.3.6.5. A Local Municipality      ................................................. 69 
 vi 
2.3.7. The  place  and  role of  environmental  health  within  the district  
health system   .............................................................................. 70 
2.4. Conclusion      ............................................................................................ 72 
 
CHAPTER THREE: THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF AVIAN INFLUENZA 
3.1. Introduction      ........................................................................................... 77 
3.2. Definition of Influenza................................................................................. 77 
3.3. Description of the influenza virus      .......................................................... 78 
3.4. Classification of the influenza virus      ....................................................... 79 
3.5. The mechanism of influenza virus variability      ......................................... 80 
3.5.1. Antigenic shift      ........................................................................... 80 
3.5.2. Antigenic drift      ............................................................................ 81 
3.6. Difference   between   human   seasonal  influenza,  avian  influenza and 
 human pandemic influenza      ................................................................... 82 
3.6.1. Seasonal influenza      ................................................................... 82 
3.6.2. Avian influenza      ......................................................................... 83 
3.6.3. Human pandemic influenza      ...................................................... 86 
3.7. Natural hosts of the avian influenza virus      .............................................. 87 
3.8. Sources of infection of the avian influenza virus      ................................... 88 
3.9. Clinical presentation of the avian influenza virus      .................................. 89 
3.9.1. Clinical features in humans      ...................................................... 89 
3.9.2. Initial symptoms in humans      ...................................................... 90 
3.9.3. Case definition for avian influenza in humans      .......................... 90 
3.9.4. Clinical signs of avian influenza in birds      ................................... 91 
3.9.5. Differential diagnosis in animals      ............................................... 91 
3.9.6. The pathology of avian influenza      .............................................. 92 
3.10. Transmission of avian influenza      ............................................................ 93 
3.10.1. Transmission of avian influenza between humans     .................... 93 
3.10.2. Transmission of avian influenza from birds to humans      ............. 95 
3.10.3. Transmission of avian influenza from humans to humans      ........ 96 
3.10.4.  Transmission of avian influenza in birds      .................................. 97 
3.10.5.  Risk  of  spreading  the  avian  influenza  in  poultry  and related 
 vii 
  industries      ................................................................................. 98 
3.11. Incidences of avian influenza      ................................................................ 100 
3.11.1.  Avian influenza incidences in the world      ................................... 100 
3.11.2.  Epidemiological case investigations of human avian influenza   .. 100      
3.11.3.  Avian influenza incidences in South Africa      .............................. 102 
3.12. Risk assessment      ................................................................................... 102 
3.12.1.  Estimated impact of a future influenza pandemic      .................... 104 
  3.12.1.1. Impact on the health care system and infrastructure .... 105 
  3.12.1.2. Impact on businesses      .............................................. 106 
 3.12.1.3. Impact  of  an   outbreak  of  highly  pathogenic  avian 
 influenza      .................................................................. 106 
3.12.2.  Mitigation of the impact of highly pathogenic avian influenza      .. 107 
3.13. Conclusion      ............................................................................................ 107 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: WORK  METHODS  AND - PROCEDURES FOR THE SUR- 
         VEILLANCE OF AVIAN INFLUENZA 
4.1. Introduction      ........................................................................................... 113     
4.2. Basic principles of human avian influenza surveillance.............................. 113 
4.3 Human case surveillance      ...................................................................... 116 
4.3.1. Case detection      ......................................................................... 117 
4.3.2. Reporting of a notifiable disease      .............................................. 120 
4.3.3. Investigation of an avian influenza outbreak     ............................. 122 
4.3.4. Human case confirmation      ......................................................... 124 
4.4. Basic elements of avian influenza surveillance in birds     ......................... 126 
4.4.1. Early detection of disease      ........................................................ 128 
4.4.2. Clinical surveillance of birds      ..................................................... 128 
4.4.3. Serological surveillance of birds      ............................................... 130 
4.4.4 Virological surveillance of birds      ................................................ 132 
4.5. Conclusion      ............................................................................................ 133 
 
 
 
 viii 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: WORK METHODS AND - PROCEDURES FOR THE CONTROL 
       OF AVIAN INFLUENZA 
5.1. Introduction      ........................................................................................... 136 
5.2. Basic strategies for avian influenza control      ........................................... 137 
5.3. Control strategies for avian influenza in humans     ................................... 138 
5.3.1. Preventing the exposure of workers in health care facilities     ...... 138 
5.3.2. Avian influenza control by vaccination      ...................................... 140 
5.3.3. Avian influenza control by antiviral drugs      ................................. 142 
5.3.4. Avian influenza education      ......................................................... 143 
5.3.5. Legislative measures for the control of avian influenza      ............ 145 
5.4. Control strategies for bird avian influenza cases      ................................... 145 
5.4.1. Biosecurity     ................................................................................. 146 
5.4.2. Elimination of infected poultry      ................................................... 148 
5.4.3. Vaccination      ............................................................................... 148 
5.4.4. Avian influenza education    .......................................................... 150 
5.5. The role of Avian Influenza Endemic Outbreak Response Teams     ......... 150 
5.5.1. The  place  and   role  of  environmental  health  in  the  National 
 Communicable Disease Outbreak Response Team      ................. 151 
5.5.2. The place and role of  environmental health  in a  Provincial Out- 
 break Response Team     .............................................................. 153 
5.5.3. The  place  and  role of  environmental health in a Health District  
 Outbreak Response Team      ....................................................... 155 
5.5.4 The place and  role  of  environmental  health  in  a  Health  Sub- 
District Outbreak Response Teams     ........................................... 158 
5.5.5. Frequency   of   meetings  for  outbreak  response  teams  at  the  
 municipal sphere of government      .............................................. 159 
5.6. Conclusion      ............................................................................................ 160 
 
 
 
 
 ix 
 
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS      ...................... 163 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY      ............................................................................................. 181 
INTERNET SOURCES CONSULTED      ............................................................. 193 
INTERVIEWS      .................................................................................................. 200 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 x 
LIST OF ANNEXURES 
 
Annexure 1: Letter: Request for permission to conduct telephonic interviews  .. 202 
Annexure 2: Telephonic questionnaire schedule ............................................... 204 
Annexure 3: Data  analysis of the  telephonic interviews  conducted  amongst 
  the   provincial   communicable  disease  outbreak  co-ordinators  
 (the group of experts)      ............................................................... 213 
Annexure 4: Personal interview schedule .......................................................... 224 
Annexure 5: Letter: Request  for  permission to  conduct research     ............... 225 
Annexure 6: Information and informed consent form      .................................... 227 
Annexure 7: Organogram of the National Department of Health      .................. 230 
Annexure 8: List of  matters  that the  provincial legislature shares concurrent 
 powers with parliament      ............................................................. 232 
Annexure 9: Organogram of the Eastern Cape Provincial Health Department .. 235 
Annexure 10: Organizational Structure of Ukhahlamba District Municipality ....... 236 
Annexure 11: Diagrams  that  illustrate the events during an antigenic shift and  
 an antigenic drift      ....................................................................... 237 
Annexure 12: Instances of avian influenza infection in humans      ..................... 239 
Annexure 13: Map  of  affected  areas with  confirmed  human  cases of  H5N1 
 avian influenza since 2003      ....................................................... 242 
Annexure14: Map of  areas  reporting  confirmed  occurrence  of  H5N1  avian 
 influenza in poultry and wild birds since 2003      .......................... 243 
Annexure 15: Phases of pandemic influenza      .................................................. 244 
Annexure 16: Clinical features of human avian influenza      ............................... 247 
Annexure 17: Active screening process for avian influenza     ............................ 249 
Annexure 18: Initial diagnosis form for notifiable diseases: Form (GW 17/5)     .. 251 
Annexure 19: Human avian influenza notification form      ................................... 252 
Annexure 20: Work  methods  and  - procedures   for   human  avian  influenza 
 specimen collection      .................................................................. 253 
Annexure 21: Avian influenza investigation kit      ................................................ 265 
Annexure 22: Avian influenza infection control measures      .............................. 266 
Annexure 23: Avian influenza-like illness monitoring form      .............................. 269 
 xi 
Annexure 24: Work methods and  - procedures  for  specimen  collection during 
 clinical surveillance of birds      ...................................................... 271 
 Annexure 25: Work methods  and - procedures  for  specimen  collection during 
 serological surveillance of poultry      ............................................. 278 
Annexure 26: Schematic  representation  of  laboratory   tests  for  determining 
                       evidence of avian influenza infection of poultry flocks ................... 282 
Annexure 27: Work methods and - procedures  for health care workers provid- 
 ing care to  avian influenza infected  patients at health care facil- 
 ities     ............................................................................................ 284 
Annexure 28: Prevention and control advice for people living in areas  affected 
 by avian influenza      ..................................................................... 292 
Annexure 29: Work   procedures   for  biosecurity  of   poultry  to   prevent   the 
 introduction of avian influenza      .................................................. 297 
Annexure 30: Work  methods and - procedures for  the  elimination  of infected 
 poultry     ....................................................................................... 300 
Annexure 31: Sectors  that  should  serve on the National Avian Influenza Out- 
 break Response Team      ............................................................. 305 
Annexure 32: Sectors that should serve on the Provincial Avian Influenza 
 Outbreak Response Team in the Eastern Cape province      ........ 307 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xii 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1: Telephonic interview response rate      .......................................... 213 
Table 2: Training   received  by  provincial   communicable   disease   co- 
 ordinators on the co-ordination of  an avian Influenza outbreak      218 
Table 3: Phases of pandemic influenza       ................................................. 244 
Table 4: Sample strategy for poultry       ...................................................... 278 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xiii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Case definition of avian influenza in humans      ........................... 118 
Figure 2: Work procedures to report human avian influenza cases      ......... 121 
Figure 3: Response procedures during an avian influenza outbreak      ....... 124 
Figure 4: Ages of the seven respondents      ................................................ 214 
Figure 5: Respondents years of  work experience relevant to their  current 
  jobs      .......................................................................................... 215 
Figure 6: Respondents  years  of  experience as provincial  communicable 
 disease co-ordinators in their own provinces      ............................ 215 
Figure 7: Educational attainment of respondents      .................................... 217 
Figure 8: Language proficiency of respondents      ....................................... 217 
Figure 9: The  presence  of  a  provincial  contingency plan to deal with an 
 avian influenza outbreak      .......................................................... 219 
Figure 10: The level  of  preparedness  of  provincial  health  departments to 
 deal with an avian influenza outbreak      ...................................... 219 
Figure 11: Taking of a throat sample      ......................................................... 254 
Figure 12: Swab techniques      ...................................................................... 255 
Figure 13: Taking of a nasopharyngeal swab sample      ............................... 256 
Figure 14: Performing a nasopharyngeal aspirate      ..................................... 257 
Figure 15: Anterior nasal swab      .................................................................. 257 
Figure 16: Putting on a tourniquet to palpate and locate the vein     ............... 259 
Figure 17: Disinfection of the venepuncture site      ........................................ 259 
Figure 18: Performing a venepuncture with a venepuncture system  ............. 260 
Figure 19: Drawing blood into a vacutainer serum-separator tube      ............ 260 
Figure 20: Applying pressure to the venepuncture site     .............................. 260 
Figure 21: Data collection form: avian influenza investigation of humans ...... 263 
Figure 22: Data collection form: avian influenza investigation of birds      ...... 275 
Figure 23: Placement of  personal  protective  equipment, including surgical 
 mask and goggles      .................................................................... 287 
 
 
 xiv 
Abstract 
 
Avian influenza is an infectious disease of birds caused by the Type A strain of the 
influenza virus. The disease, which was first identified in Italy more than 100 years ago, 
occurs worldwide (World Health Organization, 2006a). The current outbreak of the 
highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1), which began in Southeast Asia in mid-
2003, is the largest and most severe on record. Never before in the recorded history of 
this disease have so many countries been simultaneously affected. Since the last 
pandemic in 1968-1969, the risk of an influenza pandemic has not been considered 
greater than at the present time. The importance of intervention strategies had become 
increasingly evident throughout the world. The World Health Organization provides a 
generic outline for preparedness plans to assist countries in their preparations to 
respond to a possible avian influenza pandemic. These guidelines may be modified as 
the epidemiology of avian influenza evolves.     
 
The South African National Department of Health has developed national guidelines in 
the form of an avian influenza preparedness plan. These draft guidelines do not provide 
detailed Environmental Health work methods and - procedures for the effective 
surveillance and control of the disease. 
 
The general purpose of this study is to develop a standardised set of Environmental 
Health work methods and - procedures, which will contribute to the effective surveillance 
and control of avian influenza in the Eastern Cape province – South Africa. Within the 
context of the purpose of this study, a qualitative, explorative, descriptive, inductive and 
deductive research design will be used. The methods of data collection will be 
documentary research, telephonic as well as in-depth personal interviews. In this study, 
documentary research will be the primary method of data collection. With a qualitative 
approach, the researcher will be the human instrument for data analysis. The process of 
qualitative data analysis will be based on data reduction and interpretation; and will be 
conducted as an activity simultaneously with data collection, data interpretation and 
narrative reporting writing. 
 
 xv 
KEY WORDS: Avian influenza; Surveillance; Control; Work methods; Work procedures. 
 
 
 
 1 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Lite ra ture  review 
According to Taylor (2006, p.1), a literature review is an account of what has 
been published on a topic by accredited scholars and researchers. Creswell 
(2003, p.30) states that a literature review provides a framework for 
establishing the importance of the study as well as a benchmark for 
comparing the results of a study with other findings. With qualitative research, 
a literature review shows that the researcher has identified some gaps in 
previous research and that the proposed study will fill a demonstrated need 
(De Vos, Strydom, Fouché & Delport, 2002, p.263). The researcher will 
conduct a thorough search of useful and relevant information pertaining to the 
topic, with the aim of gaining knowledge and ideas for further research.  
 
Avian influenza (also referred to as avian flue) is an infectious disease of birds 
caused by the Type A strain of the influenza virus. There is currently a 
widespread epidemic in Asia of highly pathogenic avian influenza, caused by 
influenza A (H5N1) in animal populations, particularly chickens, that poses a 
considerable public health risk. Avian flue is also a highly infectious viral 
disease that can infect humans, causing severe disease with high mortality. 
The virus has the potential to adapt, or recombine with other influenza viruses, 
that can give rise to a new viral strain which may have pandemic 
consequences (World Health Organization, 2005a, p.3). 
 
While influenza pandemics are infrequent events, they are rightly feared as 
they spread very rapidly to affect all countries and cause abrupt and 
significant increases in morbidity. Neither the timing, nor the severity of the 
next pandemic can be predicted, but severe pandemics in the past have 
resulted in tens of millions of deaths. Since the last pandemic in 1968-1969, 
the risk of an influenza pandemic has not been considered greater than at the 
present time (World Health Organization, 2005a, p.2).  
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Avian influenza is a highly infectious viral disease that can affect all species of 
birds. The avian influenza virus spreads through migratory birds, but what is 
most alarming is the concern that avian flu could become a possible 
pandemic. The severity of disease depends upon the strain and subtype of 
virus and the type of bird infected. There are three types of influenza virus: A, 
B, and C. Type A and B cause the most severe illness. Avian influenza is an 
infectious disease caused by type A strains of the influenza virus. Influenza A 
viruses can be divided into subtypes on the basis of their surface proteins - 
hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA). There are 16 known HA 
subtypes (H1-H16) and nine NA subtypes (N1-N9). Any number of 
combinations are possible, as each virus has one HA and one NA antigen 
(Canada Food Inspection Agency, 2006, p.1). 
 
The avian influenza virus can be grouped into two categories, based on the 
severity of the illness in birds. The Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) 
viruses have the potential to cause severe disease in poultry, associated with 
a high death rate (up to 100%); the course of such disease can be so rapid, 
the birds may die without showing signs of the disease. Infection with Low 
Pathogenic Avian Influenza (LPAI) viruses usually results in milder, less 
virulent disease. However, some LPAI viruses can mutate into highly 
pathogenic strains (Canada Food Inspection Agency, 2006, p.1). 
 
The current outbreak of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A (H5N1), which 
began in Southeast Asia in mid-2003, is the largest and most severe on 
record (World Health Organization, 2006a). Past influenza pandemics have 
led to high levels of illness, death, social disruption and economic loss. There 
were three pandemics in the 20th century; the Spanish flu (1918-1919), Asian 
flu (1957-1958), and Hong Kong flu (1968-69). All of them have spread 
worldwide within a year of being detected (Kamps & Reyes-Teran, 2006, p.2). 
 
The widespread persistence of H5N1 in bird populations poses two main risks 
to human health. The first is the risk of infection when the virus spreads 
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directly from birds to humans. The second risk, which is of even greater 
concern, is that there will be increased possibilities for the widely circulating 
virus to infect humans and possibly reassort into a strain that is both highly 
infectious for humans that may spread easily from human-to-human. The 
accumulation of point mutations or reassortment with a human influenza virus 
could lead to increased transmissibility of the virus at any time. Such a change 
could mark the start of a new pandemic (World Health Organization, 2006c, 
p.5). 
 
Direct or indirect contact between domestic flocks and wild migratory 
waterfowl has been implicated as a frequent cause of epidemics in poultry 
populations. It is generally accepted that migratory waterfowl, most notably 
wild ducks, are the natural reservoir of avian influenza viruses, which can be 
transmitted to domestic bird populations and to commercial poultry. In the 
absence of good surveillance and prompt control strategies, avian influenza 
epidemics can last for years (World Health Organization, 2006b, p5). 
 
Transmission of avian influenza viruses to people remains relatively rare and 
in most cases occurs as a result of direct contact with infected poultry or other 
birds or their faeces. Faecal material can contaminate dust, soil, water, feed, 
equipment, clothing and feathers. Transmission to people only occurs with 
certain strains of avian influenza (Hien, et al., 2004, p1179). Information about 
the current outbreaks of avian influenza is available on the World Health 
Organization’s website at: http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian/influenza/chro 
nology/en. 
 
The first human cases of avian influenza A (H5N1) associated with the current 
outbreak in birds were confirmed in January 2004, after clinical samples taken 
from two children and one adult admitted to a hospital in Hanoi (Vietnam) with 
severe respiratory illness tested positive for the strain (Hien, et al., 2004, 
p.1179). Since then, other human cases have occurred in several countries, 
and the clinical spectrum of the infection ranges from asymptomatic to a 
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severe disseminated disease (World Health Organization, 2005a). Updated 
information on affected countries can be obtained at http://www.who.int/csr/ 
disease/avian/influenza/country/en. 
 
According to the World Health Organization (2006d) there is evidence that the 
H5N1 strain of the bird flu virus - which has been circulating in birds - has a 
unique capacity to mutate and jump the species barrier causing a disease with 
high mortality in humans. The first priority - according to the World Health 
Organization - is to reduce opportunities for human exposure to the largest 
reservoir of the virus, viz, infected poultry. This is achieved through the rapid 
detection of poultry outbreaks and the emergency introduction of control 
measures, including the destruction of all infected or exposed poultry stock, 
and the proper disposal of carcasses.  
 
Normally, avian influenza viruses do not infect humans because of host 
barriers to infection, such as cell receptor specificities. However, they can 
occasionally cross the species barrier and directly infect humans, including 
highly pathogenic strains that have caused a fatal disease in humans (Webby 
& Webster, 2003, p.1519). In 1997, avian influenza A (H5N1) caused an 
outbreak in domestic poultry in Hong Kong and also infected humans, 
hospitalizing 18 people and causing six deaths (Yuen, Chan & Peiris, 1998, 
p.467; Chan, 2004, p.58). Since then, other avian influenza outbreaks, e.g. 
H9N2 in 1999, H7N2 in 2002, and H7N7 in 2003, have resulted in human 
infections (Horimoto & Kawaoka, 2005, p.591). 
 
 To date no cases of bird flu caused by the H5N1 strain have been reported in 
South Africa. However, since the first isolation of an avian influenza virus, 
strain H5N2, two recent infections or presence of the H5N2 avian influenza-
virus were detected in South Africa. Firstly, in August 2004, H5N2 avian 
influenza -virus was isolated on a farm in the Eastern Cape province and a 
second H5N2 outbreak during May 2006 in the Western Cape districts of 
Mossel Bay and Riversdale. According to the reports by the World Health 
 5 
Organization, the World Organization for Animal Health and the South African 
Institute for Communicable Diseases, the H5N2-virus poses almost no risk to 
humans as humans do not have receptors for the virus in their respiratory 
tract. It is not similar to the H5N1 – virus affecting parts of Asia, with 
unfortunate associated human deaths (Pienaar & Horner, 2005, p.8). 
  
According to the World Health Organization (2006c) the early containment of 
an emerging pandemic avian influenza virus represents an opportunity to stop 
or delay an event of predictably severe consequences for human health and 
the global economy, and this opportunity must be seized. At present, two 
primary strategies have been implemented for addressing the current avian 
influenza situation in an attempt to reduce a pandemic threat.  
 
The first strategy, which aims to reduce opportunities for a pandemic virus to 
emerge, consists of efforts to contain outbreaks of highly pathogenic H5N1 
avian influenza in poultry, prevent the spread of the disease to new countries, 
and thus reduce opportunities for human infections to occur. The prevention of 
high-risk behaviours is part of this strategy, as is the strengthening of an early 
warning system (World Health Organization, 2006e). 
 
The second strategy, which is being introduced in tandem with the above 
strategy, is to intensify the world’s preparedness to cope with a pandemic, 
both nationally and internationally. Activities taking place within this strategy 
include the formulation of national preparedness plans, improved access to 
antiviral drugs, the development of pandemic vaccines and of plans for 
increasing their accessibility and affordability, planning for implementation of 
public health measures to reduce morbidity and mortality, and the 
development of communication plans and messages to improve compliance 
with recommended measures and reduce social and economic disruption 
(World Health Organization, 2006e).  
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The control of avian influenza in South Africa is taking place via its health 
system which is based on the primary health care philosophy for health care 
service delivery. As advocated by the World Health Organization a single 
comprehensive, equitable and integrated national health system (NHS) was 
established in South Africa, which is based on national guidelines, priorities 
and standards. The organisational structure of the NHS is discussed in a 
publication by the National Department of Health namely A National Health 
Plan for South Africa (African National Congress, 1994). Since 1995, various 
documents have been produced to provide guidance and to assist in the 
implementation of the new health system in South Africa (Maarschalk, 2003). 
Documentation includes relevant legislation, articles in journals, newspapers, 
and other publications (such as the South African Health Review and Internet 
sources). 
 
From Section 1 of the National Health Act, 2004 (Act 61 of 2003), it can be 
deduced that the surveillance and prevention of communicable diseases is a 
function of environmental health practitioners at the municipal sphere of 
government. Responsibilities of Endemic Outbreak Response Teams at the 
different spheres of government in the event of a communicable disease 
outbreak are described from a national and provincial perspective in a 
document entitled Guidelines for outbreak response and epidemic 
management (National Department of Health, 2000). In order to assist 
countries in their national preparedness plans, the World Health Organization 
prepared a generic outline document entitled Preparing Influenza Pandemic 
Preparedness Plans: A Step – by Step Approach (World Health Organization, 
2005c). 
 
The surveillance and a summary of reporting requirements of avian influenza 
can be found in a document entitled World Health Organization guidelines for 
global surveillance of influenza A/H5 (World Health Organization, 2005b). The 
aim of this document is to monitor the spread of influenza A/H5 viruses in 
human and animal populations in order to assess the global trend of the 
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disease, the public health risk it poses, its pandemic potential, and to trigger 
public health actions for pandemic preparedness as specified in the Influenza 
Pandemic Preparedness Plan. The World Health Organization guidelines for 
global surveillance of influenza A/H5 are available at: http://www.who.int/csr/ 
disease/avian/influenza/guidelines/globalsurveillance/en/. 
 
The epidemiology of avian influenza is described in a document entitled Avian 
Influenza which deals with comprehensive information on pathogenesis, 
microbiology, epidemiology, diagnosis, new cases around the world, possible 
treatment strategies and numerous other information on avian influenza 
(Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy, 2006). 
 
According to Doty (1989, p.86), work methods should be developed so that a 
task can be performed in the shortest possible time, with the greatest possible 
ease and with the most possible satisfaction to the operator. The revision and 
analysis of work methods and - procedures are discussed in a book entitled 
Public administration and management: A guide to central, regional and 
municipal administration and management (Botes, Brynard, Fourie, & Roux, 
1996). The need for formal work - procedures is sufficiently illustrated in a 
publication by Cloete (1993), namely Administration and management of 
health services. The development of work - procedures and the factors that 
inhibit the revision thereof is discussed in Public Administration and 
Management (Cloete, 1996). Furthermore, a study of work procedure and 
methods for medical practitioners is discussed by Andrews (1990) in Medical 
practitioners and nursing professionals as public managers. 
 
The development of work methods and - procedures for environmental health 
practitioners is discussed by Maarschalk (2003) in A conceptual framework for 
the development of a South African environmental health information system 
for decision – making. Procedures for public health officials for the control of 
avian influenza can be found in a document entitled Avian influenza, including 
Influenza A (H5N1), in Humans: World Health Organization Interim Infection 
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Control Guideline for Health Care Facilities (World Health Organization, 
2006a).The next section presents the problem statement. 
 
1.2. Problem statement 
The National Department of Health has developed avian influenza guidelines 
(Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Plan of January 2006) to be used by the 
Provincial Health Departments and municipalities to develop their individual 
surveillance and control strategies. To date, none of the provinces and 
municipalities has developed detailed environmental health work methods and 
- procedures within their areas of jurisdiction. This study will attempt to 
develop the said work methods and - procedures to be used by environmental 
health practitioners within the municipal sphere of government in the Eastern 
Cape province - South Africa.  
 
1.2.1. Sub problems 
 In order to effectively address the above, three sub problems have been 
 identified. These are explained below.  
 
1.2.1.1. The organisational arrangements for avian influenza surveillance and 
control in South Africa.  
In terms of Section 1 of the National Health Act, 2004 (Act 61 of 2003), avian 
influenza surveillance and control can be regarded as a function of 
environmental health practitioners in the municipal sphere of government. 
Since there are a number of role-players in the national, provincial and 
municipal spheres whose decisions may influence the efficiency and / or 
effectivity of avian influenza surveillance and control, it becomes necessary to 
critically analyse the organisational arrangements for avian influenza 
surveillance and control in South Africa. This analysis will enable the 
identification of   inadequacies / weaknesses and the making of appropriate 
recommendations. 
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1.2.1.2. The epidemiology of avian influenza 
The surveillance and control of a disease is dependent on its epidemiology. It 
is therefore important, when attempts are made to develop or improve existing 
work methods and - procedures, to have a thorough knowledge of the 
epidemiology of the disease. A thorough literature study on avian influenza as 
a disease was therefore necessary. 
 
1.2.1.3. Work methods and - procedures for the surveillance and control of avian 
 influenza. 
As mentioned above, the National Department of Health has developed 
national avian Influenza surveillance and control guidelines. These guidelines 
are based on the World Health Organization’s template which must be 
customized by member countries. Neither the World Health Organization’s 
guidelines, nor that of the National Department of Health provides detailed 
work methods and - procedures on how to conduct the surveys. They also do 
not provide details on functional / practical control strategies or activities to be 
performed at the national, provincial and municipal spheres of government 
once an outbreak of avian influenza occurs. The implication of this situation is 
that each province and municipality will develop their own work methods and -
procedures on how to conduct the surveys and control strategies. As a result, 
it would be impossible to consolidate relevant data within any of the three 
spheres of government because the data would not be valid (Cloete, 1993). 
 
From the above it can be concluded that the work methods and - procedures 
for avian influenza surveillance and control must be exactly the same within 
each of the nine provinces for valid decisions to be made. With this study an 
attempt will be made to develop a standardised set of environmental health 
work methods and - procedures for the surveillance and control of avian 
influenza in the Eastern Cape province – South Africa. Other provinces should 
be able to use the results of this study during the development of their work 
methods and - procedures for the surveillance and control of avian influenza 
within their provinces and municipalities. 
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1.3. Purpose of the study 
The general purpose of this study is to develop a standardised set of 
environmental health work methods and - procedures, which will contribute to 
effective avian influenza surveillance and control. More specifically the 
purpose of this study is to: 
  
• Firstly, analyse the national health care system with specific reference to 
the place and role of environmental health practitioners at national, 
provincial and municipal spheres – in relation to avian influenza 
surveillance and control - with the purpose to identify inadequacies and to 
make appropriate recommendations;  
• Secondly, analyse and describe the epidemiology of avian influenza, with 
focus on the distribution and characteristics of the disease in South Africa 
as a prerequisite for the development of formal work methods and -
procedures for the surveillance and control of the disease; and 
• Thirdly, to analyse relevant research that have been done globally and to 
use it, against the background of the above, to scientifically develop work 
methods and - procedures to be used by environmental health 
practitioners during the surveillance and control of avian influenza in the 
Eastern Cape province – South Africa. 
In the next section the significance of the study will be addressed. 
 
1.4.  The significance of the study 
The development of formal work methods and - procedures for avian influenza 
surveillance and control by environmental health practitioners is important 
because it gives legality and legitimacy to the actions of environmental health 
practitioners. The particular work methods and - procedures to be developed 
will compel environmental health practitioners to unite their efforts and work in 
an organised manner. It should also ensure that everyone co-operates in 
attaining set objectives (Maarschalk, 2003, p.10). The formal work methods 
and - procedures to be developed will make the actions of environmental 
health practitioners lawful and legal. It will also eliminate confusion amongst 
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future avian influenza surveillance and control personnel and make the 
actions of environmental health practitioners more purposeful and facilitate 
goal directed training (Maarschalk, 2003; Botes, et al., 1996; Cloete, 1996). 
Formal work methods and - procedures will enable the different spheres of 
government to integrate their data and to make information available from a 
local municipal, health sub-district, health district, provincial and national 
perspective. 
 
From the above it can be deduced that it is important for every country to have 
effective avian influenza surveillance and control strategies in place. The 
results of this study will contribute to a comprehensive knowledge of avian 
influenza surveillance and control from an Eastern Cape provincial 
perspective. 
      
1.5. Theoretical framework  
According to Henning, Rensburg and Smit, (2004, p.7), research cannot be 
conducted in a theoretical vacuum, even though it may be exploratory. Social 
scientists achieve their position by virtue of their knowledge of what the field 
has to offer in terms of its theory – including its methodological theory. When 
a researcher sets out to investigate an issue he does so from a position of 
knowledge, and this knowledge can frame his inquiry. 
 
Knowledge is constructed not only by observable phenomena, but also by 
descriptions of people’s intentions, beliefs, values and reasons, meaning 
making and self – understanding. Interpretive knowledge is dispersed and 
distributed. The researcher has to look at different places and at different 
things in order to understand phenomenon. That is why interpretivist research 
is a communal process, informed by participating practitioners and scrutinised 
and /or endorsed by others. Phenomena and events are understood through 
mental processes of interpretation, which are influenced by and interact with 
social contexts. The type of knowledge frameworks that drive society, also 
known as its discourse, become key role players in the interpretive project.  
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These “knowledge systems” are interrogated by the interpretive researcher 
who analyses texts to look for the way in which people make meaning in their 
lives. Thus, the interpretive researcher looks for the frames that shape the 
meaning. It thus holds that researchers in this paradigm are extremely 
sensitive to the role of context (Henning, et al., 2004, p.20).              
 
This research is situated within an interpretivist research paradigm with its 
emphasis on experience and interpretation. Interpretive research is 
fundamentally concerned with the meaning and it seeks to understand a 
social member’s definitions and understanding of situations. It seeks to 
produce descriptive analysis that emphasises a deep, interpretive 
understanding of social phenomena (Henning, et al., 2004, p.12). This ties in 
with the focus of the proposed research, as its purpose is to gain a deep level 
of understanding of the perceptions of a specific group of environmental 
health managers, environmental health practitioners and other role players in 
the multisectoral communicable disease outbreak response teams in South 
Africa. More specifically, the research focuses on the understanding of 
individual participant’s experience and perceptions of their professional roles 
as experienced in their day to day working environment, from the standpoint 
of their unique contexts and backgrounds.  
 
The foundational assumption of interpretivists is that most of our knowledge is 
gained, or at least filtered, through social constructions such as language, 
consciousness, shared meanings, documents and other artefacts.  
Interpretive research attempts to understand phenomena through the 
meanings that people assign to them (Trauth, 2001, p.219). The verbs 
“understand” and “construct” assume an interpretivist/constructivist theoretical 
paradigm (Henning, 2004, p.19). This description ties in with the intentions of 
the researcher to make inferences based on the data that will precipitate from 
the study and to construct goal orientated work methods and - procedures for 
the surveillance and control of avian influenza in the Eastern Cape province. 
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In the next section the research methodology and design of the study will be 
addressed. 
 
1.6. Research methodology and design 
Research methodology refers to the overall approach to the research process, 
from the theoretical underpinning to the collection and analysis of data (Collis 
& Hussey, 2003, p.55). A research method consists of the systematic, 
methodological and accurate execution of the research design (Babbie & 
Mouton, 2002, p.74). 
 
According to Punch (2000, p.52), research design is the basic plan for 
research that shows how the research question will be connected to the data, 
and what tools and procedures will be used in answering them. In the 
following sections the research method and research design for this study are 
outlined.  
 
1.6.1. Research methodology 
In actualizing the proposed study the researcher will make use of qualitative 
research methods. Qualitative research is typically used to answer questions 
about the complex nature of phenomena, often with the purpose of describing 
and understanding the phenomena from the participant’s point of view (Leedy 
& Ormrod, 2005, p.94). A qualitative researcher seeks to establish the 
meaning of the phenomenon from the views of participants. The qualitative 
researcher collects data on an instrument or gathers information on a 
behavioral checklist (Creswell, 2003, p.17). Creswell (2003, p.182) argued 
that qualitative research is fundamentally interpretive. This means that the 
researcher makes interpretations of the data and then draws conclusions 
about its meaning, personally and theoretically. 
 
Leedy and Ormrod (2005, pp.134 – 135) state that qualitative research 
comprises the following characteristics, namely description, interpretation, 
verification and evaluation. In order to conduct and complete this study, the 
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researcher will describe and explain the nature of avian influenza (study and 
analyse relevant information from documents and interviews) and finally draw 
conclusions in a strategy to develop work methods and - procedures for avian 
influenza surveillance and control by environmental health practitioners in the 
Eastern Cape province. The researcher will, on completion of the study, send 
a copy to the participants for verification and evaluation until saturation 
occurs. This study will thus be based on a qualitative research approach. 
 
1.6.2. Research design  
Within the context of the purpose of this study, which is to develop 
environmental health work methods and - procedures for the surveillance and 
control of avian influenza in the Eastern Cape province, an explorative, 
descriptive, inductive and deductive research design will be used. In the 
following sections these designs are briefly discussed. 
 
1.6.2.1. Exploratory research 
Exploratory research is done when few or no earlier studies were done which 
may serve as a source of verification of data (Collis & Hussey 2003, p.11). 
According to Silverman (2000, p.9), exploratory research is used to make 
preliminary investigations into relatively unknown areas of research. The topic 
of this research is relatively new and there is a lack of previous research, thus 
it conforms to the characteristics of an exploratory study. 
 
1.6.2.2. Descriptive research 
Descriptive research is research that describes phenomena, as they exist. It is 
used to identify and obtain information on the characteristics of a particular 
problem or issue (Collis & Hussey, 2003, p.11). The aim of descriptive 
research is attempting to describe a subject, often by creating a profile of a 
group of problems, people or events (Blumberg, Cooper & Schindler, 2005, 
p.10). Descriptive research can be qualitative or quantitative in nature. In 
qualitative research, according to Rubin and Babbie (2001, p.1125), 
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descriptive research refers to a more intensive examination of phenomena 
and their deeper meanings. 
 
In this study, the researcher will describe the current strategy for avian 
influenza surveillance and control in the Eastern Cape province, including a 
description of the organisational structure of the national health system and 
the epidemiology of avian influenza. The work methods and - procedures in 
relation to avian influenza surveillance and control that will be developed will 
also be described. This study will therefore also comply with the 
characteristics of descriptive research. 
 
1.6.2.3. Inductive research 
Scientific research can be divided into two categories, namely inductive and 
deductive. Inductive research reflects a reasoning process in which a theory is 
developed from observation of empirical reality. In addition, the empirical 
observations can be based on personal experience (Lancaster, 2005, p.25). 
According to Collis and Hussey (2003, p.15), inductive research involves 
moving from individual observation statements to general patterns or laws. It 
is also referred to as moving from the specific to the general. 
 
Lancaster (2005, pp.25 -26) argued that inductive research is better suited for 
qualitative data. Inductive research and investigations begin from a 
description or observation and then move towards explanation. In this study, 
relevant conditions / situations within the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
Municipality (the only Category A municipality in the Eastern Cape province) 
and two of the six District (Category C) Municipalities will be analysed as 
specific cases in an attempt to explain the general conditions of other 
municipalities in the Eastern Cape province. For example, the organisational 
structure of the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and two of the six 
District (Category C) Municipalities will be described as a model of the 
organisational structure in the municipal sphere of government regarding the 
surveillance and control of avian influenza. Furthermore, the researcher will 
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draw conclusions on the problems investigated from the qualitative data 
collected. An inductive research approach is thus appropriate for this study. 
 
1.6.2.4. Deductive research 
According to Lancaster (2005, p.22), deductive research develops theories or 
hypotheses and then tests the theories or hypotheses through empirical 
observation. For this reason, the deductive research method is referred to as 
moving from the general to a particular (Collis & Hussey, 2003, p.25). During 
this study, general theories and measures for communicable diseases 
prevention will be used to develop work methods and - procedures for the 
surveillance and control of avian influenza. The deductive research method is 
therefore also applicable to this study. In the following section, the study 
population will be highlighted. 
 
1.6.3. Study population 
According to Polit and Hungler (1993, p.173) a research population is the 
entire aggregation of cases that meets a designated set of criteria. The 
research population for this study will comprise the two groups as explained 
below. The reasons for the selection of the two groups are given under the 
section dealing with sampling (see section 1.6.4). 
 
• Group 1: The nine Provincial Communicable Disease Outbreak Control 
   Co-ordinators (a group of experts); and 
• Group 2: Managerial and line function personnel from two of the six District 
 (Category C) Municipalities and the only Metropolitan (Category 
 A) Municipality in the Eastern Cape province. 
 
1.6.4. Sampling  
Cormack (2002, p.263) refers to a sample as a group of people that a 
researcher selects about whom information will be collected.  According to 
Paton (1990) in Holloway and Wheeler (2002, p.122), the sampling strategies 
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of the qualitative researcher are guided by the underlying principles of gaining 
rich, in depth information. 
 
The purposive sampling technique will be utilised in this study. According to 
Parahoo (1997, p.232) this method of sampling involves the researcher 
deliberately choosing participants to include in the study on the basis that 
those selected can provide the necessary information. Holloway and Wheeler 
(2002, p.122) state that selection of participants is criterion based, that is that 
certain criteria are applied and a sample is chosen accordingly. The selection 
criteria of the two groups (also referred to as the sample groups) are 
discussed below: 
 
Group 1 
The Provincial Communicable Disease Outbreak Control Co-ordinators 
of the nine provinces in South Africa (group of experts): 
These members are selected on the basis of their strategic positioning and 
roles that they fulfill. In order to respond appropriately to disease outbreaks, a 
Provincial Communicable Disease Outbreak Response Co-ordinator has been 
appointed for each of the nine provinces (National Department of Health, 
2000). Their role includes the co-ordination of all activities, the organisation of 
team members as well as the co-ordination of communication to the local, 
national, and international media. Group 1 will take part in the study as a 
group of experts as discussed in sections 1.6.5.2 and 1.6.5.3. 
 
Group 2 
Managerial and line function personnel from two of the six District 
(Category C) Municipalities and the only Metropolitan (Category A) 
Municipality in the Eastern Cape province: 
In order to obtain additional information (information such as the 
organisational structure of the health care system, the current status of Local 
Outbreak Response Teams, functional and managerial problems, semi-
structured personal interviews with relevant role-players in the municipal 
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sphere of government will be conducted, namely with managerial and line 
function personnel from two of the six District (Category C) Municipalities and 
managerial and line function personnel from the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
(Category A) Municipality in the Eastern Cape province. With the semi-
structured interviews the researcher will have a set of predetermined open-
ended questions on an interview schedule (De Vos, Strydom, Fouché & 
Delport, 2002, p. 302).  
 
1.6.5. Data collection  
Qualitative research uses multiple methods that are interactive and humanistic 
(Creswell, 2003, p.181). The actual methods of data collection for this study 
will be based on the traditional qualitative research methods, namely 
documentary research and interviews. The following paragraphs describe 
these methods. 
 
1.6.5.1. Documentary research 
Documentary research is a basic method for qualitative data collection 
(Creswell, 2003, p.188). Documentary studies refer to documents that are 
being studied and analysed for the purpose of scientific research (De Vos, et 
al., 2002, p.322). For some research projects, the focus of data collection can 
be fully on documentary research (Blaxter, Hughes & Tight, 2001, p.167). 
McCulloch (2005, p.4) argued that social scientists had largely neglected and 
ignored the use of documentary research in recent years. 
 
When documentary sources are studied, it is of cardinal importance that the 
researcher evaluates the documents by the criterion of usefulness, namely 
authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning (Denscombe, 2003, 
p.220; May, 2001, p.190). To conduct documentary research, the researcher 
can collect data from the following sources: government legislation, 
government publications, official statistics, other national and international 
publications (Daly, Kellehear & Gliksman, 1997, pp. 132 – 134). 
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1.6.5.2. Group of experts 
According to Marshall and Rossman (1999, p.113) an elite interview (semi-
structure interview) is a specialized type of interview. ”Elite” individuals are 
those considered to be influential, prominent, and /or well informed people in 
an organization or community; they are selected for interviews on the basis of 
their expertise in areas relevant to the research.  
  
According to De Vos, et al., (2002, p.311) a group of experts have a high level 
of knowledge in a particular field. This "expert panel" is often used in 
forecasting the future and other concepts that require the involvement of 
knowledgeable individuals (Rezabek, 2000, p.1). 
 
 In general, a group of experts are usually used in one of three ways. Morgan 
(1997, p.2), states that: 
• Firstly, they are used as a self contained method in studies in which they 
serve as the principal source of data; 
• Secondly, they are used as a supplementary source of data in studies that 
rely on some other primary method such as a survey; and 
• Thirdly, they are used in multimethod studies that combine two or more 
means of data gathering in which no one primary method determines the 
use of the others.  
 
The information gathered from the group of experts in this study forms part of 
a multimethod data gathering strategy. In this way, the group of experts will 
not stand alone, but contribute substantially to the methods of documentary 
research and in depth personal interviews that will be used in the study. The 
researcher will use questions on a telephonic interview schedule to obtain the 
relevant information from the participants in the group of experts that 
comprises of the Provincial Communicable Disease Outbreak Control Co-
ordinators of the nine provinces in South Africa. The motivation for using a 
telephonic questionnaire is discussed in the next section. 
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1.6.5.3. Telephonic questionnaire 
The New Dictionary of Social Work (1995, p.51) defines a telephonic 
questionnaire as a set of questions on a form which is completed by the 
respondent in respect of a research project. The telephonic questionnaire can 
be open ended or closed ended (De Vos, et al., 2002, p.172). Marshall and 
Rossman (1999, p.24) contends that the questionnaire must first be 
scrutinised for bias, sequence, clarity, and face validity. Questionnaires are 
usually tested through the administration to small groups to determine their 
usefulness and reliability. The researcher will first test the usefulness of the 
telephonic questionnaire in a pilot study by sending the questionnaire to two 
Environmental Health Practitioners in the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
Municipality for scrutiny before using it in the expert group.  
 
The purpose for using a telephonic questionnaire for participants in the group 
of experts is to draw on their knowledge and experience of communicable 
disease surveillance and control in relation to avian influenza as well as their 
views on the role of the Environmental Health Practitioners in the 
Communicable Disease Outbreak Response Teams in the three spheres of 
government. Letters will be written to the employers of the nine provincial 
outbreak coordinators to ask permission to conduct telephonic interviews with 
the participants (see Annexure One). After confirmation, the researcher will 
phone the participants to arrange with them an appropriate time to conduct 
the telephonic interviews. The questions on the telephonic questionnaire are 
listed in Annexure Two. In Annexure Three the analysis of the data obtained 
during the telephonic interviews are presented. 
 
1.6.5.4.  Personal interviews with managerial and line function personnel from 
two of the six district (Category C) municipalities and the only 
metropolitan (Category A) municipality in the Eastern Cape province 
Interviews are reflective and powerful ways of accessing people's perceptions, 
meanings, definitions of situations and constructions of reality (Punch, 2005, 
p. 168). The interview is one of the main data collection methods in qualitative 
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research. In qualitative research, the inquirer seeks to examine an issue 
related to opinions of individuals whom are interviewed to determine how they 
have personally experienced phenomena (Creswell, 2003, p.21). Interviews 
can be classified into three types, namely structured, semi-structured 
(focused) and unstructured (May, 2001, pp.121-126)  
 
The semi-structured interview is designed to be focused in terms of topics and 
yet is flexible in that it is possible to steer questions into areas that appear 
promising from the point of view of providing rich data and additional insight 
(Lancaster, 2005, p.134). The researcher uses semi-structured interviews to 
gain detailed information of a participant's beliefs about a particular topic. This 
interview technique gives the researcher and the participant much more 
flexibility (De Vos, et al., 2002. p.302). 
 
With semi-structured interviews the researcher will have a set of 
predetermined and open-ended questions on an interview schedule (De Vos, 
et al., 2002, p.302). According to (Holloway and Wheeler, 2002, p.81) 
unstructured interviews start with a general question in the broad study area.  
 
In order to obtain additional information (information such as the 
organisational structure of the health care system in the Eastern Cape 
province, the current status of Avian Influenza Outbreak Response Teams, 
functional and managerial problems), semi-structured personal interviews with 
relevant role-players in the municipal sphere of government will be conducted, 
namely with managerial and line function personnel from two of the six District 
(Category C) Municipalities (Ukhahlamba District Municipality and Cacadu 
District Municipality) and managerial and line function personnel from the 
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan (Category A) Municipality in the Eastern Cape 
province. With semi-structured interviews the researcher will have a set of 
predetermined open-ended questions on an interview schedule (De Vos, et 
al., 2002, p. 302). The questions on the personal interview schedule can be 
found in Annexure Four. Not every question needs to be asked and a 
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participant can choose which question he/she wishes to answer at a specific 
time. A participant is thus allowed a key role in determining how the interview 
proceeds (De Vos, et al., 2002, p.303).  
 
The researcher will inform the participants that the interviews will be on site, at 
their respective offices. Permission will be asked from the participants to use a 
tape recorder to record the interviews prior to interviewing. This will enable the 
researcher to record the exact words of the interview, inclusive of questions 
so that he does not forget important answers and words and can have eye 
contact and pay attention to what participants say. Each recording will be 
dated and labelled. The researcher will make contextual and field notes during 
the interviews (Holloway & Wheeler, 2002, p.87). According to Polit and 
Hungler (1993, p.216) it is essential for the researcher to record observations 
while still in the process of collecting information since memory failures are 
bound to occur if there is too long a delay. These notes will complement the 
interviews. 
  
1.6.6. Entry to workplaces of participants 
Formal permission is important in any research and protects both the 
researchers and participants. Access is sought in various ways (Holloway & 
Wheeler, 2002, p.38). Researchers negotiate with “gatekeepers”, the people 
who have the power to grant or withhold access to the setting. Researchers 
should not only ask the person directly in charge but also others who hold the 
power to start and stop the research (Holloway & Wheeler, 2002, p.40).  
 
According to Halloway and Wheeler (2002, p.40) all gatekeepers have the 
power and control of access, but those at the top of the hierarchy are most 
powerful and should be asked first because they can restrict access even if 
everybody else agrees. The gatekeepers in this study will include the 
Municipal Managers in the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality, 
Ukhahlamba District Municipality and Cacadu District Municipality. Letters will 
be written to the Municipal Managers to ask permission to conduct interviews 
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with managerial and line function personnel that are responsible for avian 
influenza surveillance and control (see Annexure Five). 
 
1.6.7. Data analysis 
Data analysis is referred to as the process of bringing order, structure and 
meaning to the mass of collected data (De Vos, et al., 2002, p.339). The 
researcher is the human instrument in a qualitative research design. The 
process of qualitative data analysis will be based on data reduction and 
interpretation (Creswell, 2003, pp.143-144). Qualitative data analysis will be 
conducted simultaneously with data collection, data interpretation and 
narrative report writing. Rossman and Rallis (2003, p.24) believe that 
qualitative data analysis is an ongoing process involving continual reflection 
about the data, asking analytical questions and writing memos throughout the 
study. Data analysis is therefore not separated from other activities in the 
process, such as data collection and writing of the results (Creswell, 2003, p. 
190). 
 
Qualitative research produces a large volume of data in a variety of formats, 
such as fieldwork notes and observations, transcripts from interviews and 
documents. Miles and Huberman (1994, p.12) developed an interactive data 
analysis model, which comprises three main components, namely data 
reduction, data display and drawing and verifying conclusions. These three 
components are interwoven and concurrent throughout the data analysis 
process, which involves three main operations: coding, memoing and 
developing propositions (Punch, 2005, pp.197-199). 
 
Creswell (1998, pp.142-165) believes that the process of qualitative data 
analysis and interpretation can be represented in analytical circles rather than 
using a fixed liner approach. The coding process and data analysis will be 
conducted according to the steps suggested by Tesch (1990) in Cresswell 
(2003, p.192) and can be summarized as follows: 
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• Get a sense of the whole. Read all the transcripts carefully and make short 
notes; 
• Pick one document at a time, go through it and try to make meaning of its 
contents, write notes in the margin; 
• When this action has been completed for several documents, make a list 
of all the topics. Cluster similar ones together and list them into columns 
that can be arranged as major topics, unique topics and leftovers; 
• Take the list and go back to the data. Abbreviate the topics as codes and 
write the codes next to the appropriate segments of the text to see whether 
new categories and codes emerge; 
• Find the most descriptive wording for the topics and turn them into 
categories; 
• Reduce the total list of categories by grouping topics that relate to each 
other; 
• Lines could be drawn between categories to show interrelationships; 
• Make a final decision on the abbreviation for each category and arrange 
these categories alphabetically; 
• Assemble the data material belonging to each category in one place and 
perform a preliminary analysis; and 
• Re-code existing data if necessary. 
 
These theoretical guidelines will be used as a general guideline for the 
analysis of the raw data from the study, which will be transcripts from recorded 
in-depth interviews of participants. Transcripts of raw data will be handed over 
to an independent coder together with a guide for data analysis procedure. A 
consensus meeting between the researcher and the independent coder will 
follow. The following section addresses the trustworthiness of the study. 
 
1.7. Trustworthiness 
Trustworthiness represents the measures built into the process of research by 
the researcher to ensure that the study is valid and the results are reliable. 
Lincoln and Guba (1985, p. 290) used the “trustworthiness model” to refer to 
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the criteria of high quality research. Lincoln and Guba’s model comprises four 
aspects that reflect the assumptions of qualitative research, namely credibility, 
transferability, dependability and confirmability. The trustworthiness of this 
study in terms of Lincoln and Guba’s model is discussed below. 
 
1.7.1. Credibility 
Credibility is the internal validity, in which the goal is to demonstrate that the 
inquiry was conducted in such a manner to ensure that the subject was 
accurately identified and described (De Vos, et al., 2002, p.351). According to 
Krefting (1991, pp.215-217), strategies to ensure credibility include the 
authority of the researcher, field experiences, interview techniques, member 
checking, peer examination, reflexivity and structural coherence. 
 
In this study, data will be collected mainly from authoritative documents such 
as formal publications from the World Health Organization and governmental 
publications. The different interview techniques will enhance the credibility of 
the study. The supervisor, an expert in this field, will also monitor the 
credibility of the research. 
 
1.7.2. Transferability 
Transferability is the external validity and refers to the degree or extent to 
which the findings of research data can be transferred to other groups other 
than the original study (De Vos et al., 2002, p.352). According to De Vos 
(2002, p.352), the strategy of triangulating multiple sources of data can 
enhance a study’s transferability. This means that designing a research in 
which multiple cases, multiple informants or more than one data collecting 
method that are employed can strengthen the study’s usefulness for other 
settings. In this study, the strategy of triangulating multiple resources for data 
as discussed earlier (see sections 1.6.5.1, 1.6.5.2, 1.6.5.3 and 1.6.5.4) will be 
used to strengthen its transferability. 
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1.7.3. Dependability 
Dependability is the alternative to reliability, and is the criterion for 
consistency. This refers to the researcher attempting to account for the 
changing conditions to the chosen research phenomenon and the changes in 
design (De Vos et al., 2003, p.352). Strategies to ensure dependability in this 
study will be a dense description of research methods and triangulation 
(Krefting, 1991, p.217). 
 
1.7.4. Confirmability 
Confirmability refers to the objectivity or neutrality of the research (De Vos et 
al., 2002, p.352; Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p.209). This means that no prejudice 
is evident in the research process and results. According to Krefting (1991, p. 
217), strategies to ensure confirmability include confirmability audit, 
triangulation and reflexivity. Both the research process and research results 
will be audited by the supervisor, independent coder and experts in this field 
to ensure the confirmability of the study. 
 
1.8. Ethical considerations 
According to Marshall and Rossman (1999, p.90), the qualities that make a 
successful researcher are revealed through the exquisite sensitivity to the 
ethical issues present when we engage in any moral act. Ethical 
considerations are generic – informed consent and protecting participant’s 
anonymity – as well as situation specific. Kvale (1996, pp.109-118) adds that 
respondents must be fully informed as to what is going to happen to the 
information after recording. 
 
This study will not harm the environment, humans or animals because no 
experiments or trials are involved. Informed consent will be obtained from the 
participants prior to the start of the study (see Annexure Six). The participants, 
who are adult professionals, will be informed as to what will happen with the 
results throughout the study. Ethics approval from the Nelson Mandela 
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Metropolitan University Ethics Committee will therefore not be necessary 
(Maarschalk, personal communication, August 28, 2006). 
 
1.9. Pilot study 
A pilot study is defined as the process whereby the research design for a 
prospective survey is tested. The pilot study can be regarded as a small scale 
trial run of all the aspects planned for use in the main inquiry (De Vos et al., 
2002, p. 211). According to De Vos, et al., (220, pp. 211-215), a pilot study 
involves four aspects, namely literature study, interviews with experts, 
exploring the actual research area and intensive study of strategic units. A 
literature study will be conducted by the researcher and monitored by the 
supervisor to ensure that the findings and results of the study will meet the 
purpose of the study. Furthermore, the telephonic and personal interview 
schedules will be tested with a participant who is in the employment of the 
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality as to ensure that the right 
questions are being asked. Modifications to the telephonic and personal 
interview schedules will be made if necessary. 
 
1.10. Plan of the study 
The study is divided into six chapters, namely: 
• Chapter 1: Introduction;  
• Chapter 2: Avian influenza: The place and role of Environmental Health in 
 the national, provincial and municipal spheres of  government; 
• Chapter 3: The epidemiology of avian influenza;  
• Chapter 4: Work methods and - procedures for the surveillance of avian 
 Influenza;  
• Chapter 5: Work methods and - procedures for the control of avian 
 Influenza; and 
• Chapter 6: Conclusion and recommendations. 
 
In Chapter One a thorough literature review of the study is presented. The 
problem and sub-problem statements of the study are also presented in this 
 28 
chapter. This is followed by an explanation of the purpose, significance and 
theoretical framework of the study. Furthermore, the research design and 
methodology to be adopted for the study are explained and motivated. Also 
identified and discussed are the measures for trustworthiness and ethical 
considerations.  
 
In Chapter Two an attempt is made to define Environmental Health, to 
identify the functional areas of the environmental health profession and to 
identify the professional regulatory framework and requirements of the 
profession. Furthermore, the national health care system in South Africa is 
analysed with specific reference to the place and role of environmental health, 
as well as that of other role players within the health care system whose 
decisions may have an influence on the effectiveness of environmental health 
service delivery. The said organisational structure is discussed from a 
national, provincial and municipal perspective. Regulatory documentation 
relevant to avian influenza surveillance and control are also introduced and 
discussed. 
 
Chapter Three provides a comprehensive discussion of the influenza virus, 
with specific references to the epidemiology of the virus and the mechanisms 
of variability. Also explained are the difference between human seasonal 
influenza, avian influenza and human pandemic influenza. The different 
sources and transmission methods of avian influenza in birds and humans are 
identified and discussed. Furthermore described are the incidences of the 
avian influenza in South Africa and in the rest if the world. Lastly addressed in 
Chapter Three is the risk of an avian influenza pandemic. 
 
Chapter Four deals with work methods and - procedures for avian influenza 
surveillance. The basic principles of avian influenza surveillance are explained 
from a public health surveillance perspective. In this chapter work methods 
and - procedures for human case surveillance are discussed from four 
perspectives, namely case detection, notifiable disease reporting, the 
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investigation of an avian influenza outbreak and case confirmation. Also 
discussed in this chapter are work methods and - procedures for bird 
surveillance from four perspectives, namely the early detection of avian 
influenza amongst birds, clinical surveillance, serological surveillance and 
virological surveillance. 
 
Chapter Five focuses on work methods and - procedures for the control of 
avian influenza. In this chapter avian influenza control is discussed from four 
perspectives, namely basic strategies for avian influenza control; control 
strategies for avian influenza in humans; control strategies for avian influenza 
in birds and the role of Avian Influenza Endemic Outbreak Response Teams. 
This chapter also focuses on the place and role of environmental health 
practitioners in the national, provincial, district and sub-district communicable 
disease outbreak response teams. 
 
Chapter Six presents a conclusion with emphasis on the findings of the study. 
Appropriate recommendations are also made.  
 
1.11. Clarification of key concepts 
According to Garbers (1996, p.290) the multiplicity of interpretations of 
concepts in the human sciences necessitates that the main concepts be 
clarified in research. In the following sections theoretical definitions and 
explanations are given for the key concepts as used during this study. 
 
1.11.1. Municipal health services  
In terms of Section 1 of the National Health Act, 2004 (Act 61 of 2003), 
municipal health services include the following: 
• Water quality monitoring; 
• Food control; 
• Waste management; 
• Health surveillance of premises; 
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• Surveillance and prevention of communicable diseases, excluding 
immunisations; 
• Vector control; 
• Environmental pollution control; 
• Disposal of the dead;  
• Chemical safety, 
but excludes port health, malaria control and control of hazardous substances. 
Avian influenza surveillance and control is an activity under the services: 
surveillance and prevention of communicable diseases (see bullet five above). 
 
1.11.2. Avian influenza 
Avian influenza, also called fowl plague, avian flu and bird flu, is a highly 
contagious viral disease with up to 100% mortality in domestic fowl. The 
disease is caused by the influenza A virus, subtypes H5 and H7. All types of 
birds are susceptible to the virus but outbreaks occur most often in chickens 
and turkeys. The infection may be brought by migratory wild birds, which can 
carry the virus without showing any signs of the disease. Type A influenza 
viruses can infect several animal species aside from birds, including pigs, 
horses, seals and whales. Birds are an especially important species because 
all known subtypes of influenza A viruses circulate among wild birds, which 
are the natural hosts for influenza A viruses (Center for Infectious Disease 
Research and Policy, 2006). 
 
1.11.3. A human avian influenza outbreak 
A disease outbreak is referred to as an epidemic that is limited to a localized 
increase in the incidents of a disease (World Health Organization, 1999, p. 
150). According to Connolly (2005, p.107), a disease outbreak is defined as 
the occurrence of a number of cases that is unusually large or unexpected for 
a given place and time. In this study, a human avian influenza outbreak can 
be defined as a sudden occurrence of one or more confirmed human cases 
within a specific geographic area. 
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1.11.4 Avian influenza surveillance 
The World Health Organization (1999) defines surveillance as the systematic 
ongoing collection, collation and analysis of data and the timely dissemination 
of public health information for assessment and action as necessary. 
Surveillance is also defined as the process of systematic collection, orderly 
consolidation and evaluation of pertinent data with prompt dissemination of 
the results to those who need to know, particularly those who are in a position 
to take action (Thacker, 1996, p.11). Avian influenza surveillance is therefore 
a continuous and systematic process of collection, analysis, interpretation, 
and dissemination of descriptive information of avian influenza monitoring 
activities. 
 
1.11.5 Avian influenza control 
Control of infectious diseases refers to the actions and programmes directed 
towards reducing disease incidence and prevalence (Kim-Farley, 1997, 
p.1561). Control of avian influenza can therefore be considered as the actions 
and programmes directed toward preventing and reducing avian influenza 
incidences and prevalence. 
 
1.11.6 Work methods 
A method is defined as the way in which each step of a procedure is to be 
performed (Liebler & McConnell, 1999). It is also defined as ‘a special form of 
procedure’ or ‘orderliness; regular habits’ (Thompson, 1995). Work methods in 
this study will be defined as the procedure of a sequence of actions by 
environmental health practitioners used to accomplish the task of avian 
influenza surveillance and control. 
 
1.11.7 Work procedures 
A procedure is a series of interrelated sequential steps established for the 
accomplishment of a task (Kanawaty, 1992). In this study, work procedures 
will be defined as a series of scientifically formulated and interdependent 
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consecutive steps which must be taken towards the achievement of avian 
influenza surveillance and control (Andrews, 1990; Maarshalk, 2003).  
 
In the following chapter the national health care system in South Africa is 
analysed. The chapter attempts to identify the place and role of environmental 
health, as well as that of other role players within the health care system 
whose decisions may have an influence on the effectiveness of environmental 
health service delivery. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
AVIAN INFLUENZA - THE PLACE AND ROLE OF ENVIRONMETAL HEALTH 
WITHIN THE ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE HEALTH CARE 
DISPENSATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
2.1. Introduction 
In order to develop effective work methods and - procedures for a specific 
functional activity of a profession it firstly becomes necessary to have a clear 
understanding of the profession itself, as well as its place and role within the 
organisational structure within which it functions. It also becomes necessary to 
identify the place and role of relevant decision-makers whose decisions may 
have a direct or indirect influence on the execution of the said functional 
activity. 
 
Firstly, due to the absence of an official definition of environmental health from 
a South African perspective, an attempt will be made to define the concept. 
This will be done by analysing work that has been done by relevant authors 
and organisations. Secondly, the fields of activity of the environmental health 
profession, as it applies internationally as well as in South Africa will be 
discussed. Thirdly, the place and role of environmental health, as well as that 
of other role players within the health care system whose decisions may have 
an influence on the effectiveness of environmental health service delivery, will 
be identified and discussed. In the next section the environmental health 
profession is introduced.  
 
2.2. The Environmental Health profession 
This discussion includes the definition of environmental health, the functional 
areas of the environmental health profession and the professional regulatory 
framework and requirements relevant to the profession. 
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2.2.1. Environmental Health defined 
In order to have a meaningful discussion of the place and role of 
environmental health within the organisational structure of the health care 
system in South Africa, it firstly becomes necessary to define Environmental 
Health from a South African perspective. In the absence of a formal South 
African definition (Maarschalk, personal communication, August 2, 2007) an 
analysis of relevant work that has been done by a number of authors and 
organisations will be presented. 
 
Throughout the years, various attempts have been made to define the 
concept Environmental Health. In analysing these definitions the deduction 
could be made that each definition was developed to represent the views and 
needs of the defining agency or organization. According to the National 
Institute of Environmental Health Sciences of the United States of America 
(2005), Environmental Health is a field of science that studies how the 
environment influences human health and disease. The environment, in this 
context, means things in the natural environment like air, water, soil and also 
all the physical, chemical, biological and social features of the surroundings. 
From this definition it can be concluded that the said Institute defines 
Environmental Health as a science that not only studies how the environment 
influences human health, but also how the environment influence disease. It 
can also be deduced that the environment (i.e. air, water and soil) has 
physical, chemical, biological and social features and that it is the influence 
that these features have on human health that the “science” environmental 
health is studying. 
 
The World Health Organisation (2007a) states that environmental health 
comprises those aspects of human health, including quality of life, that are 
determined by the physical, chemical, biological, social, and psychosocial 
factors in the natural environment. It also refers to the theory and practice of 
assessing, correcting, controlling, and preventing those factors in the 
environment that can potentially affect adversely the health of present and 
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future generations. ”Health” in this context is said to mean “… a state of 
complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence 
of disease or infirmity”. 
 
The Western Cape Department of Health (2007, p.1) defines environmental 
health in a similar way as the World Health Organisation by stating that 
environmental health can be regarded as the identification, evaluation, control 
and prevention through education of all those factors in the total environment 
which exercise a detrimental effect on an individual’s physical, mental and 
social well being and development. It also implies continuous efforts to 
educate and prevent individuals from affecting the environment in such a way 
that it becomes detrimental to their wellbeing and development. 
 
According to Slabbert (2002, p.4), in its broadest sense, environmental health 
is a segment of public health that is concerned with assessing, understanding 
and controlling the impacts of people on their environment and the impact of 
the environment on them. Moeller (1992, p.23) defines environmental health 
as the art and science of protecting and promoting good health through the 
organised efforts of society and includes the promotion of the aesthetic, 
social, economic, cultural and amenity values; the fostering of positive 
environmental factors; and the reduction of potential hazards (physical, 
biological, chemical and social). Last (1998, p.107) agrees with Moeller by 
defining environmental health as the art and science of preventing disease, 
prolonging life and promoting health through the organised efforts of society. 
Pope, Snyder and Mood (1995, p.3) on the other hand, state that 
environmental health concerns the identification and control of all factors 
known at any time, to have a direct or indirect effect on health. These include 
the biological, chemical, physical and social factors in the environment. 
 
From the definitions presented above it can be concluded that environmental 
health is about the protection and promotion of human health by the mitigation 
and prevention of those environmental factors that can have an adverse affect 
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on human health. The said factors are limited to the physical, chemical, 
biological and social factors in the environment. Furthermore, environmental 
health can be regarded as a facet of public health that involves the analysis 
(assessing, identification) of the said factors in the environment and the 
introduction of strategies (correcting, controlling and preventing ) to rectify or 
prevent the occurrence of those factors that can potentially adversely affect 
the state of human well-being. In the next section the functional areas of the 
environmental health profession will be discussed. 
 
2.2.2. The functional areas of environmental health service delivery 
Basset (1992, p.xxi) is of the opinion that the essence of environmental health 
service delivery from an international perspective is the prevention, detection 
and control of environmental hazards that affect human health. This will 
include the following functional areas which constitute an integral part of that 
process: 
 
• Waste management; 
• food control; 
• housing; 
• epidemiological control; 
• air quality management; 
• occupational health and safety; 
• water resource management; 
• noise control; 
• protection of the recreational environment; 
• radiation health; 
• control of frontiers, air and sea ports and border crossings; 
• educational activities; 
• * promotion and enforcement of environmental health quality standards; 
• * collaborative efforts to study the effects of environmental hazards; and 
• * environmental impact assessments. 
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According to Basset (1992, p.xxi) the last three functional areas (see * above) 
overlap with one another, and involve all twelve areas listed above them. The 
functional areas of the environmental health profession as practiced in South 
Africa can be deduced from Section 1 of the National Health Act, 2004 (Act 61 
of 2003). In terms of this section “municipal health services” includes the 
following: 
 
• Water quality monitoring; 
• food control; 
• waste management; 
• health surveillance of premises; 
• surveillance and prevention of communicable diseases, excluding 
immunisation; 
• vector control; 
• environmental pollution control; 
• disposal of the dead;  
• chemical safety, 
but excludes port health, malaria control and the control of hazardous 
substances which are provided by the National and Provincial Health 
Departments. Avian influenza surveillance and control is an activity under the 
services: surveillance and prevention of communicable diseases (see bullet 
five above). In the next section the environmental health-decision makers at 
the national sphere of government will be identified and discussed. 
 
The scope of the environmental health profession as practised in South Africa, 
in relation to the functional areas listed above, is defined in Regulation 888 
promulgated in terms of Section 33(1) of the Medical, Dental and 
Supplementary Health Service Professions Act, 1974 (Act 56 of 1974), and 
subsequently amended by the Health Professions Act, 1974 (Act 56 of 1974). 
According to Sub-section 2(1) of this regulation the following acts shall be 
deemed to be acts pertaining to the profession of the environmental health 
practitioner: 
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(a) The identification of all unhygienic conditions and the evaluation of all 
factors of hygiene regarding the interaction between man and his 
environment. 
(b) The undertaking of acts supplementary to statutory duties to: 
(i) Eliminate unhygienic conditions; 
(ii) execute monitoring actions in order to give effect to acts for the 
safeguarding and maintenance of the health of the population; 
(iii) give health education in order to make the population self-
sufficient in respect of the creation and maintenance of an 
environment that is safe for health.  
(iv) co-operate with a multi-disciplinary team in accordance with the 
principles of interdependency for the establishment of an 
environment that is safe for health. 
      
According to Section 2 of the above-mentioned regulation the acts of an 
environmental health practitioner shall pertain to: 
 
(a) General or environmental hygiene which is applicable to the population 
and which consists mainly of the provision of dwellings that are safe for 
health, sewage, rubbish removal, the disposal of effluent and healthy 
hygienically handled foodstuffs and supervision over environmental 
health factors which may have a detrimental effect on the population; 
(b) industrial hygiene, a branch of general hygiene, which concerns the 
provision of healthy working conditions in industries and the prevention 
of occupational diseases and accidents and which includes operational 
and factory hygiene. 
 
In analysing the above-mentioned functional areas and the scope of the 
environmental health profession as practised in South Africa with Basset’s 
international perspective, it can be concluded that all the functional areas, 
including the scope of the profession as practised in South Africa correlate 
with the international perspective.  In the next section the professional 
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regulatory framework and requirements of the environmental health 
profession are discussed. 
 
2.2.3. Professional regulatory framework and requirements  
According to the Western Cape Department of Health (2007, p.1), 
Environmental Health Practitioners in South Africa are appointed in terms of 
the Health Act, 1977 (Act 63 of 1977). The environmental health practitioner 
has, in terms of this Act, been appointed and authorised to implement the Act 
and its regulations. In terms of Section 56 of the said Act, the environmental 
health practitioner has the authority to serve a health notice on any person, 
individual or company to deal with a health problem or situation that may be 
dangerous or injurious to human health. Legal action can be taken in terms of 
the act, should it be deemed necessary. 
 
In order to practice as an environmental health practitioner in the Republic of 
South Africa a person needs to complete an undergraduate qualification in 
environmental health which is recognised by the Health Professions Council of 
South Africa. Presently this qualification is called the National Diploma: 
Environmental Health. The Baccalaureus Technologiae (B.Tech), Magister 
Technologiae (M.Tech), and Doctor Philosophiae (D.Tech) are recognized by 
the Health Professions Council of South Africa as additional qualifications of 
environmental health practitioners (Health Professions Council of South 
Africa, 2007)  
 
The environmental health practitioner are not only qualified at graduate level 
but must also complete a period of compulsory practical training in practice. 
They are also required to be registered with the Health Professions Council of 
South Africa as Environmental Health Practitioners and are furthermore also 
required to develop skills through a Continued Professional Development 
Programme in order to maintain their level of professional competency. Since 
April 2004, the Professional Board for Environmental Health Practitioners in 
the Republic of South Africa has introduced a compulsory system of 
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Continued Professional Development which could be defined as the 
systematic maintenance, improvement and broadening of knowledge and 
skills and the development of personal qualities necessary for the execution of 
professional and technical duties throughout a practitioners working life. This 
programme is in line with the aims and objectives of the South African Institute 
of Environmental Health (South African Institute of Environmental Health, 
2007) which are to: 
 
• Advance and promote the science and practice of Environmental Health; 
• affiliate and liase with local, national and international bodies aimed at 
promoting the science and practice of environmental – as well as 
public/community health; 
• protect and promote the interests and status of all members registered with 
the Institute; 
• promote strong unity amongst members irrespective of race, colour, sex, 
religion, creed, political aspiration and/or affiliation; 
• promote the professionalism of its members; 
• create structures that would promote and enable the involvement and 
participation in the affairs of the Institute by members at all levels; and 
• promote the basic training as well as comprehensive specialised advanced 
education of environmental health professionals as well as environmental 
health research. 
 
According to Mbhele (personal communication, August 28, 2007), a major part 
of the work of the environmental health practitioner involves the enforcement 
of legislation which includes the: 
  
• Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act, 1965 (Act 45 of 1965); 
• Foodstuffs, Cosmetics and Disinfectants Act, 1972 (Act 54 of 1972); 
• Hazardous Substances Act, 1973 (Act 15 of 1973); 
• Health Act, 1977 (Act 63 of 1977); 
• Animal Diseases Act, 1984 (Act 35 of 1984); 
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• Environment Conservation Act,1989 (Act 73 of 1989); 
• Occupational Health and Safety Act, 1993 (Act 85 of 1993); 
• Tobacco Products Control Act, 1993 (Act 83 of 1993); 
• Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996); 
• Water Services Act, 1997 (Act 108 of 1997); 
• National Environmental Management Act, 1998 (Act 107 of 1998); 
• National Water Act, 1998 (Act 36 of 1998); 
• Meat Safety Act, 2000 (Act 40 of 2000); 
• National Health Act,  2004 (Act 61 of 2003); 
• Terrestrial Animal Health Code
• 
, 2005; and 
International Health Regulations
 
In the next section the place and role of environmental health within the 
organisational structure of the health care system in South Africa will be 
discussed. 
 
2.3. The place and role of environmental health within the organisational    
structure of the health care system in South Africa 
, 1969/2005. 
In order to develop detailed environmental work methods and - procedures for 
the surveillance and control of avian influenza in the Eastern Cape province, it 
firstly becomes necessary to identify the place and role of the environmental 
decision-makers within the South African health care system. Government in 
the Republic of South Africa renders environmental health services through a 
health care dispensation that is divided into national, provincial and municipal 
spheres. Since there are a number of role players in the national, provincial 
and municipal spheres whose decisions may influence the efficiency and/or 
effectivity of avian influenza surveillance and control within the said spheres, it 
becomes necessary to critically analyse the organisational arrangements for 
avian influenza surveillance and control in South Africa. This analysis will 
enable the identification of inadequacies or weaknesses and the making of 
appropriate recommendations. In the next section attention will firstly be given 
to legislation relevant to health care service delivery in South Africa. 
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2.3.1. Legislation relevant to health care service delivery in South Africa 
According to Rensburg (2004, p.118), legislation provides certainty to the 
institution in its policy and establishes structures and mechanisms to put 
policy into practice. It is therefore necessary to discuss the relevant legislation 
when attempts are made to analyse the organisational structure for avian 
influenza surveillance and control in South Africa. In the section below 
attention is given to the constitutional imperatives that are relevant to health 
care service delivery in South Africa. 
 
2.3.1.1. Constitutional imperatives relevant to health care service delivery in 
South Africa 
In this study the Constitution means the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa Act, 1996, (Act 108 of 1996). The Republic of South Africa consists of 
national, provincial and local spheres of government, which are distinctive, but 
also interdependent and interrelated. The Constitution confirms and 
entrenches the existence of these three levels of government and 
distinguishes between legislative, executive and juridical power. In Chapter 
Three of the Constitution, the relationship among the spheres of government 
is determined in accordance with the principle of co-operative government.  
 
According to Slabbert (2002, p.1), the Constitution is the supreme law of the 
country and represents a fundamental break from the past. Furthermore, there 
is an obligation on all three spheres of government to honour the rights of all 
people with regard to the delivery of health services. Rensburg (2004, p.137) 
agrees with Slabbert (2002, p.1) and states that the Constitution gives 
conspicuous expression to the fundamental right to health care for all; and 
also rules that the delivery of health care services is a concurrent function 
amongst the three spheres of government within a framework of co-operative 
governance. For the purpose of this study, the contents of the health rights 
are summarised below as described and reflected in Sections 24-28 of the 
Constitution. All South African citizens have a right to: 
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• An environment that is not harmful to their health and wellbeing; 
• access to health care services; 
• emergency medical treatment ;and 
• basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services. 
 
From the above it can be concluded that the development of work methods 
and - procedures for the surveillance and control of avian influenza can be 
regarded as an attempt to protect the constitutional rights of the people in 
South Africa. 
 
According to the Section 27(2) of the Constitution, the State must take 
reasonable legislative and other measures within its available resources to 
achieve the progressive realisation of the rights of the people of South Africa 
to have access to health care services. According to Slabbert (2002, p.2) it 
was in the spirit of the Constitution that a new National Health Act was 
prepared which replaced the National Health Act, 1977 (Act 63 of 1977). In 
the section below the significance of the National Health Act, 2004 (Act 61 of 
2003), for environmental health will be discussed 
 
2.3.1.2. The significance of the National Health Act, 2004 (Act 61 of 2003) for 
environmental health 
The National Health Act, 2004 (Act 61 of 2003), provides the framework for a 
structured and uniform national health care system within the Republic of 
South Africa. The said act takes into account the obligations imposed by the 
Constitution and other laws of the national, provincial and local governments 
with regard to health services and to provide for matters connected therewith. 
The national health system means the system within the republic, whether 
within the public or private sector, in which the individual components are 
concerned with the financing, provision or delivery of health services (Limpopo 
Provincial Health Department, 2004). 
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The promulgation of the National Health Act, 2004 (Act 61 of 2003), provided 
the legislative foundation to: 
 
• Unite the various elements of the national health system in a common goal 
to actively promote and improve the national health system in South Africa; 
• provide for a system of co-operative governance and management of 
health services, within national guidelines, norms and standards, in which 
each province, municipality and health district must address questions of 
health policy and delivery of quality health care services; 
• establish a health system based on decentralised management, principles 
of  equity, efficiency, sound governance, internationally recognised 
standards of research and a spirit of inquiry and advocacy which 
encourages participation; 
• promote a spirit of co-operation and shared responsibility among public 
and private health professionals and providers and other relevant sectors 
within the context of national, provincial and district health plans.  
 
The promulgation of the National Health Act, 2004 in 2003, provided direction 
and clarity on the definition of municipal health services. According to 
Agenbag (personal communication, April 2, 2007), municipal health services 
are environmental health services. This statement is in line with a MINMEC 
(Minister of Health and relevant Members of the Provincial Executive Councils 
of the nine provinces) decision dated 21 August 2003 when it was decided, 
with the concurrence of the Minister for Provincial and Local Government, that 
municipal health service delivery will be the responsibility of metropolitan 
(metro’s) and district municipalities (not local municipalities) and to define 
municipal health services as “environmental health services”. This decision 
was effective from 1 July 2004. The MINMEC decision was arrived at after a 
period of extensive consultation with key stakeholders which includes 
amongst others, the relevant Members of the Executive Councils (MEC’s)of 
the nine provinces, the National Treasury, Financial and Fiscal Commission of 
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South Africa (FFC), South African Local Government Association (SALGA) 
and the Municipal Demarcation Board (Agenbag, 2006). 
 
From the above it can therefore be concluded that health services in the 
municipal sphere of government must be interpreted as environmental health 
services. In terms of Section 1 of the National Health Act, 2004 (Act 61 of 
2003), these services include the services as listed in section 2.2.2 on page 
37. In the next section legislation relevant to avian influenza will be discussed.  
 
2.3.1.3. Other legislation relevant to avian influenza health care service delivery 
in South Africa 
The spread of avian and human influenza does not respect national 
boundaries and there could be simultaneous outbreaks in different parts of the 
world. Co-ordination of preparedness and response at the international, 
regional, and national level is therefore essential (Nagpal, personal 
communication, December 5, 2007). 
 
During May 2005 the World Health Organization in Geneva replaced the 
International Health Regulations, 1969 with the International Health 
Regulations, 2005 in an effort to manage public health emergencies of 
international concern. These regulations are an international legal instrument 
which is binding on all World Health Organization member states and all non-
member states of the World Health Organization that have agreed to be 
bound by it. The general objectives of the International Health Regulations, 
2005 are to: 
 
• Prevent; 
• protect against; 
• control; and  
• provide a public health response to the international spread of disease. 
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Many of the provisions in the new regulations are based on the experience 
gained and lessons learnt by the World Health Organization and the global 
community over the past 30 years. The need for new rules and operational 
mechanisms for a more co-ordinated international response to the spread of 
disease has been most clearly shown during the outbreaks of Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003 and avian influenza in 2004-2005. The 
regulations govern the roles of countries and the World Health Organization in 
identifying and responding to public health emergencies and the sharing of 
information.  
 
The original International Health Regulations, 1969 were designed to help 
monitor and control four serious infectious diseases - cholera, plague, yellow 
fever and smallpox. The new regulations, International Health Regulations, 
2005 govern a broader range of public health emergencies of international 
concern, including emerging diseases such as avian influenza. The new 
International Health Regulations, 2005, greatly expand the World Health 
Organization’s and member states obligations to take concrete, often daily 
actions to prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health 
response to the international spread of the said diseases. The fundamental 
principle of the International Health Regulations, 2005 is to ensure maximum 
security against the international spread of diseases with a minimum 
interference with world traffic (World Health Organization, 2005d). 
  
The Terrestrial Animal Health Code, 2005 of the World Organization for 
Animal Health provides from an international perspective, detailed guidelines 
on the surveillance and control of avian influenza. The World Organisation for 
Animal Health is an intergovernmental organisation responsible for improving 
animal health worldwide. The need to fight animal diseases at a global level 
led to the creation of the Office International des Epizooties through an 
international agreement signed on 25 January 1924. In May 2003, the said 
Office became the World Organisation for Animal Health (World Organisation 
for Animal Health, 2007b). 
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According to Pienaar and Horner (2006, p. 26), the presence of avian 
influenza viruses in wild birds creates a particular problem and makes it 
problematic to provide specific guidelines for the surveillance and control of 
the disease in wild birds. In essence, no country can declare itself free from 
avian influenza in wild birds. In the Republic of South Africa, the Animal 
Diseases Act ,1984 (Act 35 of 1984) states that poultry means pigeons, 
ducks, geese, fowl, turkeys, cage birds, muscovies, domesticated ostriches, 
tamed wild birds and wild birds kept in captivity. South Africa is currently free 
from Highly Pathogenic Notifiable Avian Influenza (HPNAI) and two Acts play 
an important role in maintaining this freedom, namely the Animal Diseases 
Act, 1984 (Act 35 of 1984) and the Meat Safety Act, 2000 (Act 40 of 2000) 
(Pienaar & Horner, 2006, p.26). The specific measures that are in place to 
safeguard the country against the introduction of this virus into the country will 
be discussed in the following two chapters that deal with work methods and 
work - procedures for the surveillance and control of avian influenza. 
 
According to Pienaar (personal communication, January 14, 2007) the Animal 
Diseases Act, 1984 (Act 35 of 1984), will be amended to make all subtypes of 
avian influenza notifiable diseases. This would mean that any outbreak or 
suspicion of an outbreak has to be reported to the World Health Organization. 
Until the amended regulations have been published, control measures with 
regards to Low Pathogenic Avian Influenza involve voluntary isolation and 
voluntary movement control. In the next section the organisational structure of 
the National Department of Health will be discussed. 
 
2.3.2. The organisational structure of the National Department of Health 
Within the national sphere of government a number of decision-makers can 
be identified whose decisions may have either a direct or indirect influence on 
environmental health service delivery throughout South Africa. The following 
section identifies and discusses these decision-makers. The Minister of Health 
is firstly introduced. 
 
 48 
2.3.2.1. The Minister of Health and the Cabinet  
Section 3 of the National Health Act, 2004 (Act 61 of 2003), states that the 
Minister of Health is the Cabinet member responsible for health. The said 
Minister is responsible within the limits of available resources to: 
 
• Endeavour to protect, promote, improve and maintain the health of the 
population; 
• promote the inclusion of health services in the socio-economic 
development plan of  the Republic;  
• determine the policies and measures necessary to protect, promote, 
improve and maintain the health and well-being of the population; 
• ensure the provision of such essential health services, which must at least 
include primary health care services, to the population of the Republic as 
may be prescribed after consultation with the National Health Council; and  
• equitably prioritise the health services that the State can provide. 
The Minister of Health, in terms Section 92(2) of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996), is accountable to 
Parliament for the exercise of powers and the performance of functions 
related to health. In terms of Section 90(1) of the National Health Act, 2004 
(Act 61 of 2003), the Minister, after consultation with the National Health 
Council, may promulgate regulations regarding communicable diseases and 
notifiable medical conditions. 
 
From the above it can be deduced that the Minister of Health is responsible 
for the protection, promotion and maintenance of the health of the people of 
South Africa. It can also be deduced that proposed regulations pertaining to 
avian influenza surveillance and control must first be sanctioned by the 
Minister of Health before it can be promulgated into legislation. To assist the 
Minister in decision–making and to enable the Minister to report to Parliament, 
a National Health Council has been established which is discussed below. 
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2.3.2.2. The National Health Council 
According to Section 22(2) of the National Health Act, 2004 (Act 61 of 2003), 
the National Health Council consists of the following: 
 
• The Minister of Health, who acts as chairperson; 
• the Deputy Minister of Health; 
• the relevant members of the Executive Councils of the nine provinces; 
• one municipal councillor, representing organised local government (the 
South African Local Government Association) and appointed by the 
national organisation contemplated in Section 163(a) of the 
Constitution,1996 (Act 108 of 1996); 
• the Director-General and the Deputy Directors-General of the National 
Department of Health; 
• the Head of each Provincial Department ; 
• one person employed and appointed by the national organisation 
contemplated in Section 163(a) of the Constitution; and 
• the Head of the South African Military Health Service. 
 
The National Health Council must advise the relevant Minister on policy 
concerning any matter that will protect, promote, improve and maintain the 
health of the population. Some of the said matters include: 
• Epidemiological surveillance and the monitoring of national and provincial 
trends with regard to major diseases and risk factors for disease; and 
• the obtaining, processing and use of statistical returns; (Section 23 of the 
National Health Act, 2004 (Act 61 of 2003)). 
 
According to Dennill, King, Lock and Swanepoel (1995, p.40), the National 
Health Council is responsible for the provision, development and co-ordination 
of all health care in South Africa. The National Health Council may create one 
or more committees to advise it on any health - related matters. 
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The deduction that can be made from the above is that the National Health 
Council is responsible for the provision, development and co-ordination of all 
health care in South Africa. A further deduction that can be made is that the 
National Health Council must advise the Minister of Health on information 
relating to the surveillance and control of avian influenza. To ensure that input 
from a broad perspective is obtained, the National Health Council is allowed to 
establish advisory committees. It can thus be concluded that the contribution 
of such committees may lead to more effective policy within the national 
sphere of government. In the next section the functions of the Director – 
General of Health will be discussed. 
 
2.3.2.3. The Director-General of Health 
The Director-General of the National Department of Health has the 
responsibility to supply health-related information to the Minister of Health. 
This information can either be supplied directly to the Minister of Health or 
through the National Health Council (Section 21 of the National Health Act, 
2004 (Act 61 of 2003)).  
 
According to Section 21 of the National Health Act, 2004 (Act 61 of 2003), the  
Director-  General is annually responsible for the  preparation of  strategic, 
medium term health and human resources plans for the exercise of the 
powers and the performance of the duties of the National Department of 
Health. In addition to the above, the Director-General must also integrate the 
health plans of the national department and provincial departments once a 
year and submit the integrated health plans to the National Health Council. 
These health plans form the basis of the department’s budget as outlined in 
Section 215 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 ( Act 
108 of 1996). 
 
From the above it can be concluded that the Director-General of Health has 
the responsibility to supply factual health-related information to the Minister of 
Health. The Director-General is also responsible for the implementation of 
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national health policy in South Africa. It can therefore be concluded that the 
Director-General plays a key role in the promotion and implementation of 
policies regarding avian influenza surveillance and control throughout South 
Africa. The Director-General cannot perform the above-mentioned functions 
unilaterally. He/she therefore relies on the Deputy Director-Generals of the 
National Department of Health and the National Consultative Health Forum to 
supply him/her with sufficient information to make informed decisions. In the 
following section the National Consultative Health Forum will be discussed. 
 
2.3.2.4. National Consultative Health Forum 
According to Section 24 of the National Health Act, 2004 (Act 61 of 2003), it is 
the responsibility of the Minister of Health to establish a body to be known as 
the National Consultative Health Forum. The National Consultative Health 
Forum must promote and facilitate interaction, communication and the sharing 
of information on national health issues between representatives of the 
national department, national organisations identified by the Minister and 
provincial consultative bodies contemplated in Section 28 of National Health 
Act, 2004 (Act 61 of 2003). The Minister of Health must determine the 
composition, the place, date and time of any meeting of the National 
Consultative Health Forum. In terms of Section 24 of the said act, the National 
Consultative Health Forum must include relevant stakeholders and must meet 
at least once every year. 
 
Due to its composition and interaction with numerous stakeholders within and 
outside the health care system, it can be deduced that the said forum plays a 
leading role in the sharing of health – related information. The National 
Consultative Health Forum can consequently play a unique role in the sharing 
of information related to the surveillance and control of avian influenza within 
and outside the national health system. In the next section the role of the 
Deputy Director of Health will be discussed. 
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2.3.2.5. The Deputy Director-General of Health 
The Director - General of Health of the National Department of Health is 
assisted by four Deputy Directors. The organisational structure of the Director 
- General’s office is set out below as well as in Annexure Seven (National 
Department of Health, 2007). 
 
There are four branches within the Director Genera’s office. These are listed 
below: 
 
• The Deputy Director-General: Corporate Services;  
• the Deputy Director-General: Health Service Delivery;  
• the Deputy Director-General: Human Resources; and  
• the Deputy Director-General: Strategic Health Programmes. 
The Deputy Director-General: Health Service Delivery has the responsibility to 
co-ordinate the activities of the sub-directorates within her/his portfolio. Six 
service delivery clusters fall under the control of his/her office, namely: 
 
• Health Information, Research and Evaluation;  
• Primary Health Care, Districts and Development ; 
• Non-communicable diseases;  
• Office of Standards Compliance; 
• Hospital Services; and 
• Health Economics. 
 
The above mentioned service delivery cluster Primary Health Care, District 
and Development is separated into five divisions. These are listed below: 
 
• Environmental Health;  
• Health Promotion;  
• Districts and Development;  
• Personal Development and Primary Health Care; and 
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• Integrated Primary Health Care. 
 
The Deputy Director-General: Health Service Delivery is the person that must 
promote, facilitate and provide health services related to avian influenza 
control and surveillance through the service delivery cluster of Primary Health 
Care, District and Development. The National Directorate: Environmental 
Health is a division in the service delivery cluster Primary Health Care, 
Districts and Development. The next section will discuss the function of the 
National Directorate: Environmental Health.  
 
2.3.3. The place and role of environmental health within the National 
Department of Health 
Environmental health is a division of the cluster Primary Health Care, Districts 
and Development under the Deputy Director-General: Health Service Delivery 
(National Department of Health, 2006). According to the White Paper for the 
Transformation of the Health System in South Africa (National Department of 
Health, 1997), the Director: Environmental Health of the National Department 
of Health is responsible for the overall co-ordination and development of 
national environmental health policies, norms and standards. The fulfilment of 
the above-mentioned responsibilities will ensure that basic environmental 
needs are met and that factors adverse to health are minimized. 
 
From the above it can be concluded that the Deputy Director-General of 
Health Service Delivery has to rely on the Director: Environmental Health to 
supply her/him with the necessary environmental health information, including 
information on the status of avian influenza in South Africa. In the next two 
sections the roles of the National Consultative Health Forum and the Director: 
Environmental Health within the National Department of Health will be 
discussed. 
 
~ 
According to Wild (personal communication, May 7, 2007), information relating 
to environmental health service delivery within the provincial and local 
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government sphere is imperative to enable the said Director to co-ordinate 
environmental health services from a national perspective as well as to 
develop relevant policies, norms and standards. A deduction that can be 
made is that the immediate source for environmental health information from a 
national perspective is the Director: Environmental Health. A further deduction 
is that the Minister of Health must account to cabinet and parliament on the 
status of avian influenza in South Africa. Such information will be provided by 
the Director: Environmental Health to the Director General via the Deputy 
Director-General of Health Service Delivery. The Director General can then 
present the information to the Minister of Health. As established earlier (see 
section 2.3.2.2), the National Health Council can also present the information 
to the Minister. 
 
The Director: Environmental Health therefore plays a key role in the 
development of quality environmental health services at both provincial and 
local spheres. Various decisions have to be made based on information 
related to environmental health service delivery at provincial and municipal 
spheres, decisions which may directly affect the quality of services rendered.  
According to Bezana (personal communication, June 10, 2007), the Director: 
Environmental Health of the National Department of Health have to rely on the 
provincial health departments (environmental health in the provincial sphere of 
government) to supply him/her with environmental health-related avian 
influenza information (including avian influenza). In the next section the 
organisational structure of the Provincial Health Departments will be 
discussed. From the analysis of the organizational structure of the national 
sphere of government the following inadequacies / shortcomings were 
identified: 
 
• The time that it takes for information to reach the Minister of Health is 
problematic. The Director: Environmental Health is not on a daily basis in 
contact with the Minister of Health. Urgent environmental health 
information from the Director: Environmental Health to the Minister of 
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Health must first be relayed via many formal structures. It can therefore be 
deduced that the formal lines of communication are very time consuming. 
Communication systems should be developed that will allow the Director: 
Environmental Health to communicate urgent environmental health 
information directly to the Minister. 
• Clear national guidelines need to be established for situations when 
emergencies arise. 
In the next section the organisational structure of the Provincial Health 
Department will be discussed. 
 
2.3.4. The organisational structure of the Provincial Health Departments 
The Republic of South Africa has nine provinces, namely the provinces of the 
Eastern Cape, Free State, Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga, Northern 
Cape, Limpopo, North West and the Western Cape. The legislative authority 
of each province is vested in its provincial legislature. The executive authority 
of a province is vested in the Premier of that province who exercises his or her 
powers together with the other members of the Executive Council (South 
Africa, 1996). 
The Executive Council of a province consists of the Premier and other 
members appointed by the premier. The Premier assigns powers to each 
member. According to Section 125 (2)(a) and (2)(b) of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996), a Premier of a province 
exercises the executive authority, together with the other members of the 
Executive Council, by implementing provincial and national legislation, which 
also includes legislation related to health services in a province. The provincial 
legislature shares concurrent legislative powers with parliament over the list of 
matters in Schedule 4 of the Constitution (See Annexure Eight). Schedule 4 
includes inter alia, municipal health services, health services, animal control 
and diseases, pollution control, etc.  The Provincial Health Departments in the 
Republic of South Africa are therefore, in terms of the Constitution, compelled 
to render environmental health services and hence services that promote the 
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surveillance and control of avian influenza. The next section will discuss a 
Provincial Health Department. 
2.3.4.1. A Provincial Health Department  
In terms of Section 25 of the National Health Act, 2004 (Act 63 of 2003) it is 
incumbent upon a provincial health department, within the framework of 
national policies, to promote and monitor the health of the people in the 
province and to develop and support a caring and effective provincial health 
system. Provinces must give effect to their constitutional mandate by the 
establishment of a province-wide district health system based on the 
principles of primary health care (National Department of Health, 1997). 
According to Hall, Haynes & McCoy (2002, pp.10-11), the organisational 
structure of health care service delivery may differ amongst provinces due to 
different provincial legislation. The next section will discuss the Member of the 
provincial executive committee responsible for health and the provincial 
legislature. 
 
2.3.4.2. Member of the provincial executive committee responsible for health 
 and the provincial legislature 
In terms of Section 26 of the National Health Act, 2004 (Act 61 of 2003), the 
relevant member of the Provincial Executive Council (MEC) must ensure the 
implementation of national health policy, norms and standards in his or her 
province. According to Slabbert (2002. p.14), the MEC responsible for Health 
is accountable to the provincial legislature for the exercise of powers and the 
performance of functions within a provincial health department. Furthermore, 
the MEC must provide the provincial legislature with full and regular reports 
concerning matters under his / her control.  
  
The inference drawn from the above is that the MEC for Health is the person 
that is accountable to the provincial legislature for the effective rendering of 
environmental health services and has to provide the legislature with full and 
regular reports regarding the monitoring and co-ordination of environmental 
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health services within the province. The implication of the above is that the 
MEC for Health must at all times be aware of the status of the environmental 
health services that are being rendered within the province. The provincial 
legislature therefore relies on the MEC of Health for factual information on the 
surveillance and control of avian influenza. The next section will discuss the 
role of the Provincial Health Council where it has to assist and advise the 
MEC of a province.  
 
2.3.4.3.  Provincial Health Council 
According to Section 27 of the National Health Act, 2004 (Act 61 of 2003), a 
Provincial Health Council must advise the MEC on a number of health-related 
issues. The Provincial Health Council of a province is chaired by the MEC for 
Health who is accountable to the provincial legislature. Section 26 of the said 
act states that every Provincial Health Council consists of: 
• The relevant member of the Executive Council, or his or her nominee, who 
acts as chairperson; 
• one councillor from each of the metropolitan municipalities in the province, 
if there are such municipalities in the province in question; 
• one councillor from each of the district municipalities in the province; 
• the head of the provincial department. In the case of the Eastern Cape 
province this person is referred to as the Superintendent General. (Eastern 
Cape Department of Health, 2007); 
• not more than three representatives involved in the management of local 
government; and 
• any other person whom the relevant MEC considers appropriate. 
 
A Provincial Health Council must, at the request of the MEC, or on its own 
accord, advise the relevant member of the executive council on policy 
concerning any matter that will protect, promote, improve and maintain the 
health of the population within the province. Some of these matters, according 
to Section 27 of the National Health Act, 2004 (Act 61 of 2003) include: 
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• Epidemiological surveillance and monitoring trends with regard to major 
diseases and risk factors for disease, i.e. avian influenza; 
• targets, priorities, norms and standards relating to the equitable provision 
and financing of health services; 
• efficient co-ordination of health services within the province and between 
neighboring provinces; 
• human resources planning, production, management and development; 
• equitable financial mechanisms for the funding of health services; and 
• obtaining, processing and the use of statistical returns. 
 
A Provincial Health Council must also, via the relevant MEC, annually prepare 
and submit to the National Department of Health, strategic medium-term 
health and human resource plans for the exercise of the powers of, the 
performance of the duties of, and the provision of health services in the 
province by the Provincial Health Department (ANC, 1994, p.66). In order for 
members of the Provincial Health Council to give effect to the legislation as 
mentioned above, they require a considerable amount of environmental health 
information, including information concerning the surveillance and control of 
avian influenza.   
 
According to Section 28(1) of the National Health Act, 2004 (Act 61 of 2003), 
the relevant member of the Executive Council (MEC) must establish a 
consultative body for his or her province to assist the Provincial Health 
Council with health information that can be used in policy-making. Such a 
provincial consultative body must promote and facilitate interaction, 
communication and the sharing of information on provincial health issues 
between representatives of the provincial department and provincial and 
municipal organisations identified by the relevant member of the Executive 
Council. A provincial consultative body must include all relevant stakeholders.  
 
Since the provincial consultative bodies consist of members who do not have 
sufficient knowledge on issues pertaining to environmental health, they have 
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to investigate such issues and report their findings to the Provincial Health 
Council. The relevant information concerning environmental health service 
delivery in a province could be obtained via sources that will be discussed in 
the sections that follow. The sources reflect the situation within the Eastern 
Cape province and can differ from post structures and designations within 
other provinces. However, other provinces would be able to identity similar 
post structures / designations with similar functions as those found in the 
Eastern Cape Provincial Health Department. The next section will discuss the 
Chief Directorate: District Health Services of the Eastern Cape Provincial 
Department of Health. 
 
2.3.4.4. Chief Directorate: District Health Services 
The organisational structure of the Superintendent General’s office is set out 
in Annexure Nine and illustrates the place of the Chief Directorate: District 
Health Services in the Eastern Cape Provincial Health Department (Eastern 
Cape Department of Health, 2007). The Chief Directorate: District Health 
Services reports to the Deputy Director General: Health Cluster. 
 
The purpose of the Chief Directorate: District Health Services is to develop, 
monitor and evaluate the rendering of District Health Services. The said Chief 
Directorate has the following functions (Sikweza, personal communication, 
August 7, 2007): 
 
• Develop, monitor and evaluate the functioning of hospitals in terms of 
clinical issues;  
• Develop, monitor and evaluate the rendering of local service areas, in 
terms of clinical issues; 
• Monitor and evaluate the functioning of Primary Health Care Services;  
• Ensure and monitor the management of Health Promotion and Healthy 
Lifestyle Programmes; and 
• Ensure and monitor the rendering of Integrated Nutrition Programme 
Services.  
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The Chief Directorate: District Health Services has the responsibility to 
coordinate the activities of the sub-directorates within her/his portfolio. Five 
service delivery clusters fall under the control of the Chief Directorate: District 
Health Services, namely (Sikweza, personal communication, August 7, 2007):  
 
• Directorate: District Hospital Management; 
• Directorate: District Development; 
• Directorate: Primary Health Care Programmes; 
• Directorate: Health Promotion and Healthy Life Styles; and 
• Directorate: Mother, Child, Women’s Health and Integrated Nutrition 
Programmes.  
 
The service delivery cluster of Primary Health Care, District and Development 
is divided into the following divisions (Sikweza, personal communication, 
August 7, 2007): 
 
• Oral Health; 
• Environmental Health; 
• Occupational Health; 
• Traditional Services; and 
• Mental Health, Substance Abuse, Chronics and Geriatrics. 
 
From the above can be concluded that the Chief Directorate: District Health 
Services in the Eastern Cape Provincial Health Department is the person 
responsible for developing, monitoring and evaluating the rendering of District 
Health Services in the province. Several health service delivery structures 
have been established to assist the Chief Directorate: District Health Services 
in the execution of his/her functions. In the next section the place and role of 
environmental health within the Provincial Health Departments are discussed. 
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2.3.5. The place and role of environmental health within the Provincial Health 
 Department 
From Section 2.3.4.4. the place of Environmental Health has been identified 
as a division within the Directorate: Primary Health Care Programmes. The 
structure responsible for Environmental Health in the Eastern Cape province 
is the Sub-Directorate: Environmental Health which is lead by the Deputy 
Director: Environmental Health. 
 
The role of the Deputy Director: Environmental Health is to take full 
responsibility for the effective rendering of environmental health services 
throughout the province (Wild, personal communication, May 7, 2007). Wild 
states that a further role of the said sub-directorate is to monitor and co-
ordinate the environmental health related functions that have been delegated 
to municipal government which include the surveillance and control of avian 
influenza as listed in Section 1 of the National Health Act, 2004 (Act 61 of 
2003).   
 
From an environmental health perspective, the Director: Primary Health Care, 
District and Development has to rely on the Deputy-Director: Environmental 
Health to provide the necessary information that will enable him/her to inform 
the Chief Directorate: District Health Services on the status of Environmental 
Health in the province. The Deputy-Director Environmental Health is the key 
functionary that co-ordinates Environmental Health services in the Eastern 
Cape province (Bezana, personnel communication, February 14, 2007). The 
office of the Deputy-Director: Environmental Health in the province of the 
Eastern Cape is the centre from which all environmental health services in the 
in the province are coordinated. The said Deputy-Director accounts to the 
Director: Primary Health Care, District and Development on issues related to 
the development, coordination and monitoring of local government 
environmental health services and the development of provincial 
environmental health policy. In general, the Deputy-Director will have to 
account for all strategies introduced to ensure that the municipalities within the 
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provinces render an effective and efficient environmental health service 
(Bezana, personnel communication, February 14, 2007). 
 
It can therefore be concluded that the Deputy-Director: Environmental Health 
must have a thorough knowledge of the status of avian influenza in the 
province in order to assist the Chief Directorate: District Health Services in the 
execution of his/her duties. Furthermore, the Deputy-Director: Environmental 
Health works in partnership with the Director: Primary Health Care, District 
and Development as well as with environmental health practitioners at the 
municipal sphere of government. The Deputy Director: Environmental Health 
has to rely on the environmental health practitioners in the municipal sphere of 
government to make available information pertaining to the surveillance of 
avian influenza. Such information will enable her/him to make informed 
decisions from a provincial perspective that can assist in the formulation of 
effective policies for the surveillance and control of avian influenza within the 
province. From the analysis of the organizational structure of the provincial 
sphere of government the following inadequacies / shortcomings were 
identified: 
 
• The time that it takes for information to reach the relevant member of the 
Provincial Executive Council of Health (MEC) is problematic. The Deputy-
Director: Environmental Health is not on a daily basis in contact with the 
MEC. Urgent environmental health information from the Deputy-Director: 
Environmental Health to the MEC must first be relayed via many formal 
structures. It can therefore be concluded that the formal lines of 
communication are very time consuming. Communication systems must be 
developed that allow the Deputy-Director: Environmental Health to 
communicate urgent environmental health issues directly to the MEC. 
• Unambiguous provincial guidelines need to be established for situations 
when emergencies arise. 
In the following section, the organisational structure of the District Health 
System will be discussed.   
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2.3.6. The organisational structure of the District Health System 
In order to identify the environmental health decision-makers in the municipal 
sphere of government it becomes necessary to analyse the organisational 
structure of the district health system as it applies to South Africa. In order to 
facilitate a meaningful discussion an explanation is firstly given of what is 
meant by a district health system. 
 
2.3.6.1. The District Health System 
According to the Limpopo Provincial Health Department (2004, p.2), a district 
health system is part of a national health system which is a vehicle for 
providing quality primary health care services to a defined geographic area in 
which individuals, communities and providers participate in processes directed 
at improving their own health through accessible, equitable and affordable 
means. According to the Limpopo Provincial Health Department (2004, p.4), 
the World Health Organization describes the package of primary health care 
services as an all-inclusive range of services, including community and 
outreach services; home-based and school services; district hospitals 
services; personal preventive services, promotive, curative and rehabilitative 
services; as well as non-personal health services (environmental health 
service) and support services such as patient transport services.   
 
In analysing the district health system in South Africa, Engelbrecht and McCoy 
(2004, p.2), highlighted three distinctive features regarding the district health 
system and these are summarised below.  
 
Engelbrecht and McCoy (2004, p.2), argue that the district health system must 
first be regarded as a means to an end, rather than an end in itself. In this 
instance, the district health system is the "means" to achieve the "end" of an 
equitable, efficient and effective health system based on the principles of the 
primary health care approach. The features, elements and conceptual 
framework of the primary health care approach should therefore be reflected 
in the nature and design of the district health system. This means that the 
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district health system is more than just a structure or form of organisation, but 
is also the manifestation of a set of activities such as community involvement, 
integrated and holistic health care delivery; inter sectoral collaboration and a 
strong "bottom-up" approach to planning, policy development and 
management. 
 
 A second feature made by Engelbrecht and McCoy (2004, p.2), is that it 
should be understood that the primary health care approach and the district 
health system model apply to the whole of the health system and at all levels 
of health care delivery. They do not just apply to the "primary" or district level 
of the health system, as is commonly implied and understood. In a district 
health system, the organisation and management of the entire health system 
is district-based, meaning that even policy areas such as health sector 
financing, utilisation of regional and tertiary hospitals, the relationship with the 
private sector and governance should be district health system-based or 
district health system-centered. In other words, the health district and its 
management structure should be the core building block of the entire heath 
system. Too often however, the district health system is understood as one 
component of the national health system rather than the underlying framework 
for the organisation of health care as a whole. 
 
A third feature made by Engelbrecht and McCoy (2004, p.2), is that the 
essence of the district health system is the organisation of health care 
according to the geographical sub-divisions of a country which are managed 
through a decentralised management structure. The district management 
structure is supposed to be the point and level at which different health 
service activities are integrated into a comprehensive and holistic approach to 
health care. For example, community-based and facility-based health 
activities would be implemented as different components of a single health 
plan for a given population and area. This is in contrast with a health system 
primarily organised according to specific health services (e.g. a nation-wide 
family planning programme operating through a centralised and vertical 
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management system), or according to non-geographic population groups (e.g. 
health care services organised by race or by class). 
 
According to Engelbrecht and McCoy (2004, p.4), the district health system 
therefore represents a truly profound break from the apartheid health system 
that was characterised by fragmentation, inefficiency, centralised 
authoritarianism and the separation of curative and preventative services. In 
the following section, a health district, that represents municipal government 
from a health perspective, is firstly explained. 
 
2.3.6.2. Health District 
According to Section 21 of the National Health Act, 2004 (Act 63 of 2003), the 
district health system consists of various health districts, and the boundaries 
of health districts coincide with district and metropolitan municipal boundaries.  
According to Owen (1995, pp.6-7), the National Department of Health used 
the World Health Organization’s definition of a Health District in its strategy for 
the development of a district health system for South Africa. This definition 
states that a health district is a more or less self contained segment of the 
national health system. It comprises first and foremost a well-defined 
population, living in a clearly delineated administrative and geographical area, 
whether urban or rural. A health district must be large enough to be 
economically efficient, but small enough to ensure effective management 
which is accountable to local communities. Geographically, every part of a 
country will be encompassed within a health district, the boundaries of which 
should not cross the boundaries of other administrative sectors, of local 
governments, or of magisterial districts - they should be coterminous with 
other boundaries (Owen, 1995, p.7). 
 
In order to fulfill the above-mentioned strategy for a district health system in 
South Africa, the provincial health departments, in terms of their own 
provincial health legislation, divided their provinces into a number of 
geographically coherent, functional health districts; whose boundaries are 
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coherent with Category A (metropolitan) and Category C (district) 
municipalities (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 (Act 108 
of 1996)). Each metropolitan and district municipality is thus known as a 
Health District (Owen, 1995, p.7). In the next section a District Health Council 
will be discussed. 
 
2.3.6.3. District Health Council 
It is the task of the relevant member of the executive council (MEC of a 
provincial health department), after consultation with the member of the 
executive council responsible for local government in the province in question, 
and the municipal council of the relevant metropolitan or district municipality, 
to establish a district health council for every health district in his or her 
province (Section 21 of the National Health Act, 2004 (Act 63 of 2003)). A 
district health council consists of the following members: 
• A member of the metropolitan (Category A) or district (Category C) 
municipal council, who will chair the council; 
• a person appointed by the relevant member of the executive council of the 
related province to represent her / him; 
• a member of the council of each local municipality (Category B) within the 
health district; and 
• not more than five other persons, appointed by the relevant member of the 
executive council after consultation with the municipal council of the  
metropolitan or district municipality, as the case may be. 
 
According to the Section 21 of the National Health Act, 2004 (Act 63 of 2003), 
the functions of a district health council are to promote co-operative 
governance, to ensure co-ordination of planning, budgeting, provision and 
monitoring of all health services that affect the residents of that health district. 
In addition, it must provide services that affect the residents of that health 
district. It must also advise the relevant member of the executive council 
though the provincial health council and the municipal council of the relevant 
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metropolitan or district municipality on any matter regarding health or health 
services in that health district. 
 
Provincial legislation must provide for the approval, after consultation with the 
district health council, by both the relevant member of the executive council 
and the municipal council of the metropolitan or district municipality of the 
provincial and municipal components respectively, of the detailed budget and 
performance targets for health services in the health district to which both the 
provincial and municipal spheres of government will contribute.  Each district 
and metropolitan municipality must also, by 31 March each year, develop and 
present to the relevant member of the executive council, a district health plan 
drawn up in accordance with national and provincial policies and guidelines 
and the requirements of the relevant integrated development plans prepared 
in terms of the Local Government Municipal Systems Act, 2000 (Act 32 of 
2000). 
 
From the above it can be deduced that a district health council is responsible 
for the overall coordination and development of health service delivery at the 
municipal sphere of government. A further deduction that can be made is that 
the district health council is a key structure that must be kept in mind in 
developing work methods and - procedures for the surveillance and control of 
avian influenza. A health district can be legally divided into a number of health 
sub-districts which will be discussed in the next section. 
 
2.3.6.4. A Health Sub- district 
In terms of Section 30(2) of the National Health Act, 2004 (Act 63 of 2003), a 
health district can be divided into health sub-districts to accomplish the 
principles laid down in Sections 27 and 195 of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa Act, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996), as well as the criteria set out in 
Section 25 of the Local Government Municipal Demarcation Act, 1998 (Act 27 
of 1998). The purpose of health sub-districts is to devolve comprehensive 
health care management autonomy and control to the lowest level, compatible 
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with rational planning, administration and the maintenance of good quality 
care (National Department of Health, 1997, p.9).  
 
Both a metropolitan (Category A) and district (Category C) municipality, as 
previously explained, are classified as health districts. In a metropolitan 
municipality, a metropolitan sub-council is the term used to denote the first 
sub-division of that area. In terms of health care delivery, this sub-structure is 
referred to as a health sub-district (Wilson, 1994, p.4). A metropolitan sub-
council (health sub-district) consists of the political representatives, or 
councilors representing the wards included in the sub-council area. The sub- 
council has such duties and powers as the metropolitan council may delegate 
to it and it may make recommendations to the metropolitan council on any 
matter affecting environmental health within its wards (Wilson, 1994, p.5). An 
example of the division of a metropolitan (Category A municipality) into heath 
sub-districts is the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality in the Eastern 
Cape province that is divided into three health sub-districts, namely: 
 
• Sub- district A - Motherwell and surrounding townships; 
• Sub- district B - Uitenhage and Dispatch; and 
• Sub- district C - Central Port Elizabeth, Walmer and the Northern Suburbs 
of Port Elizabeth (Oliphant, personal communication, 
February 7, 2007).  
 
A district municipality, in contrast with a metropolitan municipality, must 
establish within its area, internal municipal service districts to facilitate the 
provision of  municipal services in the said parts of the municipality (Local 
Government Municipal Systems Act, 2000 (Act 32 of 2000). In terms of health 
care service delivery, these municipal service districts are also referred to as 
health sub-districts (Wilson, 1994, p.4). 
 
When a district municipality establishes an internal municipal service district 
(health sub-district), it must establish a committee for each of the service 
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districts (health sub-districts). The latter is composed of persons representing 
the community in the municipal service district who act as a consultative and 
advisory forum for the district municipality regarding the management of, and 
other matters relating to the service in the service district (health sub-district). 
Health sub-district managers have been appointed at local municipalities. The 
sub-district managers are responsible for the effective implementation of 
health sub-districts in a health district (Oliphant, personal communication, 
February 7, 2007). The next section will discuss a local municipality. 
 
2.3.6.5. A Local Municipality 
A local municipality is defined, in terms of Section 1 of the Local Government 
Municipal Structures Act, 1998 (Act 117 of 1998), as a municipality that 
shares municipal executive and legislative authority in its area with a district 
municipality (Category C municipality) within whose area it falls, and which is 
described in Section 155 (1) (b) of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa Act, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996) as a Category B municipality. In terms of 
health care service delivery, these municipalities are referred to as sub-units 
of a health sub-district of a Category C municipality. 
 
An example of the division of a Category C municipality into heath sub-
districts, and the division of those health sub- districts into local municipalities 
is Cacadu District Municipality (also referred to as Cacadu Health District – a 
Category C municipality) in the Eastern Cape province that has been divided 
into three health sub-districts, namely Camdeboo, Makana and Kouga.  Each 
of these health sub districts is further divided into local municipalities.  For 
example, Kouga Health Sub-District has been divided into two local 
municipalities (Category B municipalities), namely Kouga and Koukamma 
(Dreyer, personal communication, February 19, 2007). 
 
In the Ukhahlamba district municipality (also referred to as Ukhahlamba 
Health District – a Category C municipality) in the Eastern Cape province a 
different arrangement prevails. In  line  with  the  new  municipal  boundaries,  
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a  restructuring  of  the  health  services took  place in this Category C 
municipality. According to Agenbag (2005, p.28), the Ukhahlamba district 
municipality is composed of four local municipalities (Category B), namely   
Maletswai, Gariep, Senqu and   Elundini. Based on the size of the population, 
three Local Service Areas were formed namely; Elundini, Senqu and 
Maletswai/Gariep (see Annexure Ten). 
  
In terms of Section 16 of the Local Government Municipal System Act, 2000 
(Act 32 of 2000), local (Category B) municipalities must develop a culture of 
municipal governance that complements formal representative government 
with a system of participatory governance. For this purpose, local 
municipalities must encourage and create conditions favourable for the local 
community to participate in the affairs of the municipality, including strategic 
decisions relating to the provision of environmental health services by the 
relevant Category C municipality with whom it shares its municipal executive 
and legislative authority (Maarschalk, 2003, p.136). The next section will 
discuss the place and role of environmental health within the district health 
system. 
 
2.3.7. The place and role of environmental health within the district health 
system 
From the discussion of the district health system above it was said that the 
district health system is the vehicle for the delivery of primary health care 
services which includes environmental health services. It was also said that 
environmental health services are defined as municipal health services and 
that municipal health services are rendered within health districts by Category 
A and Category C municipalities. Furthermore, each health district (Category 
A and C municipalities) has a district health council. 
 
To assist the members of a district health council to make informed decisions 
regarding environmental health services, they will require sufficient 
information. According to Dreyer (personnel communication, 19 February 
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2007) each district health council has a District Environmental Health 
Manager who is responsible for the co-ordination of environmental health 
service delivery as well as the provision of environmental health information to 
the district health council. To be able to effectively perform this function, this 
official has to rely on the health sub-districts which are situated within the 
health district to provide the information. 
 
The function of the district and metropolitan municipalities (health districts) is 
to coordinate and to support the health sub-districts within their areas of 
jurisdiction (Wilson, 1994, p.5). Each health-sub district of a metropolitan and 
district municipality has an environmental health manager who is responsible 
for the coordination of environmental health service delivery within the area of 
the health sub-district. The said environmental health manager is also 
responsible for the provision of information to the decision-makers of the 
health sub-district and district or metropolitan municipality. From a health sub 
district of a metropolitan (Category A) municipality’s perspective, this official 
will be able to obtain the required information from the environment health 
practitioners who work within that health sub-district.  From a health sub- 
district of a district (Category C) municipality perspective, the official will be 
able to obtain the required information from the environmental health 
practitioners who work at the local municipalities situated within the area of 
jurisdiction of the health sub-district (Oliphant, personal communication, 
February 14, 2007). 
 
From a local municipality’s perspective it can be concluded that the members 
of a local municipal council will require sufficient environmental health 
information to enable them to make informed decisions from a local municipal 
council’s perspective.  Each local municipality is allocated an environmental 
health manager who is employed by the relevant health district (Category C) 
municipality. A function of this official is to provide the members of the relevant 
local municipal council, as well as the relevant health sub-district 
environmental health manager with sufficient environmental health information 
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to enable them to make informed decisions on issues pertaining to 
environmental health that may affect the local municipality. This official will 
also render, together with environmental health practitioners employed by the 
relevant district municipality, environmental health services within the area of 
jurisdiction of that local municipality. These environmental health practitioners, 
as well as those employed by the district health councils of the metropolitan 
municipalities and who work within the health sub-districts of the metropolitan 
municipalities could be seen as the first link in a chain that stretches from the 
community where they work, to parliament, being the national policy-making 
body on issues pertaining to environmental health service delivery in South 
Africa. According to Titus (personnel communication, December 15, 2006) it 
often happens that the value of an environmental health practitioner’s role is 
acknowledged only when disaster or disease strikes, yet health budgets at all 
spheres of government can be reduced through preventative environmental 
health measures and timeous monitoring. 
 
From the above it can be deduced that environmental health services are 
vested in the municipal sphere of government as municipal health services. 
The role that environmental health plays at this sphere of government 
comprises the functions as discussed in section 2.2.2.  
 
2.4. Conclusion 
The development of detailed environmental work methods and - procedures 
for the surveillance and control of avian influenza in the Eastern Cape 
province requires a comprehensive understanding of the national health care 
system within which environmental health practitioners operate. This chapter 
has attempted to describe the national health care system and to identify the 
place and role of environmental health practitioners within the national, 
provincial and municipal spheres of government. 
 
It was found that the right to health care services is well established within the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996). The 
 73 
South African government follows the primary health care philosophy of health 
care delivery which includes non-personal health care services, namely 
environmental health services. The environmental health profession has a 
constitutional obligation to protect the people of South Africa against 
environmental factors (physical, chemical, biological and social factors) that 
pose a risk to human health. The development of detailed environmental 
health work methods and - procedures for the surveillance and control of 
avian influenza can therefore be regarded as an attempt to fulfill this 
constitutional imperative. 
 
It was found that the promulgation of the National Health Act, 2004 (Act 61 of 
2003), provides the legislative framework for the state to unite the various 
elements of the national health system in a common goal and to actively 
promote and improve the national health system in South Africa. The said act 
delineates the organisational framework for health care service delivery within 
each of the three spheres of government in South Africa.  
 
The promulgation of the National Health Act, 2004 (Act 61 of 2003), put to rest 
the confusion that prevailed previously as to what is meant by environmental 
health services. Although there is still not a formal definition of environmental 
health in South Africa, a better understanding exists of what is meant by 
environmental health services. It was further concluded that municipal health 
service is environmental health service and includes the list of municipal 
health services as listed in Section 1 of the National Health Act, 2004 (Act 61 
of 2003). A further finding was that avian influenza surveillance and control is 
an activity under the services: surveillance and prevention of communicable 
diseases as listed in Section 1 of the said act.  
 
The analysis of the national health care system enabled the identification of a 
number of decision-makers within the three spheres of government. The 
decision-makers can have an influence on environmental health service 
delivery and therefore play either a direct or indirect role in the surveillance 
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and control of avian influenza. The analysis of the organisational structure of 
the national department of health enabled the identification of the following 
decision - makers: 
 
• The Minister of Health and the Cabinet; 
• members of the National Health Council; 
• the National Health Advisory Committee; 
• the Director-General of Health; 
• the Deputy Director-General: Health Service Delivery; 
• the Director: Environmental Health; and  
• the National Consultative Health Forum. 
 
From the analysis of the organizational structure of the national sphere of 
government it was found that the time it takes for information to reach the 
Minister of Health is problematic. The formal lines of communication are very 
time consuming. Communication systems should be developed that allows the 
Director: Environmental Health to communicate urgent environmental health 
information directly to the said Minister. 
 
It was pointed out that the environmental health decision- makers  within the 
provincial sphere of government (Provincial Department of Health as in the 
case of the Eastern Cape provincial health department ) include the: 
  
• Members of the Provincial Executive Committee responsible for health and 
the Provincial Legislature; 
• Provincial Health Council; 
• the Chief Director: District Health Services; 
• the Director: Primary Health Care, District and Development; and  
• the Deputy-Director: Environmental Health. 
 
 75 
From the analysis of the organizational structure of the provincial sphere of 
government the deduction was made that the time it takes for information to 
reach the relevant member of the Provincial Executive Council of Health 
(MEC) is problematic. The official lines of communication are very time 
consuming. Communication systems should be developed that allow the 
Deputy-Director: Environmental Health to communicate pressing 
environmental health issues directly to the member of the executive council. 
Unambiguous provincial guidelines need to be established for situations when 
emergencies arise. 
 
To be able to identify the environmental health decision - makers within the 
municipal sphere of government it was essential to do an analysis of the 
organisational structure of the district health system as it applies to the 
municipal sphere of government in South Africa. It was therefore necessary to 
explain what is meant by Health District, District Health Authority, District 
Health Council, a Health Sub-district and a Local Municipality.  
 
What became evident from interviews conducted with environmental decision-
makers at the municipal sphere of government is that municipalities must be 
encouraged to budget appropriately for strategies of avian influenza 
surveillance and control. The said municipalities must address avian influenza 
preparedness plans as an integral part of their annual integrated development 
plans. It was also found that all too often the value of an environmental health 
practitioner’s role is acknowledged only when disaster or disease strikes, yet 
health budgets at all spheres of government can be reduced through 
preventative environmental health measures and timeous monitoring.  
 
From interviews conducted during the study it was discovered that a need 
exists for the education of all role players on avian influenza and the training 
of environmental health practitioners on detailed work methods and -
procedures for the surveillance and control of the disease. Liaison and 
communication networks need to be strengthened amongst local 
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municipalities in an attempt to monitor and identify outbreaks at an early 
stage. 
 
The surveillance and control of a disease is dependent on its epidemiology. 
The epidemiology of avian influenza will be presented in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF AVIAN INFLUENZA 
 
3.1.  Introduction  
The surveillance and control of a disease is dependent on its epidemiology. It 
is therefore important, when attempts are made to develop or improve existing 
work methods and - procedures, to have a thorough knowledge of the 
epidemiology of the disease. Therefore a literature study on the disease 
condition and a demarcation of its relevant aspects is presented.  
 
Firstly, attention will be given to influenza as a disease and the variability of 
the virus. Secondly, the difference between human seasonal influenza, avian 
influenza and human pandemic influenza will be presented. Thirdly, the 
natural hosts and sources of the virus will be discussed. Fourthly, attention will 
be given to the clinical presentation of the virus in people and animals. This 
will be followed by the transmission of the virus and its occurrences. Lastly 
discussed are risk assessment, the possible impact of an avian influenza 
pandemic and the different phases of pandemic influenza. 
 
The resources used for this part of the study consist of manly documents from 
the World Health Organization, the National Department of Health, relevant 
literature from the internet, as well as the Pandemic Preparedness and 
Response Plans from the Provincial Departments of Health in South Africa. In 
the next section an attempt will be made to define influenza. 
 
3.2. Definition of Influenza 
The Free Dictionary (2007) describes Influenza as an acute contagious viral 
infection characterized by inflammation of the respiratory tract and by fever, 
chills, muscular pains, and prostration. Included are any of the various viral 
infections of animals, characterized generally by fever and respiratory 
involvement. 
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According to Prescott, Harley and Klein (1996), influenza, or flu, is a 
respiratory system disease caused by orthomyxoviruses which is 
characterised by chills, fever, headaches, malaise, and general muscular 
aches and pains. The National Department of Health (2006) in South Africa 
describes   influenza or 'flu' as a respiratory illness associated with infection by 
an influenza virus. Symptoms frequently include headache, fever, cough, sore 
throat, aching muscles and joints. There is a wide spectrum of severity of 
illness ranging from minor symptoms through to pneumonia and death.   
 
From the above it can be concluded that influenza is an acute contagious 
respiratory illness associated with infection by the influenza virus of the family 
Orthomyxoviridae. The illness can be present in human and in animals. The 
severity of the illness can range from mild to fatal. Symptoms frequently 
include headaches, aching muscles and joints, malaise, fever, chills, cough, 
sore throat and prostration. The next section provides a description of the 
virus. 
  
3.3. Description of the influenza virus 
According to the National Department of Health (2006), the influenza virus is 
genetically highly variable. It is this variability that gives rise to constant 
changes in its antigenicity. The genetic variability of the virus is common in 
most Ribonucleic Acid [RNA] viruses. A characteristic of the virus is that the 
antigenic changeability constantly gives rise to new strains.  The epidemiology 
of the virus is thus characterised by a constant arrival of new antigenic strains, 
resulting in recurring outbreaks or epidemics.  
 
A unique feature of the virus is the frequency with which changes in 
antigenicity occur. Alterations of the antigenic structure can lead to infection in 
humans by variants of the virus to which little or no resistance is present in the 
population at risk. This explains why influenza continues to be a major 
epidemic disease and frequently produces wide pandemics (Prescott, et al., 
1996, p.740). 
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From the above it can be deduced that the influenza virus is genetically 
extremely variable and it is this variability that gives rise to regular modification 
in the antigenicity of the virus. The antigenic changeability constantly gives 
rise to new strains, resulting in frequent outbreaks or epidemics. Next 
presented is the classification of the influenza virus. 
 
3.4. Classification of the influenza virus 
The influenza virus can be classified into three types, based on the 
antigenicity (the ability of a substance to trigger an immune response in a 
particular organism)  of surface nucleoprotein proteins, which surrounds the 
RNA genome of the virus. The three types of influenza viruses are referred to 
as Type A, Type B and Type C. All three types of influenza viruses are 
infectious but they differ in severity (Prescott, et al., 1996 p.740).  
 
According to the Biology Online Dictionary (2007), the Type A virus is the 
cause of pandemics. This virus can infect other mammals and birds; Type B 
virus only affects humans and the Type C virus causes only a mild infection in 
humans. According to Schoub and Martin (2006, p.20), the Type A influenza 
virus is further divided into subtypes based on the antigenicity of the two 
proteins embedded in the envelope of the virus, which are used to attach to 
the host cell and to penetrate into the host cell.  These are haemagglutinin 
(HA), (so named because the protein agglutinates red blood cells which form 
the basis of the serological test to identify the virus using specific antisera - 
the haemagglutination inhibition or HI test) and neuraminidase (NA) (so 
named because this protein is an enzyme which digests the neuraminic acid 
receptor of the cell to allow the attached virus to penetrate into the cell).  
Sixteen different HA viruses and nine different NA’s have been identified in 
various combinations in wild aquatic birds, the reservoir host for influenza 
viruses.  Only three subtypes are known to infect humans and these are 
H1N1, H2N2 and H3N2.  At present two of the subtypes are circulating in 
humans, namely H1N1 and H3N2.   
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Each of the Type A subtypes as well as the Type B subtype are, in turn, 
subdivided into strains based on the antigenicity of the HA protein. The strains 
are designated according to a formula which describes the full pedigree, i.e. 
its type, geographical location of where it was first isolated and the year of 
isolation. Hence the virus strains incorporated into the 1997 vaccine were 
designated as A/Texas/36/91 (H1N1), A/Wuhan/359/95 (H3N2), B/Beijing/ 
184/93 or B/Harbin/07/94. The additional number before the year of isolation 
is merely a laboratory identification number (Schoub & Martin, 2006, p.25). 
 
From the above it can be concluded that the influenza viruses can be 
classified into three types based on the antigenicity of the nucleoproteins 
which surrounds the RNA genome of the virus. The three types are Type A, 
Type B and Type C of which Type A is the most virulent and infects mammals 
and birds. Influenza Type A viruses can be divided into subtypes on the basis 
of their surface proteins - hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA). There 
are sixteen known HA subtypes and nine NA subtypes. The HA and NA 
surface proteins can form a number of possible combinations. In the following 
section the mechanism of influenza virus variability are discussed. 
 
3.5. The mechanism of influenza virus variability 
According to the National Department of Health (2006), there are two ways in 
which the influenza virus can change its antigenicity. The first one (antigenic 
shift) is rare but a dramatic event. The other one (antigenic drift) represents a 
more common and subtle change. The two ways of changing antigenicity are 
described below. 
 
3.5.1. Antigenic shift 
The influenza virus is one of the few viruses where the individual genes occur 
on separate and discrete pieces of nucleic acid instead of the more usual 
complete single strand for the whole genome. As a result of this, if two 
different subtypes happen to infect the same cell, genes from different origins 
may be swopped when the progeny virus is put together in the assembly 
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phase of the virus’ replication. Usually the alien gene or genes will produce an 
inconsequential hybrid progeny virus which cannot survive or be propagated. 
This process is called reassortment and the hybrid offsprings are referred to 
as reassortants (Schoub & Martin, 2006, p.25). 
 
The events during an antigenic shift and antigenic drift are illustrated in the 
diagram in Annexure Eleven (National Institute of Allergy and Infectious 
Diseases, 2007, p.2). In China and the Far East, the enormous human 
populations come into close contact with animal reservoirs that harbour a 
great variety of influenza subtypes. Nevertheless, reassortment producing a 
new human virus is a rare event, happening about once every 10-40 years. 
When it does occur, it gives rise to a completely new subtype of virus 
(acquiring a totally new HA and sometimes a new NA protein as well) to which 
the human population will be readily susceptible and this would then result in 
the dramatic and sudden classical pandemics such as the 1918/19 Spanish 
flu pandemic, the 1957 Asian flu pandemic and the 1968 Hong Kong flu 
pandemic. The sudden and major change in antigenicity of the virus is 
therefore called an antigenic shift (National Institute of Allergy and Infectious 
Diseases, 2007, p.1). 
 
3.5.2. Antigenic drift 
Antigenic drift is a more subtle change in the antigenicity of the HA protein - 
the protein involved specifically in the critical attachment of the virus to its 
receptor on the host cell. Thus, even subtle changes (i.e. sometimes only one 
or two amino acids) may enable the virus to elude the host’s immunity. These 
HA mutations occur readily and continually. Point mutations (i.e. substitution 
of one amino acid) usually do not translate on their own into a significant 
antigenic change. However, accumulation of these point mutations under the 
selective pressure of antibodies formed in innumerable human hosts will 
eventually produce meaningful antigenic changes, resulting in a virus which 
can spread throughout the human population, causing widespread epidemic 
activity. This more gradual but progressive change is called antigenic drift and 
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it gives rise to new antigenic strains of influenza, approximately every three to 
five years (National Department of Health, 2006, p.12). 
 
From the above it can be concluded that there are two ways in which the 
influenza virus can change its antigenicity, namely antigenic shift and 
antigenic drift. Antigenic shift represents a sudden and major change in 
antigenicity that gives rise to a completely new subtype of virus (about once 
every 10-40 years), which can cause dramatic and sudden classical 
pandemics. Antigenic drift represents a gradual but progressive change which 
can then spread throughout the human population, causing widespread 
epidemic activity, approximately every three to five years. In the next section 
the difference between human seasonal influenza, avian influenza and human 
pandemic influenza are clarified. 
 
3.6. Difference between human seasonal influenza, avian influenza and 
human pandemic influenza 
According to the Western Cape Department of Health (2006), it is very 
important to understand that there are fundamental differences between 
human seasonal influenza, avian influenza and human pandemic influenza. It 
is therefore important that those involved in the surveillance and control of 
avian influenza are able to differentiate between the different types of 
influenza in order to develop scientifically formulated work methods and - 
procedures for the surveillance and control of avian influenza. While avian flu 
is diagnosed in birds, causing illness primarily in birds and potentially leading 
to severe losses in the poultry industry, its direct human health implications 
are comparatively minor. However, it may serve as the origin of a new 
"human" influenza virus subtype which might then be rapidly transmitted 
between people and cause a human influenza pandemic.  
 
3.6.1. Seasonal influenza  
Influenza viruses cause outbreaks of influenza every winter season (May to 
August in the Southern hemisphere and November to February in the 
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Northern hemisphere). This is called seasonal influenza. These outbreaks are 
variable but usually affect between two and thirty percent of the population 
resulting in a variable degree of morbidity and mortality, mostly confined to 
elderly individuals, especially those with underlying medical conditions. 
  
The virological mechanism behind seasonal influenza is antigenic drift.  As 
they are transmitted from human to human (being highly contagious and 
therefore infecting large numbers of individuals), pre-existing immunity 
"drives" the selection of mutant viruses that are less well neutralised by the 
immune system. This leads to slight changes in the genetic make-up of 
circulating virus strains over time. When significant antigenic variation occurs 
in the circulating virus so that the population is largely susceptible, 
significantly greater epidemic activity occurs which is often global in extent, 
with varying intensity in different countries often depending on population 
immunity (Western Cape Department of Health, 2006). Discussed next is 
avian influenza. 
 
3.6.2. Avian influenza 
According to the World Health Organization (2005a), avian influenza is an 
infectious disease of birds caused by the Type A strain of the virus. All birds 
are thought to be susceptible to infection with avian influenza. Avian influenza 
infection in birds causes a wide spectrum of symptoms, ranging from mild 
illness (low pathogenicity) to a highly contagious and rapidly fatal disease 
resulting in severe epidemics. This is known as “highly pathogenic avian 
influenza” (HPAI) which is characterized by a sudden onset, severe illness, 
and rapid death of affected birds/flocks. The mortality rate can reach 100%. 
 
According to the Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy (2006), 
avian influenza, also called fowl plague, avian flu and bird flu, is a highly 
contagious viral disease with up to 100% mortality in domestic fowl. The 
disease is caused by the influenza A virus, subtypes H5 and H7. All types of 
birds are susceptible to the virus but outbreaks occur most often in chickens 
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and turkeys. The infection may be brought about by migratory wild birds, 
which can carry the virus without showing any signs of the disease. Type A 
influenza viruses can infect several animal species aside from birds, including 
pigs, horses, seals and whales. Birds are an especially important species 
because all known subtypes of influenza A viruses circulate among wild birds, 
which are the natural hosts for influenza A viruses (Center for Infectious 
Disease Research and Policy, 2006, p.1). The Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (2007, p.1) states that avian influenza 
viruses are members of the family Orthomyxoviridae. 
 
Pienaar and Horner (2005, p.5) describe avian influenza as a highly 
contagious viral disease of domestic poultry and many species of wild birds, 
caused by infection with a Type A influenza virus.  Type A viruses can cause 
infection in man, pigs, equines, birds and marine mammals. The virus has a 
worldwide occurrence and may occur as a low pathogenic strain (LPAI) or as 
a high pathogenic (virulent) strain (HPAI).  The latter form is, according to the 
current International Animal Health Association Disease Listing, a “List A” 
disease and could result in mortality approaching 100% in chickens, turkeys, 
and guinea fowl. 
 
The new definition of Notifiable Avian Influenza (NAI), with specific reference 
to the poultry industry as proposed by the International Animal Health 
Association, is an infection of poultry caused by any influenza A virus of the 
H5 or H7 subtypes, or by any avian influenza virus with an intravenous 
pathogenicity index (IVPI) greater than 1.2 (or as an alternative at least 75% 
mortality) as described below. NAI viruses can be divided into highly 
pathogenic notifiable avian influenza viruses (HPNAI) and low pathogenic 
notifiable avian influenza (LPNAI). 
 
HPNAI viruses have an IVPI in 6-week-old chickens greater than 1.2 or, as an 
alternative, cause at least 75% mortality in 4 to 8 week-old chickens infected 
intravenously. H5 and H7 viruses which do not have an IVPI of greater than 
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1.2 (or cause less that 75% mortality in an intravenous lethality test) should be 
sequenced to determine whether multiple basic amino acids are present at the 
cleavage site of the hemagglutinin molecule (HA0); if the amino acid motif is 
similar to that observed for other HPNAI isolates. The isolate being tested 
should be considered as HPNAI. LPNAI are all influenza A viruses of H5 and 
H7 subtypes that are not HPNAI (Pienaar & Horner, 2005, p.16). 
 
 The Western Cape Department of Health (2006) states that avian influenza, 
or “bird flu”, is caused by different influenza virus strains that normally infect 
only various species of birds and less commonly other animals such as pigs. 
The natural reservoir of these influenza viruses is wild water birds in whom 
they typically do not cause disease. In domestic poultry, infection with avian 
influenza viruses may cause two forms of the disease. The so-called “low 
pathogenic form” commonly causes only mild symptoms (e.g. ruffled feathers, 
a drop in egg production) and may easily go undetected. The “highly 
pathogenic form” is far more dramatic. It spreads very rapidly through poultry 
flocks, causes disease, affecting multiple internal organs and has a mortality 
that can approach 100%, often within 48 hours. Accordingly, low pathogenic 
avian influenza (LPAI) viruses are distinguished from highly pathogenic avian 
influenza (HPAI) viruses. The latter all belong to the H5 and H7 HA subtypes, 
but not all viruses with those subtypes are highly pathogenic. Their 
occurrence has to be notified to the World Organisation for Animal Health 
(Office International des Epizooties, OIE); hence the terms notifiable avian 
influenza (NAI) and HPNAI or LPNAI (Western Cape Department of Health, 
2006). 
 
From the above it can be concluded that avian influenza, also called fowl 
plague, avian flu or bird flu, is a highly contagious viral disease with up to 
100% mortality in domestic fowl. Avian influenza viruses are members of the 
family Orthomyxoviridae. All types of birds are susceptible to the virus but 
outbreaks occur most often in chickens and turkeys. Type A viruses can 
cause infection in man, pigs, equines, birds and marine mammals. Avian 
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influenza can be divided into two broad categories: (1) Low Pathogenic Avian 
Influenza (LPAI) and (2) Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI). Avian 
influenza (NAI) is an infection of poultry caused by any influenza A virus of the 
H5 or H7 subtypes.  Low Pathogenic Avian Influenza (forms H5 and H7) 
subtypes have been identified in poultry in South Africa but as the name 
implies, they do not cause major mortality problems. To date no Highly 
Pathogenic Avian Influenza strain has been reported in South Africa. 
 
3.6.3. Human pandemic influenza 
According to the Western Cape Department of Health (2006), an influenza 
pandemic occurs when a new influenza virus subtype emerges that has not 
previously circulated in humans. This phenomenon may be caused by 
antigenic shift as a result of so-called "reassortment" of two different influenza 
viruses infecting the same individual (and cell) and exchanging their gene 
segments. Thus, a new influenza virus may emerge against which no human 
being has any degree of immunity. This may result in a global pandemic with 
high numbers of cases and deaths. Improved transport systems, rapid 
urbanization and increased travel are more likely to facilitate the spread of the 
new viruses worldwide (Western Cape Department of Health, 2006). 
 
From the above it can be concluded that there is a fundamental difference 
between human seasonal influenza, avian influenza and human pandemic 
influenza. While avian flu is diagnosed in birds, causing illness primarily in 
birds and potentially leading to severe losses in the poultry industry, its direct 
human health implications are comparatively minor. However, it may serve as 
the origin of a new "human" influenza virus subtype which might be rapidly 
transmitted between people to cause a human influenza pandemic. Seasonal 
influenza viruses cause outbreaks of influenza every winter season. These 
outbreaks usually affect between 2-30% of the population, resulting in a 
variable degree of morbidity and mortality, mostly confined to elderly 
individuals, especially those with underlying medical conditions - Avian 
influenza or “bird flu”, is caused by different influenza virus strains that 
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normally infect only various species of birds, and less commonly other animals 
such as pigs. The natural reservoir of these influenza viruses is wild water 
birds in whom they typically do not cause disease. Although avian influenza 
viruses are normally highly species-specific and of concern to poultry farmers 
and veterinary authorities, they have on comparatively rare occasions crossed 
the species barrier to infect humans. An influenza pandemic (global epidemic) 
occurs when a new influenza virus subtype emerges that has not previously 
circulated in humans. In the next section the natural hosts of avian influenza 
virus are discussed.      
 
3.7. Natural hosts of the avian influenza virus      
Avian influenza virus outbreaks occur most frequently in domestic fowl and 
turkeys, although ducks, geese, guinea fowl, quail and pheasants are also 
susceptible. A particular isolate may produce severe disease in turkeys but 
not in chickens or any other avian species. It would be impossible to 
generalize on the host range for HPAI, for it will likely vary with the isolate. 
This assumption is supported by reports of farm outbreaks where only a single 
avian species of several species present on the farm became infected. Many 
species of wild birds, particularly waterbirds and seabirds are also susceptible, 
but infections in these birds are generally subclinical (Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations, 2007). 
 
According to Olsen and Munster (2006, p.14), the most important avian 
species that are known to carry avian influenza A viruses are ducks, geese, 
swans, gulls, terns, waders, and rails. Of all the avian species, ducks have 
been shown to have the highest prevalence for the influenza A virus. 
  
From the above it can be concluded that domestic fowl, ducks, geese, 
turkeys, guinea fowl, quail and pheasants can be regarded as natural hosts of 
the avian influenza virus. Ducks have the highest prevalence for the influenza 
A virus. In the next section the sources of infection of the avian influenza virus 
are discussed. 
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3.8. Sources of infection with the avian influenza virus         
Direct or indirect contact between domestic flocks and wild migratory 
waterfowl has been implicated as a frequent cause of avian influenza 
epidemics in poultry populations. It is generally accepted that migratory 
waterfowl, most notably wild ducks, are the natural reservoir of avian viruses, 
which can be transmitted to domestic bird populations and to commercial 
poultry. In the absence of good surveillance and prompt control measures, 
avian epidemics can last for years (World Health Organization, 2005a). 
 
The immediate source of infection for domestic poultry can seldom be 
ascertained, but most outbreaks probably start with direct or indirect contact of 
domestic poultry with migratory waterbirds. Many of the strains that circulate in 
wild birds are either non-pathogenic or mildly pathogenic for poultry. However, 
a virulent strain may emerge either by genetic mutation or by reassortment of 
less virulent strains. Scientific evidence indicates that the former mechanism 
of infection occurred in 1983-87 in the Eastern United States (Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2007). 
Swine appear to be important in the epidemiology of infection of turkeys with 
swine influenza virus when they are in close proximity. Other mammals do not 
appear to be involved in the epidemiology of HPAI. The infection of humans 
with an H5 avian influenza virus in Hong Kong in 1997 has resulted in a 
reconsideration of the role of the avian species in the epidemiology of human 
influenza (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2007). 
 
From the above it can be deduced that it is commonly accepted that migratory 
waterfowl, most conspicuously wild ducks, are the natural reservoir of avian 
influenza viruses, which can be transmitted to domestic bird populations and 
to commercial poultry. Direct or indirect contact between domestic flocks and 
wild migratory waterfowl has been implicated as a recurrent cause of 
epidemics in poultry populations. The next section describes the clinical 
presentation of the avian influenza virus. 
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3.9. Clinical presentation of the avian influenza virus 
According to Nagpal (2006), the current strain of avian flu tends to infect 
young people and children who had previously been in good health. Avian flu 
in people causes a viral pneumonia that is potentially fatal, even before there 
is evidence of secondary bacterial infection. 
 
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2007), states 
that the clinical signs are very variable and are influenced by factors such as 
the virulence of the infecting virus, species affected, age, sex, concurrent 
diseases and the environment. In the next section the clinical features in 
humans will be discussed. 
 
3.9.1. Clinical features in humans  
The clinical spectrum of influenza A (H5N1) in humans is based on 
descriptions of hospitalized patients. The frequencies of milder illnesses, 
subclinical infections, and atypical presentations (e.g., encephalopathy and 
gastroenteritis) have not been determined, but case reports indicate that each 
of these occurs. Most patients had been previously healthy young children or 
adults (Hien, et al., 2004, p.1179). 
 
The incubation period of avian influenza A (H5N1) may be longer than for 
other known human influenzas. In 1997, most cases occurred within two to 
four days after exposure. Recent reports indicate similar intervals but with 
ranges of up to eight days. The case-to-case intervals in household clusters 
have generally been two to five days, but the upper limit has been eight to 17 
days, possibly owing to unrecognized exposure to infected animals or 
environmental factors (Hien, et al., 2004, p.1179).  
 
It therefore can be deduced that the clinical signs in humans are inconsistent 
and are influenced by factors such as the virulence of the infecting virus, 
species affected, age, sex, concurrent diseases and environmental factors. 
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The incubation period of the virus in humans is two to four days after 
exposure. Initial symptoms in humans are described next. 
 
3.9.2. Initial symptoms in humans 
Most patients have initial symptoms of high fever (typically a temperature of 
more than 38°C) and an influenza-like illness with lower respiratory tract 
symptoms. Upper respiratory tract symptoms are sometimes present. Unlike 
patients with infections caused by avian influenza A (H7) viruses, patients with 
avian influenza A (H5N1) rarely have conjunctivitis. Diarrhea, vomiting, 
abdominal pain, pleuritic pain, and bleeding from the nose and gums have 
also been reported early in the course of the illness in some patients. Watery 
diarrhea without blood or inflammatory changes appears to be more common 
than in influenza due to human viruses and may precede respiratory 
manifestations by up to one week (World Health Organization, 2004b, p.1). 
 
It can thus be concluded that most avian influenza infected patients have 
initially high fever and influenza-like illness symptoms. The section below 
describes the case definition for avian influenza in humans. 
 
3.9.3. Case definition for avian influenza in humans 
The World Health Organization (2005b), points out that due to local conditions 
each country may have a different case definition for avian influenza in 
humans. In Chapter Four (see Section 4.3.1.) a case definition for avian 
influenza in humans is developed based on the case definition of the World 
Health Organization (2005b, p.3). 
 
From the above it can be deduced that all countries will have their own case 
definitions for avian influenza and that they can use the World Health 
Organization’s definition as a template in developing theirs. In the next section 
clinical signs in animals will be discussed. 
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3.9.4. Clinical signs of avian influenza in birds  
In virulent, or highly pathogenic avian influenza of the type traditionally 
associated with fowl plague, the disease appears suddenly in a flock and 
many birds die either without premonitory signs or with minimal signs of 
depression, inappetence, ruffled feathers and fever. Other birds show 
weakness and a staggering gait. Hens may at first lay soft-shelled eggs, but 
soon stop laying. Sick birds often sit or stand in a semi-comatose state with 
their heads touching the ground. Combs and wattles are cyanotic and 
oedematous, and may have petechial or ecchymotic haemorrhages at their 
tips. Profuse watery diarrhoea is frequently present and birds are excessively 
thirsty. Respiration may be laboured. Haemorrhages may occur on 
unfeathered areas of skin. The mortality rate varies from 50 to 100% (Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2007). 
 
In broilers, the signs of disease are frequently less obvious with severe 
depression, inappetence, and a marked increase in mortality being the first 
abnormalities observed. Oedema of the face and neck and neurological signs 
such as torticollis and ataxia may also be seen. The disease in turkeys is 
similar to that seen in layers, but it lasts two or three days longer and is 
occasionally accompanied by swollen sinuses. In domestic ducks and geese 
the signs of depression, inappetence and diarrhea are similar to those in 
layers, though frequently with swollen sinuses. Younger birds may exhibit 
neurological signs (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 
2007). The incubation period is usually three to seven days, depending upon 
the isolate; the dose of inoculum, the species, and the age of the bird (World 
Health Organization, 2006e). Discuss below are differential diagnosis in birds. 
 
3.9.5. Differential diagnosis in animals 
According to Harder & Werner (2006, p.1), the following diseases must be 
considered in the differential diagnosis of virulent avian influenza: 
 
• Newcastle disease; 
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• infectious laryngotracheitis; 
• duck plague; 
• acute poisonings; 
• other diseases causing swelling of the combs and wattles; 
• acute fowl cholera and other septicaemic diseases; and 
• bacterial cellulitis of the comb and wattles. 
 
Less severe forms of the disease may be confused with, or complicated by 
many of the diseases with respiratory or enteric signs. Avian influenza should 
be suspected in any disease outbreak in poultry that persists, despite the 
application of preventive and therapeutic measures for other diseases (Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2007). It can be concluded 
from the above that avian influenza must be suspected in any disease 
outbreak in poultry, despite the fact that there are other bird diseases with 
similar symptoms.  
 
3.9.6. The pathology of avian influenza 
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(2007), birds that die of a peracute disease may show minimal gross lesions, 
consisting of dehydration and congestion of viscera and muscles. In birds that 
die after a prolonged clinical course, petechial and ecchymotic haemorrhages 
occur throughout the body, particularly in the larynx, trachea, proventriculus 
and epicardial fat, and on serosal surfaces adjacent to the sternum. There is 
extensive subcutaneous oedema, particularly around the head and hocks. 
The carcase may be dehydrated. Yellow or grey necrotic foci may be present 
in the spleen, liver, kidneys and lungs. The air sacs may contain an exudate 
and the spleen may be enlarged and haemorrhagic. 
 
Avian influenza is characterised histologically by vascular disturbances 
leading to oedema, haemorrhages and perivascular cuffing, especially in the 
myocardium, spleen, lungs, brain and wattles. Necrotic foci are present in the 
lungs, liver and kidneys. Gliosis, vascular proliferaion and neuronal 
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degeneration may be present in the brain (Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations, 2007). Transmission of avian influenza is discussed in 
the next section. 
 
3.10. Transmission of avian influenza  
Although the names avian influenza and bird flu conjure up images of an 
upper respiratory disease, in birds a large volume of virus is shed through the 
faeces. Infected faecal contamination of feed, water, equipment, clothing, 
boots, etc, is thus a common method of spreading the disease. Birds that 
survive infection excrete the virus for at least ten days, orally and in faeces, 
thus facilitating further spread at live poultry markets and by migratory birds 
(Nagpal, 2006). The following paragraphs discuss different modes of 
transmission. 
  
3.10.1. Transmission of avian influenza between humans 
Available evidence suggests that transmission of human influenza viruses 
occurs through multiple routes including large droplets by direct or indirect 
contact. Airborne (droplet nuclei) transmission may be more likely to occur in 
situations in which droplet nuclei particles are generated (i.e., aerosol-
generating procedures in infected patients). Using current transmission-based 
terminology, influenza is transmitted between humans via droplets (droplet 
transmission), by direct and indirect contact (contact transmission), and small-
particle aerosols (airborne transmission). The importance of each route of 
transmission, particularly in settings where there are adequate air changes 
per hour, remains unclear (World Health Organization, 2006a). 
 
The World Health Organization (2006a) is of the opinion that although 
assessment of possible human-to-human transmission of avian influenza A 
(H5N1) is complicated by the likelihood that close contacts often have similar 
exposure histories (e.g., poultry exposures), available evidence indicates that 
limited human-to-human transmission avian influenza, including influenza A 
(H5N1), in humans may have occurred. Sustained transmission has not been 
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demonstrated and there is no evidence that there has been more than one 
generation of human-to-human transmission. 
 
 In the 1997 avian influenza A (H5N1) outbreak in Hong Kong, there was 
evidence of possible human-to-human transmission between infected persons 
and household contacts and health care workers, but social contact was not 
associated with avian influenza A (H5N1) infection. In the current avian 
influenza outbreak, investigation of human avian influenza A (H5N1) cases 
suggests that human-to-human transmission may have occurred in household 
clusters and in one case of apparent child to mother transmission. Thus far, all 
secondary cases appear to have had close contact with cases without the use 
of precautions and human-to-human transmission via the airborne route has 
not been identified (World Health Organization, 2006a). 
 
Human conjunctivae and ciliated nasal epithelial cells contain cellular 
receptors that are preferentially recognized by avian, rather than human, 
influenza haemagglutinin. Therefore, the contribution of the possible routes of 
transmission in humans may differ between avian influenza A (H5N1) and 
seasonal human influenza. Although it is unknown at this time whether 
inoculation of the eye or nose will be important in the acquisition of human 
avian influenza A (H5N1) infection, it seems prudent to protect these sites 
from inoculation. Also, since diarrhoea has been frequently noted in avian 
influenza avian influenza A (H5N1) infected patients and avian influenza A 
(H5N1) has been isolated from the faeces of a human case, faeces may also 
prove to be a source of infection (World Health Organization, 2006a).  
 
The World Health Organization (2006e) states that disease transmission and 
severity may also be related to viral load, viral strain, and host immune 
response. Although human-to-human transmission of avian influenza A 
(H5N1) has been rare to date, the accumulation of point mutations or 
reassortment with a human influenza virus could lead to increased 
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transmissibility of the virus at any time. Infections in health care workers could 
signal such a change.  
 
From the above it can be construed that human-to-human transmission of 
avian influenza A (H5N1) has been infrequent to date. The accumulation of 
point mutations or reassortment with a human influenza virus could lead to 
increased transmissibility of the virus. Discussed blow are the transmission of 
avian influenza from the environment to humans. 
 
3.10.2. Transmission of avian influenza from birds to humans  
According to the World Health Organization (2006a), the first human cases of 
avian influenza (H5N1) associated with the current outbreak in birds were 
confirmed in January 2004, after clinical samples taken from two children and 
one adult admitted to a hospital in Hanoi with severe respiratory illness tested 
positive for this strain. Since then, additional human cases have occurred in 
several countries. The clinical spectrum of avian influenza (H5N1) infections in 
humans ranges from asymptomatic to a severe disseminated disease.  
 
Transmission of avian influenza viruses from birds to people remains relatively 
rare and in most cases occurs as a result of direct contact with infected poultry 
or other birds or their faeces. Faecal material can contaminate dust, soil, 
water, feed, equipment, clothing and feathers. Transmission to people only 
occurs with certain strains of avian influenza. According to the World Health 
Organization (2006a), there is evidence that the H5N1 strain of the bird flu 
virus - which has been circulating in birds - has a unique capacity to mutate 
and jump the species barrier causing a disease with high mortality in humans. 
The first priority, according to the World Health Organization, is to reduce 
opportunities for human exposure to the largest reservoir of the virus, viz, 
infected poultry. This is achieved through the rapid detection of poultry 
outbreaks and the emergency introduction of control measures, including the 
destruction of all infected or exposed poultry stock and the proper disposal of 
carcasses.  
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Normally, avian influenza viruses do not infect humans because of host 
barriers to infection, such as cell receptor specificities. However, they can 
occasionally cross the species barrier and directly infect humans, including 
highly pathogenic strains that have caused a fatal disease in humans (Webby 
& Webster, 2003). In 1997, avian influenza A (H5N1) caused an outbreak in 
domestic poultry in Hong Kong and also infected humans, hospitalizing 18 
people and causing six deaths (Yuen, et al., 1998; Chan, 2004, p.2). Since 
then, other avian influenza outbreaks, e.g., H9N2 in 1999, H7N2 in 2002, and 
H7N7 in 2003, have resulted in human infections (Horimoto & Kawaoka, 
2005). To date no cases of bird flu caused by the H5N1 strain have been 
reported in South Africa. 
 
From the above it can be deduced that transmission of avian influenza viruses 
to people remains relatively uncommon and in most cases crop up as a result 
of direct contact with infected poultry or other birds or their faeces. In general, 
avian influenza viruses do not infect humans but occasionally transcend the 
species barrier and can infect humans.  
 
3.10.3. Transmission of avian influenza from the environment to humans 
Given the survival of influenza A (H5N1) in the environment, several modes of 
transmission are theoretically possible. Oral ingestion of contaminated water 
during swimming and direct intranasal or conjunctival inoculation during 
exposure to water are potential modes of transmission, as is contamination of 
hands from infected fomites and subsequent self-inoculation. The widespread 
use of untreated poultry faeces as fertilizer is another possible risk factor 
(Hien, et al., 2004, p.1179). 
 
Apart from being highly contagious, avian influenza viruses are readily 
transmitted from farm to farm by mechanical means, such as by contaminated 
equipment, vehicles, feed, cages, or clothing. Highly pathogenic viruses can 
survive for long periods in the environment, especially when temperatures are 
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low. Stringent sanitary measures on farms can, however, confer some degree 
of protection (Pienaar & Horner, 2005, p.7). 
 
From the above it can be concluded that that there are several possible 
modes of avian influenza transmission from the environment to humans. A 
further deduction is that the avian influenza virus can survive in various harsh 
environmental conditions. Below explained is the transmission in birds. 
 
3.10.4. Transmission of avian influenza in birds 
According to Nagpal (2006), birds that survive infection excrete the virus for at 
least ten days, orally and in faeces, thus facilitating further spread to live 
poultry markets and to migratory birds. Once avian influenza is established in 
domestic poultry, it is a highly contagious disease and wild birds are no longer 
an essential ingredient for its spread. Infected birds excrete the virus in high 
concentrations in their faeces and also in nasal and ocular discharges. Once 
introduced into a flock, the virus is spread from flock to flock by the usual 
methods involving the movement of infected birds, contaminated equipment, 
egg flats, feed trucks and service crews to mention a few. The disease 
generally spreads rapidly in a flock by direct contact, but on occasions spread 
is erratic. 
 
Airborne transmission may occur if birds are in close proximity and with 
appropriate air movement. Birds are readily infected via instillation of the virus 
into the conjunctival sac, nares, or the trachea. Preliminary field and 
laboratory evidence indicates that the virus can be recovered from the yolk 
and albumen of eggs laid by hens at the height of the disease. The possibility 
of vertical transmission is unresolved; however, it is unlikely that infected 
embryos could survive and hatch. Attempts to hatch eggs in disease isolation 
cabinets from a broiler breeder flock at the height of the disease failed to 
result in any AI-infected chickens. This does not mean that broken 
contaminated eggs could not be the source of virus to infect chicks after they 
hatch in the same incubator. The hatching of eggs from a diseased flock 
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would probably be associated with considerable risk (Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations, 2007).  Next discussed are the risk of 
spreading avian influenza in poultry and related industries.  
 
3.10.5. Risk of spreading the avian influenza in poultry and related industries 
According to Pienaar and Horner (2005, p.8), avian influenza could appear in 
more than one province within a short space of time because of the ease of 
spread and bird movement from a single initial introduction. The poultry 
industry is important for South Africa’s food security as it is a major supplier of 
animal protein and supplies many direct and indirect industries. It therefore 
becomes important to develop detailed work methods and - procedures for the 
surveillance and control of avian influenza within these industries.  
 
According to Pienaar and Horner (2005), the South African poultry industry is 
broadly divided into four sectors, namely: 
 
• A large commercial/industrial sector; 
• a widely distributed small-commercial sector; 
• a widely distributed village poultry population, backyard poultry and pet 
bird collections; and 
• the ostrich industry. 
 
Nagpal (2006, p.23) list the poultry and related industries that pose a high risk 
of avian influenza spread as follows: 
 
• Primary and secondary breeder farms; 
• Hatcheries; 
• Broiler /grower farms; 
• Layer farms; 
• Pullet rearing farms; 
• Non-commercial sector; 
• Abattoirs; 
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• Further processing; 
• Egg depots; 
• Retail outlets; 
• Feed industry; 
• Pharmaceutical industry; and 
• Poultry equipment, buildings, electronics, manufacturing and supply 
industries. 
 
According to Nagpal (2006, p.23). The possible routes of the avian influenza 
virus entry into South Africa include the following activities.  
 
• Importation of live birds (domestic or other); 
• importation of poultry products; 
• smuggling of birds or products; 
• return of persons who have been in direct/indirect contact with infected 
chickens/premises overseas; and 
• contact with wild birds especially waterfowl and waterbirds. 
 
 Pienaar and Horner (2005), state that it is important to recognise the danger 
of open dams/vleis near poultry premises which may be used by wild birds.  
Water from such areas could act as a source of the avian influenza virus. 
Poultry that have access from the said areas could in turn infect other poultry 
flocks. 
  
From the above it can be concluded it is important to identify all possible risk 
areas that may increase the risk of spreading avian influenza in the country. 
The identification of the said risk areas can be used in the development of 
detailed work methods and - procedures for the surveillance and control of 
avian influenza. The next section discusses incidences of avian influenza. 
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3.11. Incidences of avian influenza 
The avian influenza virus has a worldwide occurrence and may occur as a low 
(LPAI) or high (HPAI) pathogenic (virulent) strain (World Health Organization, 
2006a).In the sections that follow the incidences of avian influenza will be 
discussed. 
 
3.11.1. Avian influenza incidences in the world  
The outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1), which began in 
Southeast Asia in mid-2003, is the largest and most severe on record. Never 
before in the recorded history of this disease have so many countries been 
simultaneously affected. The avian influenza A (H5N1) virus has also proved 
to be especially tenacious. Since January 2004 the World Health Organization 
has reported human cases of avian influenza A (H5N1) in Asia, Africa, the 
Pacific, Europe, and the Near East. Since December 2003, avian influenza A 
(H5N1) infections in animals have also been reported in Asia, Africa, the 
Pacific, Europe, and the Near East (World Health Organization, 2007c). 
 
The avian influenza A (H5N1) epizootic (animal outbreak) in Asia and parts of 
Europe, the Near East, and Africa is not expected to diminish significantly in 
the short term. Despite the death or destruction of an estimated million birds, 
the virus is now considered endemic in many parts of Indonesia and Vietnam 
and in some parts of Cambodia, China, Thailand, and the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic (World Health Organization, 2006e). 
 
3.11.2. Epidemiological case investigations of human avian influenza 
The paragraph below presents notable findings of epidemiologic 
investigations of human H5N1 cases (World Health Organization, 2006a): 
 
• Thailand, 2004: An investigation concluded that probable human-to-human 
spread of influenza A (H5N1) had occurred in a family as a result of 
prolonged and very close contact between an ill child and her mother. 
Transmission did not continue beyond one person; 
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• Vietnam, 2004: While the majority of known human H5N1 cases have 
begun with respiratory symptoms, one atypical fatal case of encephalitis in 
a child in southern Vietnam was identified retrospectively as H5N1 
influenza through testing of cerebrospinal fluid, faecal matter, and throat 
and serum samples. Further research is needed to ascertain the 
implications of such findings; 
• Vietnam, 2005: Investigations suggest transmission of H5N1 viruses to at 
least two persons through consumption of uncooked duck blood;  
• Azerbaijan, 2006: Investigations revealed contact with H5N1-infected wild 
dead birds (swans) as the most plausible source of infection in several 
cases in children. The children were involved in removing feathers from the 
birds; and 
• Indonesia, 2006: The World Health Organization reported evidence of 
human-to-human spread. In this situation, eight people in one family were 
infected. The first family member is thought to have become ill through 
contact with infected poultry. This person then infected six family 
members. One of those six people (a child) then infected another family 
member (his father). No further spread outside of the exposed family was 
documented or suspected.  
 
Confirmed instances of avian influenza viruses infecting humans since 1997 
are listed in Annexure 12 (Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy, 
2006). In Annexure 13 and Annexure 14 respectively, affected areas with 
confirmed human cases of H5N1 avian influenza since 2003 and areas 
reporting confirmed occurrence of H5N1 avian  influenza in poultry and wild 
birds since 2003, are illustrated (World Health Organization, 2006e). From the 
above maps it can be concluded that recent H5N1 avian influenza occurrence 
is not limited to Southeast Asia, but has now also affected birds and human in 
Europe and in Africa.  
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3.11.3. Avian influenza incidences in South Africa  
To date, no cases of bird flu caused by the highly pathogenic avian influenza 
strain have been reported in South Africa. However, since the first isolation of 
the avian influenza strain H5N2, two recent infections of the H5N2 avian 
influenza virus were detected in South Africa (National Department of Health, 
2005).  
 
Firstly, in August 2004, H5N2 avian influenza virus was isolated on a farm in 
the Eastern Cape province and a second H5N2 outbreak was recorded during 
May 2006 in the Western Cape districts of Mossel Bay and Riversdale. 
Previously avian influenza viruses were found in ostriches in 1991, 1994 and 
1995.  LPAI (H6N2) was reported and confirmed for the first time in the 
commercial chicken industry in South Africa, following outbreaks of the 
disease in KwaZulu-Natal in 2002 and subsequently in Gauteng, the Free 
State, North-West, Mpumalanga and the Western Cape provinces (National 
Department of Health, 2005). 
 
The expanding geographic distribution of avian influenza A (H5N1) infections 
indicates that more human populations are at risk. The risk of a pandemic will 
persist until the disease is controlled in birds, which may take several years 
(World Health Organization, 2006e). 
 
3.12. Risk assessment 
South Africa is classified by the World Health Organization as a low-risk 
country for an outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza. The risk of a 
pandemic is great and will persist, but the timing and severity are unknown.  
Risks need to be defined immediately.  Various sectors that are more likely to 
be affected are encouraged to conduct studies on the expected impact of an 
avian influenza pandemic. Modelling studies on the impact of an avian 
influenza pandemic on varying attack rates should be done as well as 
systems for early detection, testing and reporting.  Impact measures should 
include health facility attendance, admissions, and deaths.  The social and 
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economic impact should also be assessed.  An estimation of the effects of 
potential interventions with antiviral medication and/or vaccines in various 
groups should be computed (National Department of Health, 2006). 
 
It is impossible to predict when the next pandemic of influenza will occur. It is 
almost 35 years since the last pandemic, and the longest interpandemic 
interval recorded with certainty is 39 years. The next pandemic virus is likely 
to emerge in South East Asia, as have two of the last three pandemic viruses. 
Complete global spread is likely to occur within six months or less, due to 
increased travel and urbanization. It is likely that the usual interpandemic 
pattern of age-specific mortality will deviate temporarily towards higher 
mortality in younger adults. The extent to which this will happen is unclear, as 
the shift was extreme in 1918-1919, but less so in subsequent pandemics. 
Nevertheless, this may have important implications for the protection of 
essential workers such as health care, emergency service and military 
personnel. The extent to which elderly persons will be affected will depend 
upon previous exposure to similar influenza viruses. It is impossible to predict 
the likely increase in excess mortality that will occur when a new pandemic 
virus emerges. Whilst mortality on the scale experienced in 1918-1919 is 
probably unlikely, there was a high level of mortality among those infected 
with the A/H5N1 virus in 1997. It therefore cannot be assumed that a future 
pandemic will be as mild as those that occurred during 1957-1958 and 1968-
1969 (Nagpal, 2006). 
 
According to the World Health Organization (2006a), the widespread 
persistence of H5N1 in bird populations poses two main risks to human 
health. The first is the risk of infection when the virus spreads directly from 
birds to humans. The second risk, which is of even greater concern, is that 
there will be increased possibilities for the widely circulating virus to infect 
humans and possibly reassort into a strain that is both highly infectious for 
humans that may spread easily from human-to-human. The accumulation of 
point mutations or reassortment with a human influenza virus could lead to 
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increased transmissibility of the virus at any time. Such a change could mark 
the start of a pandemic.  
 
3.12.1. Estimated impact of a future influenza pandemic  
If the morbidity and mortality of the past pandemics are the yardsticks for the 
future, then it is certain that with the modern day air travel and other 
modalities of transport the disease would spread fast between continents, 
countries, states and districts. There would be a simultaneous impact on all 
communities. High population densities would further augment it. The high 
strike rate would overwhelm existing health facilities. Limited availability of 
drugs and vaccines would accentuate the crisis situation. Sickness and 
absenteeism would impact on all sectors. Socio-economic disruption would 
ensue. Assistance from state and international agencies may not be available 
due to nation and world impact (Nagpal, 2006). 
 
There is likely to be more than one wave of infection and health services in 
most countries would be hard-pressed to provide vaccines or to manage 
populations with clinical attack rates of approximately 25-30% and 
concomitant increases in demand for both primary and secondary health care 
services (Nagpal, 2006). Provincial health departments can calculate the best- 
and worst case scenario of an avian influenza outbreak in a province (Nagpal, 
2006). The values are calculated from the United States preparedness plan 
that took the past pandemic figures as a yardstick. Other provinces can in a 
similar way calculate the different scenarios for their provinces that can assist 
in the preparation of an avian influenza pandemic preparedness plan. 
Provinces must keep in mind possible confounding factors in their respective 
provinces that could influence the calculated values. A best case scenario and 
worst case scenario of an avian influenza outbreak in the Eastern Cape 
Province are presented below (Eastern Cape Department of Health, 2001, 
p.22). 
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• Best case scenario for the Eastern Cape province  
 Population 6 436 763; 
 Attack rate (30-35%) = 1 931 028.90 to 2 252 867.05. Average attack 
rate = 2 091 947.98; 
 Out patients (at 6-15%) = 386 205.78 to 965 514.45. Average out 
patients = 675 860.12; 
 Hospitalization (at 0.1 to 0.25%) = 6 436.76 to 16 091.91. Average 
hospitalization = 11264.34; and 
 Deaths (at 0.03-0.07% of total patients) = 117.79 to 687.12. 
 
• Worst case scenario for the Eastern Cape province 
 Population 6 436 763; 
 Attack rate 60-65% = 3 862 057 to 4 183 895.95. Average attack rate = 
4 022 976.48); 
 Outpatients (at 15-30%) = 965 514.45 to 1 931 028.90. Average out 
patients = 1 448 271.68; 
 Hospitalization (at 5-10%) = 321 838.15 to 643 676.3. Average 
hospitalization = 482 757.23; and 
 Deaths (at 50-60% of hospitalized patients) = 160 919.08 to 386 205.8. 
 
3.12.1.1.  Impact on the health care system and infrastructure 
The impact of a future influenza pandemic on the health care system will 
contribute to: 
 
• extreme staff shortages; 
• shortage of beds;  
• shortage of key supplies (ventilators, drugs); 
• hospital morgues, health care workers and mortuary services will be 
overwhelmed; and 
• extreme demands on social and counselling services (Nagpal, 2006). 
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The impact of a future influenza pandemic on infrastructure will contribute to 
significant disruption of transportation, commerce, utilities, public safety and 
communications (Nagpal, 2006). 
 
3.12.1.2. Impact on businesses 
The impact of a future influenza pandemic on businesses will contribute to: 
 
• high absenteeism; 
• challenges getting to/from worksites; 
• psychological impacts on the workforce will be extreme; 
• social distancing efforts may dramatically change hours of operation or 
close businesses temporarily; and 
• economic losses – small businesses are at greatest risk (Nagpal, 2006). 
 
From the above it can be deduced that a future influenza pandemic will be 
devastating on businesses and contribute to enormous economic losses. 
 
3.12.1.3. Impact of an outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza 
Pienaar and Horner (2005) give a similar list for the impact of an outbreak of 
highly pathogenic avian influenza on poultry production within the Republic of 
South Africa. A highly pathogenic avian influenza outbreak will have a direct 
effect on: 
 
• trade; 
• export; 
• allied industries; 
• employment; 
• food security; 
• movement of live poultry and poultry products; 
• media reaction; 
• public reaction/fears; and 
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• public health implications. 
 
From the findings above it can be concluded that the impact of an outbreak of 
highly pathogenic avian influenza will have devastating consequences on the 
various parts of the industry, the village chicken farmer, the country and also 
for the Southern African region.  
 
3.12.2.  Mitigation of the impact of highly pathogenic avian influenza 
In order to mitigate the risk  and for international planning purposes, the World 
Health Organization (2006e) has defined six phases in the progression of an 
influenza pandemic from the first emergence of a new influenza virus to the 
wide international spread (see Annexure 15). These phases allow a stepwise 
escalating approach to preparedness planning and response. The Director-
General of the World Health Organization has designated a global pandemic 
alert: Phase Three as of 16 March 2006. South Africa is designated as “not 
affected”, but is still required to implement measures for Phase Three.  
 
The World Health Organization has recommended that each country set 
overarching goals, objectives and specific activities for each of the new 
pandemic phases. The objectives and actions are divided into the following 
five categories: (i) planning and coordination; (ii) situation monitoring and 
assessment; (iii) prevention and containment (non-pharmaceutical public 
health interventions, vaccines and antivirals); (iv) health system response; and 
(v) communications. The mentioned mitigating aspects will be discussed in the 
following two chapters. From the discussions above it can be concluded that a 
well coordinated strategy for preparedness is required at provincial and health 
district level for a robust response to mitigate the impact of a pandemic.  
 
3.13 Conclusion 
Influenza is an infectious respiratory illness associated with infection by the 
influenza virus of the virus family Orthomyxoviridae. The severity of the illness 
can range from gentle to lethal. It is an illness that can be present in humans 
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and in animals. Symptoms normally comprise headaches, aching muscles and 
joints, malaise, fever, chills, cough, sore throat, and prostration. 
 
The influenza virus is genetically extremely changeable. It is this changeable 
nature of the virus that results into regular alterations in the antigenicity of the 
virus. The constant genetic changes within the virus contribute to new strains 
of the virus ensuing in recurring outbreaks or epidemics.  
 
The influenza virus can be categorized into three types. The three types are 
Type A, Type B and Type C of which Type A is the most dangerous. The 
three different classifications of the virus are based on the antigenicity of the 
nucleoproteins which envelop the RNA genome of the virus. Influenza Type A 
viruses can be separated into two subtypes, hemagglutinin (HA) and 
neuraminidase (NA). There are sixteen identified HA subtypes and nine NA 
subtypes. The HA and NA surface proteins can form a number of probable 
permutations. 
 
There are fundamentally two ways in which the influenza virus can alter its 
antigenicity, namely antigenic shift and antigenic drift. Antigenic shift is 
characterized by sudden and major modifications in antigenicity that gives rise 
to a totally new subtype of virus. Antigenic shift is happening about once every 
10-40 years and can cause dramatic and unexpected pandemics. Antigenic 
drift represents slow but progressive changes in antigenicity which can spread 
throughout the human population, causing widespread epidemic activity - 
approximately every three to five years. 
 
Avian influenza, or bird flu, is a highly contagious viral disease of animals. All 
types of birds are susceptible to the virus but outbreaks occur most often in 
chickens and turkeys. Type A viruses can cause infection in man, pigs, 
equines, birds and marine mammals. Avian influenza can be separated into 
Low Pathogenic Avian Influenza and Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza. 
Avian influenza infections in poultry are caused by the H5 and H7 subtypes of 
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the influenza A virus.  Low Pathogenic Avian Influenza, (forms H5 and H7 
subtypes) have been identified in poultry in South Africa, but as the name 
implies, it does not cause major mortality problems. Currently no Highly 
Pathogenic Avian Influenza strain has been reported in South Africa. 
 
There are conspicuous difference between human seasonal influenza, avian 
influenza and human pandemic influenza. Human Seasonal influenza viruses 
cause outbreaks of influenza every winter season. These outbreaks generally 
distress between 2-30% of the population ensuing unpredictable levels of 
morbidity and mortality. This form of influenza is mostly confined to elderly 
individuals, especially those with underlying medical conditions. Avian 
influenza, or bird flu, is caused by different influenza virus strains that normally 
infect various species of birds. Although avian influenza viruses are generally 
extremely species-specific and therefore are of concern primarily to poultry 
farmers and veterinary authorities, they have on relatively infrequent instances 
transcended the species barrier to infect humans. An influenza pandemic 
(global epidemic) occurs when a new influenza virus subtype emerges that 
has not previously circulated in humans. 
 
Domestic fowl, ducks, geese, turkeys, guinea fowl, quail and pheasants are 
considered as natural hosts of the avian influenza virus. Ducks have been 
identified as the bird specie with the highest prevalence for the influenza A 
virus. It is generally established that migratory waterfowl, most conspicuously 
wild ducks, are the natural reservoir of avian influenza viruses. Epidemics in 
the poultry populations are frequently caused by direct or indirect contact 
between domestic flocks and wild migratory waterfowl.  
 
The clinical signs of avian influenza are inconsistent and are influenced by 
features such as the virulence of the infecting virus, species affected, age, 
sex, concurrent diseases and environment. The incubation period of the virus 
in humans is two to four days after exposure. The initial symptoms of the 
majority of patients are characterized by high fever (typically a temperature of 
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more than 38°C) and an influenza-like illness with lower respiratory tract 
symptoms. All countries must develop their own case definitions. Countries 
can use the case definition of the World Health Organization as a template in 
developing theirs. 
 
In virulent (or highly pathogenic) avian influenza of the type conventionally 
linked to fowl plague, the disease appears swiftly in a flock and many birds die 
either without premonitory signs or with minimal signs of depression, 
inappetence, ruffled feathers and fever. In broilers, the signs of disease are 
often less noticeable with severe depression, inappetence and a striking 
increase in mortality being the first abnormalities observed. The incubation 
period of the disease in birds is normally three to seven days. The incubation 
period can be influenced by factors such as the type of specie, the type of 
isolate, the dose of inoculum, and age of the bird. Mortality amongst birds are 
histologically characterized by vascular disturbances leading to oedema, 
haemorrhages and perivascular cuffing, especially in the myocardium, spleen, 
lungs, brain and wattles. Necrotic foci are present in the lungs, liver and 
kidneys. 
 
To date the transmission of avian influenza viruses to people remains fairly 
sporadic. Most reported cases occur as a result of direct contact with infected 
poultry or other birds or their faeces. Generally, avian influenza viruses do not 
infect humans because of host barriers to infection, such as cell receptor 
specificities. However, they can occasionally cross the species barrier and 
directly infect humans. It has been established that the H5N1 strain - which 
has been circulating in birds - has the potential to mutate and transcends the 
species barrier causing a disease with eminent mortality in humans. 
Environment to human transmission of the virus can occur through several 
modes including self-inoculation by contact with contaminated equipment, 
vehicles, feed, cages, clothing or contaminated water. 
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Birds that survive infection excrete the virus for at least 10 days, orally and in 
faeces, thus facilitating further spread at live poultry markets and by migratory 
birds. Once avian influenza is established in domestic poultry, it is a highly 
contagious disease and wild birds are no longer essential for the spread. The 
disease generally spreads rapidly in a flock by direct contact, but on 
occasions spread is erratic. Direct contact can come from contaminated 
equipment, egg flats, feed trucks, and service crews. Airborne transmission 
may occur if birds are in close proximity and with appropriate air movement. 
 
The risk of spreading of the disease is increase by direct spread through 
contact with live birds, infected premises, infected products, contaminated 
equipment, or by the movement offsite of personnel, vehicles, etc. The virus 
can survive in/on carcasses, feathers, meat, on eggs, offal, faeces and litter. 
Live bird markets/sales are an important potential source for the rapid 
spreading of epidemic diseases. The poultry industry is important for South 
Africa’s food security as it is the major supplier of animal protein and supplies 
many direct and indirect industries. Therefore it becomes important to identify 
the sectors within the poultry and related industry in order to develop detailed 
work methods and - procedures for the surveillance and control of avian 
influenza.  
 
Avian influenza is gradually becoming a worldwide occurrence with the 
(H5N1) strain proved to be particularly tenacious. The avian influenza A 
(H5N1) animal outbreak in Asia and parts of Europe, the Near East, and 
Africa is not expected to diminish significantly in the short term. The increasing 
geographic distribution of avian influenza A (H5N1) infections signify that 
more human populations are at risk. The widespread persistence of H5N1 in 
bird populations poses two main risks to human health. The first is the risk of 
infection when the virus spreads directly from birds to humans. The second 
risk is that there will be increased possibilities for the widely circulating virus to 
infect humans and possibly reassort into a strain that is both highly infectious 
for humans that may spread easily from humans-to-humans. 
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An outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza will have devastating 
consequences on various parts of the poultry industry, the village chicken 
farmer, the country and also for the Southern African region. There would be 
simultaneous impact on all communities. The high strike rate would 
overwhelm health facilities. Socio-economic disruption would ensue. 
Therefore, a well coordinated strategy for preparedness is required at 
provincial and district level for a robust response and to mitigate the pandemic 
impact. The next chapter will discuss the work methods and - procedures for 
the surveillance of avian influenza in the Eastern Cape province, South Africa.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
WORK METHODS AND - PROCEDURES FOR THE SURVEILLANCE OF AVIAN 
INFLUENZA 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Avian influenza, which is caused by the A (H5N1) influenza subtype in animal 
populations, continues to pose a global public health risk. The virus has 
expanded its geographical range and therefore increasing the size of the 
populations at risk. The ability to control an infectious disease like avian 
influenza requires an effective and comprehensive public health surveillance 
system.  
 
In this chapter, work methods and - procedures for avian influenza 
surveillance are presented and discussed. Firstly, since avian influenza 
surveillance is a component of public health surveillance, the basic principles 
of avian influenza surveillance are explained from a public health surveillance 
perspective. 
 
Secondly, work methods and - procedures for human case surveillance are 
discussed in terms of case detection, reporting of the disease, the 
investigation of an avian influenza outbreak and case confirmation. Thirdly, 
work methods and - procedures for bird surveillance (poultry and wild birds in 
general) are discussed. The said work methods and procedures are discussed 
in terms of early detection of avian influenza amongst birds, as well as clinical, 
serological and virological surveillance. The basic principles of human avian 
influenza surveillance are firstly presented below. 
 
4.2. Basic principles of human avian influenza surveillance 
According to Nagpal (2006, p.11), public health surveillance includes the 
process of disease detection through a standardized information collection 
system, the analysis and interpretation of the data, the dissemination of 
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information to the individuals who can act on it, and the facilitation of  the 
necessary response that will effectively deal with the problem. The system 
should be structured in such a way that that it can efficiently deal with routine 
health threats as well as epidemics. Whatever the public health problem, the 
surveillance and response capability must be built on a foundation of skills in 
areas such as case detection, epidemiology of the disease, data gathering, 
data analysis and interpretation, laboratory diagnostic confirmation and the 
application of an appropriate response. 
 
Public health surveillance can also be described as the systematic collection 
of data pertaining to the occurrence of specific diseases, the analysis and 
interpretation of the data, and the dissemination of consolidated and 
processed information to contributors to the programme and other interested 
persons (Alfred, Evans, Richard, and Kaslow, 1997, p.89). 
 
Thacker (1996, p.11), in a similar way as Alfred, et al. (1997, p.89), describes 
surveillance as the process of systematic collection, orderly consolidation and 
evaluation of pertinent data with prompt dissemination of the results to those 
who need to know. The prompt dissemination of the said data is particularly 
critical for those who are in a position to take action. The World Health 
Organization (2006c, p.18) lists the core components during the surveillance 
of any health event as: 
 
• Case detection; 
• case confirmation; 
• case registration; 
• reporting;  
• data analysis and interpretation; 
• epidemic preparedness;  
• response and control; and 
• feedback.  
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According to Alfred, et al. (1997, p.101), the general elements to consider 
during the development of a surveillance system are: 
 
• Mortality registration; 
• morbidity reporting; 
• epidemic reporting; 
• laboratory investigation; 
• individual case investigation; 
• epidemic field investigation; 
• survey of human cases; 
• animal reservoir and vector distribution studies;  
• biologics and drug utilization; and 
• knowledge of the population and environment. 
 
Epidemic disease surveillances can be classified according to the method of 
reporting, the criteria for initiating the report, the location or population studied, 
and the purpose of the system (Alfred, et al., 1997, p.91). Generally 
surveillance is classified as passive surveillance or active surveillance. These 
are described below. 
 
• Passive surveillance is the most common method of surveillance. 
Passive surveillance is defined by the World Health Organisation (1999b, 
p.152) as reports that are awaited, and no active attempt is made to seek 
reports from participants. The reporter, usually a physician or health 
officials of clinics and hospitals, transmits a weekly summary of all the 
cases of notifiable diseases they have identified the previous week. Pre-
formatted reporting instruments are usually provided with a list of notifiable 
conditions, as defined by the relevant health authority. The reporting 
instruments are then sent in at periodic intervals to the public health office 
designated. The reporter gives data on the number of cases seen in the 
interval prescribed. Reporting can be accomplished by electronic mail, by 
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telephone (using toll - free numbers) and automatic recording devices that 
are available at all hours (Alfred, et al., 1997, p.91). 
 
• Active surveillance means that the health authority conducting the 
surveillance initiates the procedures to obtain reports on a regular basis 
(usually weekly), rather than waiting for the reports, such as telephone 
calls or personal visits by the reporting individuals (Jekel, Elmore & Katz, 
1996, p.37). 
 
The gathering of surveillance data for avian influenza activities requires a 
combination of both active and passive surveillance. The surveillance data 
collected can be used for immediate public health action, programme planning 
and evaluation and the formulation of research hypotheses (Centre for 
Disease Control and Prevention, 2001, Section 4). It can therefore be 
deduced that the surveillance data are crucial in any surveillance system. In 
order to develop an effective avian influenza surveillance system, real-time 
and up-to-date information will be required. Avian influenza data can be 
collected by means of the surveillance strategies that deal with (United States 
of America Department of Health, 2006): 
 
• Human case surveillance; and 
• Bird surveillance.  
 
In the following sections, the above - mentioned strategies will be discussed. 
Firstly discussed is human case surveillance. 
 
4.3.  Human case surveillance 
For the purpose of this study, human avian influenza surveillance is divided 
into the following activities:  
• Case detection; 
• Reporting of a notifiable disease; 
• Investigation; and  
 117 
• Confirmation 
 
The section below identifies and discusses the work methods and - 
procedures for case detection of human avian influenza. 
 
4.3.1. Case detection 
Case detection is the process of identifying positive human cases or 
outbreaks. Case detection can take place through the formal health system, 
private health system or community structures. Up-to-date case definitions, 
appropriate alert and epidemic threshold values and a functioning rumour 
verification system are all vital elements for case and outbreak detection 
(World Health Organisation, 2006c, p.18). 
 
According to Teutsch and Thacker (1995, p.6), an effective public health 
surveillance system is dependent on a clear case definition for the health-
related event under surveillance. The case definition of a health-related event 
can include clinical manifestations (i.e., symptoms), laboratory results, 
epidemiological information (e.g., person, place, and time), and/or specified 
behaviours, as well as levels of certainty (e.g., confirmed/definite, 
probable/presumptive, or possible/suspected). The use of a standard case 
definition increases the specificity of reporting and improves the comparability 
of the health-related event reported from different sources of data, including 
geographic areas. The case definition of human avian influenza is discussed 
below. 
 
• Case definition of avian influenza in humans 
The case definitions in Figure One below applies to phase three of pandemic 
influenza. Phase three of pandemic influenza represents the global pandemic 
alert period during which little evidence exist of human to human transmission 
of avian influenza. Phase three refers to a new influenza virus subtype that is 
causing disease in humans, but is not yet spreading efficiently and sustainably 
among humans. The phase three classification may change as new 
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information about the disease or its epidemiology becomes available (World 
Health Organization, 2004a, p.3). 
 
 
FIGURE 1 
 
CASE DEFINITION OF AVIAN INFLUENZA IN HUMANS 
 
1. Suspected cases include patients with the following symptoms: 
• Fever (body temperature of 38 degrees Celsius or higher); in addition 
to: 
• One or more of the following symptoms – muscle ache, cough, 
abnormal breathing (unusual breathing difficulty), or suspicion of 
pneumonia by a physician, or influenza; in addition to: 
History of direct contact with infected / dead birds in the past 7 days, 
or occurrence of unusual death of birds in the community within the 
past 14 days; or contact with a pneumonia patient or another patient 
suspected of avian influenza. 
2. Probable cases, which include the above - mentioned symptoms of 
    suspected cases, in addition to: 
• Preliminary test shows infection of influenza group A, but cannot yet 
be confirmed whether it is influenza from humans or birds; 
• Respiratory failure; and 
• Death. 
3. A confirmed case of influenza A/H5 infection is an individual, alive or 
    deceased, in whom laboratory testing demonstrates one or more of the 
    following: 
• a positive viral culture for influenza A/H5; 
• a positive polymerase chain reaction (PCR) for influenza A/H5; 
• a positive immunofluorescence antibody (IFA) test for H5 antigen 
using H5 monoclonal antibodies; and 
• a 4-fold rise in H5-specific antibody titre in paired serum samples. 
Note: Diagnosis of suspected and probable cases can be changed if 
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confirmation tests show that the patient’s infection was caused by other 
factors. 
Source: Modified from World Health Organisation (2005b, p.3) and confirmed 
by the Provincial Communicable Control Co-ordinators (group of experts) on 
31 August 2008. 
 
Health workers making a diagnosis must be familiar with the case definitions 
and with the clinical features of human avian influenza as listed in Annexure 
16. Detailed contact and travel histories and knowledge of viral activity in 
poultry are essential for appropriate clinical case detection. Updated 
information on countries with recent avian influenza cases can be found at the 
following website: www.who.int/csrdisease/viannfluenza/en/ and http://www 
.oie.nt/eng/en./pub/index.htm. 
 
Suspected avian influenza cases can be detected by the active screening 
process (see Annexure 17). This screening method, also known as a febrile 
respiratory illness screener survey, provides screening questions to be asked 
of patients as part of an active screening process that can be done 
telephonically or at health establishments and can serve as an initial detection 
for avian influenza human cases. According to Nagpal (2006), a surveillance 
strategy for human cases of avian influenza requires close monitoring of all 
possible entrance points. This can include the monitoring of incoming 
travellers from infected regions, countries or localities in the country, state, 
province or locality, arriving by all means of transport. 
  
For avian influenza, a single suspected case is the trigger for taking action, 
reporting the case to a higher level, and conducting an investigation.  This is 
confirmed by the World Health Organization (2005c, p.8) who states that the 
alert threshold value for human avian influenza is one. An alert threshold 
suggests to health staff that further investigation is needed. It therefore means 
that all cases that meet the criteria outlined in Figure One above should 
immediately be reported to the local health authority. Work methods and - 
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procedures to be followed during the notifiable disease reporting processes 
are presented in the next section. 
 
4.3.2. Reporting of a notifiable disease 
Reporting of a notifiable disease refers to the process by which surveillance 
data move through the surveillance system from the point of generation. It 
also refers to the process of reporting suspected and confirmed outbreaks. 
Different reporting systems may be in existence depending on the type of data 
and the information being reported, the purpose and urgency of relaying the 
information and where the data/information is being reported (World Health 
Organization, 2006c). 
 
A notification can serve as the first step in a surveillance cycle, namely data 
capturing or data collection. Government health agencies have the authority to 
designate that certain diseases are notifiable by law and their occurrence 
must be reported (Buehler, 1998, p.449). Notification of communicable 
diseases is governed both by country laws and International Health 
Regulations. According to the International Health Regulations, 2005, 
countries are obligated to report any occurrence of diseases of a sensitive 
nature to the World Health Organization (National Department of Health, 
2006). 
  
As in the majority of countries worldwide, South Africa has a routine 
notification system for reporting notifiable medical conditions. The primary 
purposes of the reporting system are disease control and the monitoring of 
disease trends in South Africa. The current disease notification system is 
based on the Health Act, 1977 (Act 63 of 1977), coupled with regulations on 
the reporting of specific diseases to local, provincial and national health 
departments. The International Health Regulations, 2005, govern a broad 
range of public health emergencies of international concern. It also includes 
emerging diseases such as avian influenza that upon confirmation must be 
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reported through the National Department of Health to the World Health 
Organization (World Health Organization, 2006c). 
 
In South Africa, notification can be done via electronic mail, fax or telephone 
to the local authority concerned. Any person (not necessarily a health worker) 
can notify a medical condition. The formal work - procedures for avian 
influenza notification are illustrated in Figure Two below. 
 
FIGURE 2 
 
WORK  PROCEDURES TO REPORT HUMAN AVIAN INFLUENZA CASES 
 
Diagnosis: Can be any health worker, not 
necessarily a doctor 
 
Fill in form GW 17/5 (initial diagnosis form) 
and report immediately to the relevant: 
 
Local authority / Hospital / Health District 
 responsible for disease containment 
 
Fill in form GW7/3 (cases) 
Fill in form GW 17/4 (deaths) 
and report immediately to the relevant: 
 
Health District Surveillance Office 
Health Information Unit if data entry is done at provincial level 
 
Send data immediately 
 on computer disks or by electronic-mail to the relevant: 
 
Provincial Disease Surveillance Office 
Health Information Unit if data entry is done at provincial level 
 
(Send data on computer disks or by electronic-mail) 
Report immediately to: 
 
National Department of Health 
Directorate: Communicable Disease Control 
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(Send data on computer disks or by electronic-mail) 
Report within 24 hours to: 
 
World Health Organisation 
Prevention and Control of Diseases Unit 
  
 
Source: Modified from the National Department of Health (2003, pp. 344-347) 
and confirmed the Provincial Communicable Control Co-ordinators (group of 
experts) on 31 August 2008. 
 
Reports of avian influenza cases should be standardized so that, whenever 
possible, the same information is recorded for each case (World Health 
Organisation Regional Office for Africa, 2001, pp. 56-57). A disease reporting 
form should provide important information of the reporting process. The 
currently used initial diagnosis form (i.e. form GW 17/5) for notifiable disease 
reporting is attached as Annexure 18. The initial diagnosis form mentioned 
above does not include a clear case definition or details of epidemiological 
and environmental investigation. From a human avian influenza surveillance 
perspective, a notifiable disease reporting form is presented in Annexure 19 
which was accepted by the Provincial Communicable Control Co-ordinators 
(group of experts) on 31 August 2008. The following section discusses the 
investigation of an avian influenza outbreak. 
 
4.3.3. Investigation of an avian influenza outbreak  
According to the World Health Organisation Regional Office for Africa (2001, 
p.97), an investigation is a method used for identifying and evaluating people 
who have been exposed to an infectious disease or affected by an unusual 
health event. The investigation of a disease outbreak is a primary function of 
public health authorities.  
 
The objectives for investigations of human cases of A(H5N1) is essentially, to 
firstly confirm the diagnosis of recent infection with influenza A(H5N1) in an 
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attempt to reduce morbidity and mortality through rapid identification, isolation, 
treatment and clinical management of cases and subsequent follow-up of 
contacts (World Health Organization, 2007b). Secondly, to ensure timely 
exchange of information among clinicians, investigators of public and animal 
health, and government officials to facilitate critical and informed decision-
making at sub-district, district, provincial, national and international levels 
during the investigation.  
 
Clinicians and public health officials at all levels need to be alerted to the 
detection of possible human cases of A (H5N1) infection. Once an avian 
influenza outbreak has been detected, routine or passive surveillance should 
be replaced by active surveillance (Giesecke, 2002, p.151). This implies that 
the investigation of the outbreak must be carried out immediately.  
 
Tyler (1996, p.14) states that an epidemiological investigation is often 
triggered by effective epidemiological surveillance at various levels of 
reporting. From an avian influenza surveillance perspective, one or more 
suspected avian flu cases require an immediate outbreak investigation. 
Detection of possible human case(s) of A (H5N1) should trigger immediate 
notification of local, sub-national and national public health authorities to make 
immediate decisions about the launching of an investigation. 
 
A number of critical activities must be undertaken as part of every A (H5N1) 
investigation. The detailed steps to be followed during every A (H5N1) 
investigation are described in a document entitled: Guidelines for investigation 
of human cases of avian influenza A (H5N1) (World Health Organization, 
2007b). The key steps during the investigation of human cases of avian 
influenza A (H5N1) are indicated in Figure Three below: 
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FIGURE 3 
RESPONSE PROCEDURES DURING AN AVIAN INFLUENZA 
OUTBREAK 
 
• Preparation for the investigation; 
• Confirm the diagnosis, interview the case patient and visit the 
patient’s home; 
• Define a case and actively search for cases and their contacts; 
• Collect specimens; 
• Visit hospitals and other sites of health care; 
• Initiate enhanced surveillance; 
• Undertake animal health and environmental investigations; 
• Analyse data;  
• Implement prevention and control measures; and 
• Reporting and notification. 
 
Source: Adapted from World Health Organization (2007b) and confirmed the 
Provincial Communicable Control Co-ordinators (group of experts) on 31 
August 2008. 
 
Next presented are work methods and - procedures for human case 
confirmation. 
 
4.3.4. Human case confirmation  
Case/outbreak confirmation refers to the epidemiological and laboratory 
capacity for confirmation. Capacity for case confirmation is enhanced through 
improved referral systems, networking and partnerships. This means having 
the capacity for appropriate specimen collection, packaging and transportation 
(World Health Organization, 2006a).  
 
The appropriate collection of specimens is essential for the successful 
identification of viruses in clinical samples. There are several variables that 
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can contribute to the successful isolation and/or identification of a viral 
pathogen. Some of these variables include: 
 
• The source of the specimen;  
• the timing of collection of specimen in relation to the onset of the 
symptoms ; 
• the rapidity and method of specimen delivery to the laboratory; and 
• specimen data provided to the laboratory (Alfred and Evens, p. 61). 
 
According to the World Health Organization (2004b), the success of virus 
diagnosis largely depends on the quality of the specimen and the conditions 
for transport and storage of the specimen before it is processed in the 
laboratory. Work methods and - procedures for specimen collection of 
suspected human avian influenza cases are presented in Annexure 20. The 
equipment that will be required by surveillance personnel in collecting human 
specimens is listed in Annexure 21. In collecting a specimen it is important for 
surveillance and control personnel to adhere to the infection precautions in 
Annexure 22 and to monitor their health for five days to detect early infection 
after contact with a suspected patient. The Influenza Illness Monitoring Form 
in Annexure 23 can be used for this purpose. 
 
An avian influenza outbreak should be concluded by an investigation report. 
The investigation report should explain why the outbreak occurred and identify 
weaknesses in existing surveillance and control measures. This will enable 
recommendations to be made on specific prevention and control strategies 
(Katzenellenbogen, Joubert & Karim, 1997, p.203). When an outbreak of 
avian flue occurs, all efforts and resources should be aimed at controlling the 
outbreak. The process of an avian outbreak investigation should be conducted 
parallel with avian influenza control strategies. The next section discusses 
basic elements of avian influenza surveillance in birds. 
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4.4. Basic elements of avian influenza surveillance in birds 
As discussed in Chapter Three, avian influenza is a highly contagious viral 
disease of domestic poultry and many species of wild birds caused by 
infection with a Type A influenza virus.  Type A viruses can cause infection in 
man that could appear in more than one geographical area within a very short 
space of time because of the ease of spreading and bird movement from a 
single initial introduction. The ability to efficiently control the spread of a highly 
infectious, exotic disease such as highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza is 
dependent upon the capacity to rapidly detect the pathogen if introduced 
(Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2006b).  
 
According to the United States Department of Agriculture (2007, p.14), the key 
to successful avian influenza surveillance in birds should involve the following 
strategies:  
• Early detection of morbidity and mortality; 
• rapid reporting and submission of appropriate biological specimens to 
qualified diagnostic facilities;  
• immediate assessment of the field event (descriptive epidemiology);  
• rapid, accurate, and consistent diagnosis and confirmation; 
• immediate reporting of diagnostic results, once confirmed; and  
• pre-planned contingency and response training for the occurrence of 
highly pathogenic avian influenza. 
 
The surveillance plan for avian influenza in birds should be in the form of a 
continuing programme which should focus on the following two elements 
(Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2006b): 
 
• Firstly, an early warning system for reporting suspicious cases, and 
• secondly, the implementation of relevant, regular and frequent clinical 
inspection, serological and virological testing of high-risk groups of 
animals, such places where birds and poultry of different origins are mixed, 
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such as live bird markets, poultry in close proximity to waterfowl or other 
sources of possible avian influenza.  
 
As mentioned earlier in Section 3.7., the natural hosts of the avian influenza 
virus include domestic fowl, ducks, geese, turkeys, guinea fowl, quail, 
pheasants, and other species of wild birds. For the purpose of this study the 
surveillance of birds will focus on poultry and wild birds in general and is 
explained below. 
 
The World Health Organisation for Animal Health (2007b, p.26), defines 
poultry as all birds reared or kept in captivity for the production of meat or 
eggs for consumption, for the production of other commercial products, for 
restocking supplies of game, or for breeding these categories of birds. 
Similarly in South Africa the Animal Diseases Act, 1984 (Act 35 of 1984) 
defines “poultry” as pigeons, ducks, geese, fowl, turkeys, cage birds, 
muscovies, domesticated ostriches, tamed wild birds and wild birds kept in 
captivity.  
 
Wild birds, by their very nature, are not subject to disease containment 
controls as are domestic birds and people. While their movements are 
generally uncontrollable, their movements are largely predictable on both a 
daily and seasonal basis. Local movements within or between breeding, 
feeding, and roosting areas should be monitored and documented by the state 
and local wildlife management authorities and others familiar with local bird 
populations. The movement of wild birds poses thus a particular problem to 
avian influenza surveillance personnel and requires an understanding of bird 
ecology and the meticulous mapping of daily and seasonal bird movements 
(World Organisation for Animal Health, 2007b). 
 
Avian influenza surveillance strategies for birds are discussed under the 
following sections below: 
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• Early detection of disease; 
• Clinical surveillance of birds; 
• Serological surveillance of birds; and 
• Virological surveillance of birds. 
 
4.4.1. Early detection of disease 
According to Pienaar and Horner (2005, p.46), early detection, reporting and 
diagnosis of the disease, together with the swift imposition of effective 
eradication and movement controls are essential in an attempt to contain an 
outbreak. An early detection system enables rapid detection of the 
introduction of, or sudden increase in the incidence of any disease of livestock 
which has the potential of developing to epidemic proportions and/or causing 
serious socio-economic consequences or public health concern. Early 
detection embraces all initiatives, mainly based on disease surveillance, 
reporting and epidemiological analysis that would lead to improved awareness 
and knowledge of the distribution and behaviour of disease outbreaks (and of 
infection) and which allow forecasting of the source and evolution of the 
disease outbreaks and the monitoring of the effectiveness of disease control 
campaigns (World Health Organisation, 2005, p.18). 
 
According to the World Organisation for Animal Health, (2007a, p.33) avian 
influenza surveillance should include active and passive surveillance and both 
should be ongoing. The target population for surveillance aimed at the 
identification of the disease and infection should cover all the susceptible 
poultry species within a country. The frequency of active surveillance should 
be at least every six months. Surveillance should be composed of random and 
targeted approaches using virological, serological and clinical methods. These 
methods are discussed below. 
 
4.4.2 Clinical surveillance of birds 
Clinical surveillance aims at the detection of clinical signs of avian influenza at 
the flock level. Whereas significant emphasis is placed on the diagnostic value 
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of mass serological screening, surveillance based on clinical inspection 
should not be underrated. It may, for example, be appropriate to target clinical 
surveillance at particular species likely to exhibit clear clinical signs (e.g. 
chickens). Similarly, virological and serological testing could be targeted to 
species that may not show clinical signs (e.g. ducks) (Pienaar & Horner, 2005, 
p.46). 
 
• Clinical signs of avian influenza in birds. 
Monitoring of production parameters, such as increased mortality, reduced 
feed and water consumption, presence of clinical signs of a respiratory 
disease or a drop in egg production is important for the early detection of 
avian influenza infection in birds. In some cases of poultry species the only 
indication of avian influenza infection may be a drop in feed consumption or 
egg production (World Organisation for Animal Health, 2007a). 
 
As discussed in Chapter Three (see Section 3.9.4.) bird flue can appear 
suddenly in a flock and many birds can die either without pre-monitory signs 
or with minimal signs of depression, inappetence, ruffled feathers and fever. 
Other birds show weakness and a staggering gait. Hens may at first lay soft-
shelled eggs, but soon stop laying. Sick birds often sit or stand in a semi-
comatose state with their heads touching the ground. Combs and wattles are 
cyanotic and oedematous, and may have petechial or ecchymotic 
haemorrhages at their tips. Profuse watery diarrhoea is frequently present and 
birds are excessively thirsty. Respiration may be laboured and haemorrhages 
may occur on unfeathered areas of the skin. The mortality rate varies from 50 
to 100% (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2007). 
 
In broilers, the signs of the disease are frequently less obvious with severe 
depression, inappetence, and a marked increase in mortality being the first 
abnormalities observed. Oedema of the face and neck and neurological signs 
such as torticollis and ataxia may also be seen. The disease in turkeys is 
similar to that seen in layers, but it lasts two or three days longer and is 
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occasionally accompanied by swollen sinuses. In domestic ducks and geese 
the signs of depression, inappetence, and diarrhea are similar to those in 
layers, though frequently with swollen sinuses. Younger birds may exhibit 
neurological signs (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 
2007). The incubation period is usually three to seven days, depending upon 
the isolate, the dose of inoculum, the species, and the age of the birds (World 
Health Organization, 2006a). 
 
Clinical surveillance and laboratory testing should always be applied in series 
to clarify the status of avian influenza suspects. Laboratory testing may 
confirm clinical suspicion, while clinical surveillance may contribute to 
confirmation of positive serology. Any sampling unit within which suspicious 
animals are detected should be classified as infected until evidence to the 
contrary is produced. The identification of suspect flocks is also vital to the 
identification of sources of avian influenza and to enable the molecular, 
antigenic and other biological characteristics of the virus to be determined 
(World Health Organization, 2006e). All suspected cases based on the clinical 
features above must be immediately reported to the local authorities in order 
to mount an investigation. Work methods and - procedures for specimen 
collection during clinical surveillance of birds are presented in Annexure 24. 
The section below discusses serological surveillance of birds. 
 
4.4.3 Serological surveillance of birds 
According to Alfred, et al. (1997, p.101), serological surveillance can be 
defined as the systematic collection and testing of blood samples from a 
target population or a representative sample thereof  to identify current and 
past infectious diseases by means of antigen and antibody tests. An effective 
surveillance system for birds will periodically identify suspicious cases of avian 
influenza that require follow up and investigation to confirm or exclude the 
cause of an avian influenza infection. 
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Serological surveillance of birds is aimed at the detection of antibodies against 
highly pathogenic avian influenza. Positive avian influenza antibody test 
results can have four possible causes (World Organisation for Animal Health, 
2007a, p.37) namely: 
 
• Natural infection with avian influenza; 
• vaccination against avian influenza;  
• maternal antibodies derived from a vaccinated or infected parent flock are 
usually found in the yolk and can persist in progeny for up to 4 weeks; and 
• positive results due to the lack of specificity of the test. 
 
Serological surveillance methods can be targeted at random. Positive 
serological results should always be followed up with virological methods 
(Pienaar & Horner, 2005, p.48). The frequency of sampling should be 
dependent on the epidemiological situation. The criteria for random 
surveillance should be decentralized, i.e., to be decided at municipal sphere 
as to which farms or sites should be tested. The selection of targeted 
surveillance is based on the increased likelihood of infection in particular 
localities or species. Serological and virological methods should be used 
concurrently to define the avian influenza status of high - risk populations 
Annexure 25 presents work methods and - procedures for specimen collection 
during the serological surveillance of poultry. 
 
The discovery of clusters of seropositive flocks may reflect any of a series of 
events, including but not limited to the demographics of the population 
sampled, vaccinal exposure or infection. Clustering of positive flocks is always 
epidemiologically significant and therefore should be investigated. If 
vaccination cannot be excluded as the cause of positive serological reactions, 
diagnostic methods to differentiate antibodies due to infection or vaccination 
should be employed (World Organisation for Animal Health, 2007a, p.33). 
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The results of random or targeted serological surveys are important in 
providing reliable evidence of avian influenza infection in a country. Highly 
pathogenic avian influenza has never occurred in South Africa in the poultry 
industry, however the highly pathogenic virus of H5N2 sub - type was isolated 
from ostriches in the Eastern Cape province in July 2004.  Avian influenza 
viruses were found in ostriches in South Africa in 1991, 1994 and 1995. A 
targeted serological surveillance approach must be followed that will allow the 
early detection of an avian influenza outbreak in all possible high - risk areas 
(Pienaar & Horner, 2005, p.8).  
 
Serological surveillance as part of control programmes to detect the 
circulation of the H5N1 virus is considered to be of limited value if used in 
isolation because most infected birds, e.g. chickens die before they develop a 
detectable antibody response. Most birds surviving outbreaks are likely not to 
have been infected (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 
2007). It is therefore important that serological and clinical surveillance be 
seen as parallel and ongoing processes. The section below describes 
virological surveillance of birds. 
 
4.4.4 Virological surveillance of birds 
 The objective of virological surveillance is to (Pienaar and Horner, 2005,
 p.49): 
 
• confirm clinically suspected cases; 
• follow up positive serological results; 
• monitor at - risk populations; 
• test ‘normal’ daily mortality; 
• ensure early detection of infection in the face of vaccination; and 
• establish epidemiological links to an outbreak. 
 
A schematic representation of laboratory tests for determining evidence of 
avian influenza infection by using virological methods is presented in 
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Annexure 26. Virological surveillance is performed by laboratories registered 
with the World Health Organization and is described in detail in the Terrestrial 
Animal Health Code, 2005 (World Organisation for Animal Health (2007b, 
Chapter 2).  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
Avian influenza surveillance is a continuous and systematic process of 
standardized information collection, the analysis, interpretation, and 
dissemination of descriptive information of avian influenza monitoring 
activities. For the purpose of this study, human avian influenza surveillance 
was discussed in terms of the following core surveillance activities: 
 
• Case detection; 
• Reporting of a notifiable disease ; 
• Investigation; and  
• Confirmation. 
 
Surveillance is classified into two types, namely active surveillance and 
passive surveillance. Both are usually combined within an avian influenza 
surveillance programme. In South Africa, the current notification system is 
based on the Health Act, 1977 (Act 63 of 1977). Each avian influenza 
surveillance case must be reported to the local health department and the 
Provincial Department of Health, who then report to the National Department 
of Health and subsequently to the World Health Organization. 
 
A public health surveillance system is dependent on a clear case definition of 
the health-related event under surveillance. An avian influenza case reporting 
form should be standardized so that whenever possible, the same information 
is recorded for each case. 
 
The early detection of an avian influenza outbreak is dependent on an 
effective avian influenza surveillance system. Even a single confirmed case is 
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the epidemic threshold for an avian influenza outbreak investigation. Once an 
avian influenza outbreak has been identified, routine passive surveillance 
should be replaced by active surveillance. This implies that the outbreak must 
be investigated immediately. 
 
The ability to efficiently control the spread of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian 
influenza is dependent upon the capacity to rapidly detect the pathogen if 
introduced. An avian influenza surveillance strategy should focus on the early 
detection of morbidity and mortality in birds, rapid reporting and the 
submission of appropriate biological specimens to approved diagnostic 
laboratories. 
 
The approach for the surveillance for avian influenza in birds should be in the 
form of a continuing programme with regular and frequent clinical inspection, 
serological and virological testing of high-risk groups of birds. The surveillance 
can be random or targeted, especially at places where birds and poultry of 
different origins are mixed, such as live bird markets, poultry in close proximity 
to waterfowl or other sources of avian influenza.  
 
Clinical surveillance aims at the detection of clinical signs of birds. Monitoring 
of production parameters, such as increased mortality, reduced feed and 
water consumption, presence of clinical signs of a respiratory disease or a 
drop in egg production, is important for the early detection of avian influenza 
infection. Clinical surveillance and laboratory testing should always be applied 
in series to clarify the status of avian influenza suspects. 
 
Serological and virological testing should be targeted to species that may not 
show clinical signs (e.g. ducks). Serological surveillance can be defined as the 
systematic collection and testing of blood samples from a target population. 
Serological surveillance methods can be targeted or random. A targeted 
serological surveillance approach must be followed that will allow the early 
detection of an avian influenza outbreak in all possible high - risk areas. 
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The objective of virological surveillance is to confirm clinically suspect cases, 
to follow up positive serological results, to monitor at - risk populations and to 
ensure early detection of infection in the face of vaccination or in 
establishments epidemiologically linked to an outbreak. A prerequisite for a 
successful bird surveillance programme should also include a study of local 
bird ecology and the concise mapping of bird avian influenza incidences. 
 
Detailed environmental health work methods and - procedures during the 
surveillance of bird flue are attached as Annexures to this chapter and include 
the following: 
 
• Annexure 17: Active screening process for avian influenza; 
• Annexure 18: Initial diagnosis form for notifiable diseases (Form GW17/5); 
• Annexure 19: Human avian influenza notification form; 
• Annexure 20: Work methods and - procedures for human avian influenza  
 specimen collection; 
• Annexure 22: Avian influenza infection control measures;      
• Annexure 23: Avian influenza-like illness monitoring form; 
• Annexure 24: Work methods and - procedures for specimen collection 
 during clinical surveillance of birds; and 
• Annexure 25: Work methods and - procedures for specimen collection 
 during serological surveillance of poultry.  
 
Effective avian influenza surveillance is the premise for successful avian 
influenza prevention and control. Work methods and - procedures for avian 
influenza control are developed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
WORK METHODS AND - PROCEDURES FOR THE CONTROL OF AVIAN 
INFLUENZA 
 
5.1. Introduction  
Avian influenza control has been defined as the actions and programmes 
directed towards preventing and reducing avian influenza incidences and 
prevalence. In this chapter, work methods and - procedures for avian 
influenza control are developed from four perspectives, namely: 
 
• Basic strategies  for avian influenza control; 
• control strategies  for avian influenza in humans; 
• control strategies for avian influenza in birds ; and 
• the role of  Avian Influenza Endemic Outbreak Response Teams. 
 
Firstly, basic strategies for avian influenza control are discussed. These 
control strategies describe the basic strategies needed to protect people at 
risk, measures to interrupt the transmission of avian influenza and strategies 
to eliminate or reduce the sources of infection.  
 
Secondly, control strategies for avian influenza in humans are developed. 
These control strategies include work methods and - procedures for 
preventing the exposure of workers in health care facilities, vaccination, 
antiviral drugs, health education and legislative measures. 
 
Thirdly, control strategies for avian influenza in birds are developed. These 
control strategies includes biosecurity, elimination of infected poultry, 
vaccination and education.  
 
Fourthly discussed is the establishment of Communicable Disease Outbreak 
Response Teams. This section focuses on the place and role of 
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environmental health practitioners in the National, Provincial, District and Sub-
district Communicable Disease Outbreak Response Teams. Also discussed is 
the frequency of meetings for outbreak response teams at the health district 
and - sub district levels. The basic strategies of avian influenza control are 
introduced in the section below. 
 
5.2. Basic strategies of avian influenza control 
According to Kim-Farley (1997, p.1561), the control of infectious diseases 
refers to the actions and programmes directed towards reducing disease 
incidence and prevalence. Connolly (2005, p.125) states that a communicable 
disease outbreak can be controlled by eliminating or reducing the source of 
infection, interrupting the transmission of the disease and protecting persons 
at risk. Furthermore, communicable disease control strategies can be divided 
into four categories, namely: 
 
• Prevention of exposure: The source of infection must be reduced to 
prevent the disease spreading to other members of the community. This 
may involve prompt diagnosis and treatment of cases using standard 
protocols, isolation of cases, health education, modification of the 
environment and vector and reservoir control; 
• Prevention of infection: Susceptible people should be vaccinated;  
• Prevention of disease: Prophylaxis treatment for high-risk people; and 
• Prevention of death: through effective health care services delivery. 
 
Webber (1996, p.35I) states that communicable disease control can be 
directed at the chain of infection, namely the agent, the transmission route, 
the host and/or the environment. According to Kim-Farley (1997, p.1563), 
control measures of communicable diseases are multiple and mainly include 
immunisation, isolation, environmental methods and vector control.  
From the above, it can be concluded that avian influenza control can be done 
by developing measures to protect people at risk, measures to interrupt the 
transmission of avian influenza and strategies to eliminate or reduce the 
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source of infection. The section below discusses the control strategies for 
avian influenza in humans. 
 
5.3. Control strategies for avian influenza in humans 
According to the World Health Organisation (2004b, p.15) human avian 
influenza control strategies should be aimed at efforts to prevent infection and 
control measures to reduce opportunities for further transmission of the 
disease. Human avian influenza control measures include the following: 
 
• Preventing the exposure of workers in health care facilities; 
• vaccination; 
• antiviral drugs; 
• health education; and  
• legislative measures. 
 
In the following sections the above mentioned control measures will be 
discussed. Firstly is preventing the exposure of workers in health care 
facilities. 
 
5.3.1. Preventing the exposure of workers in health care facilities 
The World Health Organization (2006a, p.5) regards every case of 
transmission of an avian influenza virus to humans as a cause for concern, 
which requires heightened vigilance and increased surveillance. Generally, 
health care workers will be the first line of workers at health services that 
come in contact with suspected or infected avian influenza patients. It is 
therefore important to provide them with protection against the hazards 
associated with the virus. The prompt identification and isolation of patients, 
healthcare employees and visitors who may be infected is critical to minimise 
the risk of nosocomial transmission and to enable an efficient public health 
response. Health care workers include people working in a health care facility, 
e.g., medical officers, nurses, physiotherapists, cleaners, psychologists, 
laboratory workers, ambulance drivers, etc.  
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In an era of emerging and re-emerging communicable diseases, basic 
infection control precautions are the cornerstone of the approach to prevent 
transmission of communicable diseases in health care facilities. The basic 
level of infection control precautions (standard precautions), will be effective in 
preventing transmission of most communicable diseases in health care 
facilities. The European Commission for Disease Prevention and Control 
(2007, p.13) describes infection control precautions as the measures intended 
to reduce the risk of transmission from an infected person to uninfected 
persons (e.g. hand and respiratory hygiene, masks and respirators and 
disinfection). 
 
During the 1997 human avian influenza A (H5N1) outbreak in Hong Kong, no 
nosocomial spread of the virus was observed when droplet and contact 
precautions were used at health care facilities (Salgado, 2002, p.145). 
According to Beigel (2005, p.1375), there is no evidence to suggest that 
airborne human-to-human transmission of avian influenza A (H5N1) has 
occurred thus far where strict droplet and contact precautions were used at 
health care facilities. 
 
In general, the transmission of human influenza viruses occurs through 
multiple routes - including large droplets, direct and indirect contact, and 
droplet nuclei (Goldman, 2000, p.102). Observational studies conducted at 
healthcare facilities suggest that droplet transmission is the major mode of 
transmission in health care settings (Scott, Kerr and Carman, 2002, p.249) 
and that standard plus droplet precautions are recommended for the care of 
patients infected with the virus. Against the background of what has been 
discussed in this section, work methods and - procedures for health care 
workers providing care to avian influenza infected patients at health care 
facilities have been developed and presented in Annexure 27. The following 
section discusses avian influenza prevention by vaccination. 
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5.3.2. Avian influenza control by vaccination 
According to the World Health Organization (2007d, p.8), human H5N1 
vaccines are anticipated to be one of the major pharmaceutical interventions 
against a pandemic of H5N1 influenza, but this vaccine has not been widely 
used in human populations yet. The development of human H5N1 influenza 
vaccines offers an additional option of control and could potentially be used in 
the area surrounding a local outbreak, to dampen the possibility of the virus 
spreading. In this way, H5N1 vaccines could be used as an adjunct to other 
immediate containment efforts. 
 
The European Commission for Disease Prevention and Control (2007, p.8) 
states that published data in Europe and data disclosed confidentially by 
industries identified no serious concerns in the use of human H5N1 influenza 
vaccines. The data available so far suggest that human H5N1 influenza 
vaccines should be safe and effective in protecting humans against H5N1 
influenza. This is in line with presentations made at two World Health 
Organization meetings on the clinical trial results of a range of pandemic 
candidate vaccines (including H5N1) in November 2005 and May 2006. None 
of the pandemic prototype vaccines tested was associated with additional 
safety issues and all were well tolerated in the age groups studied. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that the H5N1 influenza vaccines explained 
above must be referred to as pre-pandemic vaccines because there is no 
guarantee that the next human influenza pandemic will evolve from the 
current H5N1 avian influenza strain. The human H5N1 vaccine “H5N1” 
remains the only possible candidate strain for the next pandemic, albeit a 
worrying candidate, because of its persistence in poultry and high 
pathogenicity in humans. 
 
Nagpal (personal communication, December 15, 2006) stated that no 
pandemic vaccine is in existence. No direct evidence can be available ahead 
of a pandemic, though it is likely that a vaccine developed from the pandemic 
strain will be effective. Availability of any pandemic vaccine will be minimal 
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during the first pandemic wave as it can take months to develop the ideal 
vaccine.  
 
Scientific studies suggest there would likely be some protective effect against 
an H5-based pandemic even if the pandemic strain had changed somewhat 
from the current H5N1 viruses circulating in birds. Modelling work has 
suggested that the strategy of having a stockpiled vaccine (and possibly 
deploying it in advance), even if incompletely matched to the pandemic virus, 
may prevent more infections and deaths than waiting for specific ‘true’ 
pandemic vaccines (Ferguson, 2006, p.448 ; Germann, 2006, p.5935). 
 
The World Health Organization (2007d, p.18) identified five general options for 
considering the use of human H5N1 influenza vaccines. The first three of the 
options relate to non-pandemic periods, i.e., when H5N1 infections of people 
are zoonotic and the identity of the next pandemic influenza virus is unknown. 
The other two options relate to the early stage outbreaks with pandemic 
potential, that is if an H5N1 pandemic appeared imminent or was under way. 
The different options are listed below. 
 
• To protect people at high risk of contracting zoonotic avian H5N1 
influenza; 
• to “prime” the immune systems of people in selected groups or populations 
in anticipation of a possible H5N1 influenza pandemic;  
• to fully immunize people in selected groups or populations in anticipation 
of a possible H5N1 influenza pandemic; 
• to help contain the initial and localised emergence of a potential H5N1 
influenza pandemic; and 
• to immunise people in selected groups or populations following sustained 
human-to-human transmission of an H5N1 influenza virus. 
 
Although vaccination against avian influenza may deliver a variety of desirable 
outcomes, including potentially reducing virus transmission in populations with 
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high vaccination levels, the most important outcomes would be the protection 
of vaccinated individuals against severe disease, hospitalisation and 
premature death. 
 
5.3.3. Avian influenza control by antiviral drugs 
Antiviral drugs have demonstrated efficacy in the treatment and prevention of 
seasonal influenza. Additional research is needed on the role of antiviral drugs 
in the treatment and prophylaxis of avian influenza. Older inhibitor antiviral 
drugs like amantidine and ramantidine are ineffective against avian influenza 
A (H5N1) in vitro (Hayden, 2004, p.874). According to Zeitlin and Maslow       
(2005, p.193), avian influenza A (H5N1) is susceptible in vitro to 
neuraminidase inhibitors (oseltamivir and zanamavir). The optimal dose and 
duration of treatment for avian influenza with neuraminidase inhibitors are 
unknown. 
 
In Europe much reliance is being put on the use of antiviral drugs (mostly 
oseltamivir - commercially known as Tamiflu) for prophylaxis or early 
treatment for the pandemic influenza strains (European Commission for 
Disease Prevention and Control, 2007, p.13). The use of antiviral drugs as 
prophylaxis in reducing transmission of avian influenza is only effective when 
given early enough following exposure or development of symptoms (Hayden 
2004, p.874). According to Halloran and Haydon (2007, p.212) as well as 
Jefferson (2006, p.303), oseltamivir and zanamavir (commercially known as 
relenza), influenza A treatment drugs are effective in reducing symptoms but 
not in eliminating the experience of symptoms. 
 
The Western Cape Department of Health (2006, p.8) states that oseltamivir 
may reduce the severity and duration of illness, provided it is administered 
early in the course of the illness, i.e., within 48 hours after onset of symptoms. 
The currently recommended doses for treatment of influenza A per mouth 
intake are: 
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i) Adults: 
• 75 mg twice a day for five days 
ii) Children 1 year of age or older: (weight adjusted doses):  
• 30mg twice daily for ≤ 15 kg 
• 45mg twice daily for >15 to 23 kg 
• 60mg twice daily for >23 to 40kg 
• 75mg twice daily for >40kg 
iii) Children < 1 year of age:  
• Not recommended 
 
At present, there is no clear evidence that shows that higher dosages than the 
recommended ones will be more effective for patients with H5N1. Because 
the optimal dosage has not been resolved by clinical trials, and because 
H5N1 infections continue to have a high mortality rate, prospective studies are 
needed urgently to determine optimal dosage and duration of treatment for 
H5N1. The World Health Organization will continue to monitor the situation 
and will provide updates on the availability of clinically important new 
information related to the optimal dosage and duration of treatment with 
oseltamivir for H5N1-infected persons (World Health Organization, 2007d, 
p.5). In the next section avian influenza health education is discussed.  
 
5.3.4. Avian influenza education 
According to Connolly (2005, p.88), health education and community 
participation during intervention strategies play a key role in avian influenza 
prevention and control. Avian influenza education strategies should focus on 
specific human behaviour that can contribute to reducing the risk of H5N1 
transmission. The reasons for focusing on specific human behaviour are listed 
below (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2006, p.2): 
 
• At present the extended spread of the H5N1 virus among animals is of 
great concern and therefore human behaviour reduces the further 
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dissemination of the virus and needs to be addressed as an entry point for 
reducing the risk of human infection; 
• information about the spread of the virus in birds and the specific risk 
factors that have  led to human infection is limited - therefore there will be 
a need to adjust the behavioural interventions as more evidence becomes 
available; and 
• behaviour change requires addressing important socio-cultural and 
economic factors, such as compensation for reporting sick/dead birds at 
the community level. 
 
The expected human actions at community level during an avian influenza 
outbreak should include the following (Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations, 2006, p.2): 
 
• Report unusual sickness/death among poultry, wild birds and other 
animals immediately to the health authorities; 
• People should immediately seek medical treatment if they experience 
fever after contact with sick birds; 
• Wash hands frequently with soap and water; 
• Clean clothes, footwear, vehicles and cages with soap or disinfectant; 
• Separate poultry species from wild birds, new birds and living areas; 
• Handle, prepare and consume poultry safely; and 
• Burn and/or bury dead birds safely. 
 
From the above it can be concluded that health education is a strategy to 
change human behaviour to concur with the principles of avian influenza 
control. In Annexure 28 prevention and control guidelines for people living in 
areas affected by avian influenza are presented. The objective of the 
guidelines is to provide the general public during an avian influenza outbreak 
with specific work - procedures to be followed in an attempt to reduce the risk 
of H5N1 transmission. Environmental health practitioners should bring this 
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information under the attention of the public. In the next section legislative 
measures for avian influenza control are discussed.  
 
5.3.5. Legislative measures for the control of avian influenza 
Avian influenza control can only be carried out and maintained effectively by 
legislative measures (National Department of Health, 2006, p.13). Legislative 
measures in this context refer to the regulations and laws that relate to avian 
influenza control.  In South Africa, a number of legislative measures regarding 
the control of the disease exist. These include the:  
 
• International Health Regulations
• 
, 2005; 
Terrestrial Animal Health Code
• 
, 2005;  
National Health Act
• 
, 2004 (Act 61 of 2003); 
Animal Diseases Act
• 
, 1984 (Act 35 of 1984); and the 
Meat Safety Act
 
The abovementioned legislations were discussed in Chapter Two (see 
sections 2.3.1.2. and 2.3.1.3.). Any avian influenza control strategy must 
comply with the said legislation. In analysing the abovementioned legislations 
it becomes noticeable that no provision is made for work methods and -
procedures on how to execute the legal requirements. This situation 
contributed to the need for this study and is supported by the Provincial 
Communicable Control Co-ordinators (group of experts) (see Chapter One). 
The control strategies for bird avian influenza cases are discussed in the next 
section.  
 
5.4. Control strategies for bird avian influenza cases 
, 2000 (Act 40 of 2000).  
According to the World Organization for Animal Health (2008, p.2), measures 
for the control of avian influenza must be aimed at halting further spread in 
birds and minimising economic losses. The said measures need to be closely 
coordinated with measures that minimise the longer-term risks to human 
health. Control strategies aimed at eliminating the disease in birds will also 
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reduce the presence of the virus in the environment and thus reduce 
opportunities for human exposure and infections. The elimination of infection 
in birds can be a complex, difficult, and a costly undertaking. Outbreaks can 
be controlled through immediate culling of infected flocks, quarantine and 
disinfection of farms, strict biosecurity, restrictions on the movement of 
animals and compensation for farmers. 
 
The objectives of an avian influenza control programme for birds should be 
directed towards the prevention, control and eradication of the avian influenza 
outbreak (Swane and Akey, 2003, p.113). The said objectives can be 
achieved through various strategies that include the following: 
 
• Biosecurity (prevention or reduction to exposure); 
• elimination of infected poultry; 
• vaccination; and  
• education. 
 
The following sections discusses the above mentioned control strategies for 
birds. Firstly discussed below is biosecurity. 
 
5.4.1. Biosecurity  
The outbreak of highly pathogenic notifiable avian influenza on farms in the 
Eastern and Western Cape provinces during 2004 has highlighted various 
aspects of the poultry industry that are not conducive to efficient disease 
control. Biosecurity and disease monitoring in particular are important aspects 
of disease control in order to prevent further problems relating to avian 
influenza outbreaks in South Africa (Pienaar and Horner, 2005).  
 
According to Swane and Akey (2003, p.115), biosecurity includes best 
management practices to reduce the risk of introducing an avian influenza 
virus into a poultry house or farm. In most situations, these practices focus on 
preventing the following: 
 147 
• The  movement of the avian influenza virus on contaminated equipment, 
clothing and shoes off farms with infected birds; 
•  preventing movement of infected poultry or their by-products (e.g., 
manure); and 
•  preventing exposure of poultry to wild waterfowl. 
 
In the event of an avian influenza outbreak of birds in a region, farm 
quarantine must be included in the biosecurity practices. Quarantine as a 
biosecurity measure means controlling the movement of people, including 
restrictions to minimise the number of visitors to infected farms. This is best 
achieved by restricting inbound and outbound movements through 
circumferential fencing of the farm and locking of the gates, or even better, a 
manned guard shack to ensure adherence to biosecurity policies. Other high-
risk activities must be managed by proper cleaning and disinfection of the 
following: 
 
• Equipment that is shared between farms; 
• decontamination of clothing and shoes of workers (preferably having work 
clothing and shoes left on the farm with laundering locally); 
• having employees dedicated to one farm; and  
• having strict rules prohibiting employees from owning backyard or 
recreational poultry or from visiting other poultry farms or establishments. 
 
 For shared employees such as vaccination crews, catch crews, feed truck 
drivers, service personnel etc., they must diligently practise cleaning and 
disinfection of equipment (including vehicles), clothing and shoes, and 
minimise their exposure to the birds. Ideally, poultry farms should be of low 
density in a geographic area to reduce the ease of farm-to-farm transmission 
(Capua and Marangon, 2003, p. 353). Against the background of what has 
been discussed in this section biosecurity work procedures for poultry have 
been developed and presented in Annexure 29 and were confirmed by the 
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Provincial Communicable Control Co-ordinators (group of experts) on 31 
August 2008. The next section discusses the elimination of infected poultry. 
 
5.4.2. Elimination of infected poultry 
According to Swane and Akey (2003, p.120), avian influenza-infected poultry 
flocks can be eliminated through on-farm depopulation and disposal. The 
depopulation and disposal of infected birds must be performed bearing in 
mind that this needs to be done in the quickest time span possible to prevent 
the spread of infection. Euthanasia and disposal is the preferred method of 
eliminating flocks infected with avian influenza. Depopulation requires two 
processes:  
 
• Firstly, the rapid, humane euthanasia of large numbers of poultry; and  
• Secondly, the disposal of the carcasses in an environmentally safe way. 
 
Work methods and - procedures for the elimination of infected poultry are 
presented in Annexure 30. These procedures were confirmed by the 
Provincial Communicable Control Co-ordinators (group of experts) on 31 
August 2008. The section below discusses vaccination as an avian influenza 
control strategy. 
 
5.4.3. Vaccination  
Dealing with avian influenza has become increasingly complex and requires 
the need to develop control strategies that complement the traditional 
stamping out approach. Vaccination aims to protect the susceptible population 
of birds from potential infection, thereby reducing the incidence or the severity 
of the disease. Vaccination strategies can effectively be used as an 
emergency effort in the face of an outbreak or as a routine measure in an 
endemic area (World Organization for Animal Health, 2008, p.2). 
 
According to Van Der Goot, Koch, De Jong and Van Boven (2005, p.1814), 
vaccination can be a powerful tool to support eradication programmes if used 
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in conjunction with other control methods that include biosecurity and 
monitoring of the evolution of the infection. Vaccination has been shown to 
increase resistance and reduce transmission of the virus. It is important to 
note that on the one hand, vaccinated birds shed fewer viruses; on the other 
hand, they do not show any clinical signs of disease and could therefore act 
as silent carriers (Capua and Marangon, 2006, p.1319). 
 
Swayne, Beck and Mickle (1997, p.122) state that the vaccination of poultry 
with avian influenza vaccines can decrease the susceptibility of poultry to the 
virus. Vaccination with inactivated whole AI-virus, or recombinant live AI-virus 
vaccines prevented clinical disease and mortality, and decreased replication 
and shedding of the field virus from respiratory and digestive tracts. However, 
vaccines do not completely prevent infection, especially in the field, thus 
biosecurity practices are essential to prevent spread between vaccinated 
flocks that may become infected (Capua and Marangon 2003, p.335; Swayne 
2003, p.201). 
 
From a South African perspective, vaccination is currently not considered as a 
possible control measure in the case of an outbreak of highly pathogenic 
avian influenza, as the slaughter-out of all infected birds is the current control 
policy to be followed. Vaccination as a possible control measure will only be 
considered during an uncontrollable outbreak of highly pathogenic avian 
influenza in the country. This is where the disease is spreading very rapidly or 
where the disease is occurring on more than a single front, or in more than 
one province.  Vaccination will be employed in conjunction with slaughtering-
out, as a defence ring to prevent spread of the disease. While slaughtering-
out is taking place inside the ‘line of defence’ all vaccinated birds will be 
slaughtered eventually, as the presence of antibodies (even if due to 
vaccination) will confuse future routine serological surveillance (nor 
withstanding the use of the DIVA principle (differentiating infected from 
vaccinated animals). Serological surveillance would be one of the important 
tools used to establish the disease status in the area or country (Pienaar & 
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Horner, 2005, p.66). The next section discusses education as a control 
strategy for avian influenza control in birds. 
 
5.4.4. Avian influenza education 
According to Swane and Akey (2003, p.120), education is an essential 
component of any avian influenza prevention, control or eradication strategy. 
This involves providing information to the industry and farm workers 
concerning: 
 
• The biology of avian influenza viruses; 
• how the avian influenza virus is transmitted and the identification of the 
virus ; 
• how the virus is introduced and how it spread on farms;  
• elimination of behaviours that put the farm at risk for avian influenza 
introduction (e.g., owning backyard poultry, working on or visiting multiple 
poultry farms); 
• the application of methods and practices in biosecurity to prevent the 
introduction of the avian influenza virus onto a farm (exclusion biosecurity 
practices); 
• biosecurity practices to prevent the avian influenza virus from leaving a 
farm (inclusion biosecurity practices); and 
• risk communication, which is essential between companies or farms when 
avian influenza-infected premises is identified.  
 
The next section discusses the role of Avian Influenza Endemic Outbreak 
Response Teams. 
 
5.5 The role of Avian Influenza Endemic Outbreak Response Teams 
As discussed in section 4.4, once a disease surveillance system detects an 
outbreak of avian influenza, Endemic Outbreak Response Teams must be 
formed. The responsibilities of Endemic Outbreak Response Teams at the 
different spheres of government in the event of a communicable disease 
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outbreak are described from a national and provincial perspective in a 
document entitled Guidelines for outbreak response and epidemic 
management (National Department of Health, 2000). 
 
According to the Mpumalanga Provincial Health Department (2006, p.7), the 
overall aim of Endemic Outbreak Response Teams is to identify infectious 
disease outbreaks, conduct surveillance, prepare for emergencies, ensure a 
rapid response and to promote the systematic management of outbreaks in 
order to reduce morbidity, disability and mortality. 
 
In practice, an Endemic Outbreak Response Team should be established 
before an outbreak occurs. Members of the said team are normally performing 
their usual roles, but in the event of an outbreak of avian influenza, they come 
together to undertake the said functions. The next section discusses the place 
and role of environmental health in the National Communicable Disease 
Outbreak Response Team. 
 
5.5.1. The place and role of environmental health in the National 
Communicable Disease Outbreak Response Team 
According to National Departments of Health (2006, p.16), the Deputy-
Director General of the National Department of Health is responsible for 
providing leadership to the multidisciplinary disease outbreak response teams 
involved in the development of avian influenza preparedness strategies at 
national, provincial and municipal health departments. The Deputy-Director 
General, together with the National Institute for Communicable Diseases and 
health partners from the private sector are responsible to establish and 
sustain well-constituted and well-functioning outbreak response teams at the 
different spheres of government in order to give effect to avian influenza 
pandemic preparedness strategies. 
 
The overall aim of the National Outbreak Response Team with regard to avian 
influenza is to (National Department of Health, 2006, p.18): 
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• Provide leadership; 
• identify avian influenza outbreaks by ensuring the existence of a functional 
surveillance system in the country; 
• investigate avian influenza outbreaks in the country; 
• prepare adequately and timeously for emergencies; 
• ensure rapid response and systematic management of avian influenza 
outbreaks, in order to reduce morbidity and mortality; and 
• enhance coordination at each sphere of government. 
 
According to the National Department of Health (2006, p.15) a number of 
sectors acts on the National Outbreak Response Team in South Africa. These 
sectors play different, yet complementary roles in the National Outbreak 
Response Team. The National Directorate: Environmental Health forms part 
of the National Outbreak Response Team. Annexure 31 represents the list of 
sectors involved in the said outbreak response team. Not all the sectors are 
present during the routine monthly meetings, but the presence of all can be 
requested during an avian influenza outbreak.  
 
According to Ramkrishna (personal communication, June 11, 2007), the 
National Directorate: Environmental Health must provide leadership to 
environmental health practitioners in the provincial and municipal spheres 
regarding their role in influenza outbreak response teams. This includes the 
following: 
 
• Conduct environmental assessments and management of risk factors 
predisposing individuals to influenza; 
• collect environmental samples for laboratory testing in order to confirm 
sources of outbreaks; and 
• coordinate port health activities. 
 
Detailed roles and responsibilities of the different sectors within the National 
Outbreak Response Team can be found in the influenza preparedness plans 
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of the National Department of Health (2006). In the following section the place 
and role of environmental health in Provincial Outbreak Response Teams are 
discussed. 
 
5.5.2. The place and role of environmental health in a Provincial Outbreak 
Response Team  
At the provincial sphere, a Provincial Outbreak Control Coordinator has been 
appointed for each of the nine provinces in South Africa (Tshabalala-
Msimang, 2004). These coordinators have the responsibility to establish 
multidisciplinary Provincial Outbreak Control Teams and to prevent and 
control disease outbreaks in their provinces (National Department of Health, 
2000, pp.5-7).  
 
The multidisciplinary Provincial Outbreak Response Team is made up of the 
following sectors and was confirmed by the Provincial Communicable Control 
Co-ordinators (group of experts) on 31 August 2008: 
 
• Communicable Disease Control; 
• Clinical Care; 
• Surveillance / Epidemiology;  
• Environmental Health; and 
• Health Promotion. 
 
The above sectors, together with the Department of Agriculture, are also 
responsible for epidemiological investigations at the provincial sphere. 
However, there are additional sectors that can form part of the overall 
Provincial Outbreak Response Team during disease outbreaks. These include 
the following sectors at the provincial sphere and were confirmed by the 
Provincial Communicable Control Co-ordinators (group of experts) on 31 
August 2008: 
• Pharmaceutical Services; 
• Communication; 
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• Hospital Management; 
• Emergency Medical Services; 
• Disaster Management Units; 
• Primary Health Care Teams; 
• Infection Control Teams; 
• Occupational Health Unit; 
• Expanded Programme on Immunisation (EPI) Section; 
• Human Resources Section; 
• Mental Health, Nutrition, and Information units; 
• Departments of Water Affairs and Forestry; 
• Defence; 
• Local Government; 
• Education; 
• Non-governmental organisations; 
• International agencies; 
• Civic structures; and 
• Community structures. 
 
Nagpal (2006, p.15) proposes a similar list and added several important 
sectors that should be part of the Provincial Outbreak Response Team of the 
Eastern Cape province (See Annexure 32). 
 
According to Gouws (2006, p.10) a Provincial Outbreak Response Team is 
chaired by the Provincial Outbreak Coordinator who reports to the Chief 
Director: Communicable Diseases at the National Department of Health and 
to the Head of the Health Department in the provincial sphere. The Provincial 
Outbreak Response Team can co-opt any member of the private sector with 
specialised expertise to advise it on certain matters. It is the role of the 
Provincial Outbreak Response Team to ensure that an integrated and uniform 
approach is followed in dealing with avian influenza outbreaks. A further 
function of the Provincial Outbreak Response Team is to assist in planning, 
 155 
formulating policy guidelines, providing information, providing physical and 
financial support, providing training, research and capacity building on avian 
influenza surveillance and control which will continually be executed at 
provincial sphere. 
 
A key function of the Deputy-Director: Environmental Health in the Eastern 
Cape province , who should form part of the Provincial Outbreak Response 
Team, is to monitor and ensure the implementation of preparedness plans in 
the provincial and local spheres (Wild, personal communication, May 7, 2007). 
The said Deputy-Director is also responsible for the training of environmental 
health practitioners at district and sub-district levels within the Eastern Cape 
province on epidemiological avian influenza investigations. The next section 
discusses the place and role of environmental health with in a District 
Outbreak Response Team.  
 
5.5.3. The place and role of environmental health in a Health District Outbreak 
Response Team  
In the Eastern Cape province, district municipalities (Category C 
municipalities) have established their own District Outbreak Response Teams 
(Agenbag, personal communication, April 2, 2007 and Dreyer, personal 
communication, February 19, 2007). In the case of the Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan Municipality, a Metropolitan Outbreak Response Team is in 
existence (Oliphant, personal communication, February 5, 2007). The list 
below reflects the sectors that are currently part of the Metropolitan Outbreak 
Response Team in the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality in the 
Eastern Cape province (Oliphant, personal communication, February 5, 2007 
and Masiso, personal communication, January 29, 2007): 
 
• A senior environmental health practitioner from the metropolitan 
municipality (Category A municipality); 
• the Health District Manager of the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
Municipality; 
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• doctors and nurses from  both public and private hospitals within the 
municipality; 
• representatives from the local Disaster Management Committee; 
• an epidemiologist from a tertiary educational institution; 
• veterinarians from the Department of Agriculture in the municipality;  
• a representative from the Provincial Department of Health; 
• environmental health practitioners from the metropolitan sub councils; and 
• representatives from relevant private organisations in the metropolitan 
municipality. 
The District Outbreak Response Teams of the District Municipalities (Category 
C municipalities in the Eastern Cape province have similar compositions 
(Agenbag, personal communication, April 2, 2007 and Dreyer, personal 
communication, February 19, 2007).  According to the Eastern Cape 
Department of Health (2001, p.5), in all the Health Districts in the Eastern 
Cape province an Outbreak Task Team should be established composed of 
the: 
 
• District Manager; 
• District Communicable Disease Coordinator (convener); 
• district information manager; 
• district maternal and child coordinator; 
• medical doctor from the district hospital; 
• district environmental health practitioner; 
• district pharmacist; 
• district laboratory coordinator;  
• environmental health practitioner from each sub-district within the health 
district ; and  
• a community health nurse from each sub-district within the health district . 
 
The District Outbreak Response Team is responsible for collecting and 
providing information and reports to the Provincial Outbreak Response Team. 
 157 
Gouws (2006, p.17), is of the opinion that the District Environmental Health 
Manager should chair the disease outbreak response team meetings at the 
district (Category C municipality) level. 
 
From Section 1 of the National Health Act, 2004 (Act 61 of 2003) it was 
deduced that the surveillance and prevention of communicable diseases is a 
function of environmental health practitioners at the municipal sphere of 
government. According to Bezana (personal communication, June 10, 2007), 
the role of environmental health practitioners in relation to the surveillance and 
prevention of communicable diseases must be the anticipation, identification 
and assessment of environmental health risk factors through:  
 
• inspections; 
• investigations; 
• research and monitoring; 
• analysis of surveillance information; 
• risk assessment for the purpose of determining the appropriate remedial or 
preventative measures; 
• the implementation of remedial or preventative measures; 
• re-monitoring for establishing the effectiveness of measures taken; and 
• to provide a surveillance system that will prevent the re-introduction of an 
infection. 
 
Agenbag (personal communication, April 2, 2007) states that environmental 
health practitioners should play a leading role in coordinating and facilitating 
the surveillance and control of avian influenza in a District Outbreak Response 
Team. From an environmental health point of view, there is currently no team 
in place that deals specifically with the surveillance and control of avian 
influenza in the Eastern Cape province. It is therefore important to establish 
specialist teams for environmental health at health district level that can deal 
with the surveillance and control of avian influenza. Oliphant (personal 
communication, February 5, 2007) agrees with Agenbag and added that 
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environmental health practitioners represented on such a team should not 
only have the theoretical knowledge, but also practical experience. The next 
section discusses the place and role of environmental health in a Health Sub-
District Outbreak Response Team. 
 
5.5.4. The place and role of environmental health in a Health Sub-District 
Outbreak Response Team  
Each municipal sub-district within the Ukhahlamba and Cacadu District 
Municipalities as well as the metropolitan sub-councils in the Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan Municipality in the Eastern Cape province established Sub-
District / Metropolitan Sub-Council Outbreak Response Teams in consultation 
with the relevant role players. These teams generally consist of nurses from 
clinics, local doctors and an environmental health practitioner. These teams 
are less structured than the District Outbreak Response Teams and meets on 
an ad-hoc basis (Agenbag, personal communication, April 2, 2007). According 
to Dreyer, (personal communication, February 2, 2007), the Sub-District 
Outbreak Teams should meet on a weekly basis and an environmental health 
practitioner should be part of the said teams. A representative of the Sub-
district Outbreak Response Team should attend the monthly meetings of the 
District Outbreak Response Team. Titus (personal communication, February 
2, 2007) states that environmental health practitioners should not always wait 
for information on avian influenza from nurses, clinics and hospitals but should 
play a more pro-active role and conduct surveillance strategies to identify 
individuals and places at risk within their respective areas of jurisdiction. 
 
According to Gouws (personal communication, December 5, 2007), the Sub-
District Outbreak Response Teams should promote an integrated and 
coordinated approach to avian influenza surveillance and control in a 
municipal area. All government organs and role-players within a health sub-
district should put special emphasis on the prevention / mitigation of an avian 
influenza outbreak. Sub-district Outbreak Response Teams should act as a 
repository and a conduit for information concerning avian influenza outbreaks 
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within their areas of jurisdiction. Sub-district Outbreak Response Teams 
should also promote avian influenza surveillance and control by capacity 
building, training and education in the communities that are vulnerable to an 
avian influenza outbreak. Sub-district Outbreak Response Team should 
promote the recruitment, training and participation of volunteers in the event of 
an avian influenza outbreak in a municipal/sub-district area.  
 
According to Oliphant (personal communication, February 5, 2007) avian 
influenza training needs should be included in the integrated development 
plans of municipalities and should be part of the annual municipal budget. 
This will ensure that avian influenza preparedness strategies become a 
priority within the municipal sphere. The next section discusses the frequency 
of meetings for outbreak response teams at the municipal sphere of 
government. 
 
5.5.5. Frequency of meetings of outbreak response teams at the municipal 
sphere of government 
According to Gouws (2006, p.68), the frequency of meetings at the municipal 
sphere will depend on the development of the epidemiological situation. 
During outbreaks, it is recommended that the team meet on a daily basis.  
The frequency may be reduced depending on the extent of the outbreak. 
When the control measures are launched and when epidemiological 
surveillance data show no more extension of the epidemic, a weekly meeting 
may suffice. During every team meeting, the responsibilities of members 
should be reviewed in order to ensure the success of control actions. 
Outbreak coordinators should ensure proper secretarial support and proper 
minutes must be kept of each meeting. The minutes of the monthly District 
Outbreak Response Team meetings must be captured electronically on the 
District Health Information System (DHIS) that is linked with the Provincial and 
National Health Departments (Erasmus, personal communication, June 5, 
2007).  
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According to Agenbag (personal communication, April 2, 2007), 
communication amongst outbreak response teams from different districts in 
the Eastern Cape province is poor. Due to the avian influenza outbreaks that 
occurred previously in the province, monthly meetings are advisable during 
non-outbreak periods. Outbreak response teams should systematically assess 
the trends of avian influenza outbreaks and continuously review the 
implementation of existing preparedness plans. 
 
5.6. Conclusion 
Avian influenza control includes all the actions and programmes directed 
towards preventing and reducing avian influenza incidences and prevalence. 
In this chapter, strategies for avian influenza control were developed from four 
perspectives, namely basic strategies for avian influenza control, control 
strategies for avian influenza in humans, control strategies for avian influenza 
in birds, and the role of avian influenza endemic outbreak response teams. 
 
Most documentary sources discuss avian influenza control under two main 
categories, namely control strategies for avian influenza in humans; and the 
control of avian influenza in birds. Control strategies for avian influenza in 
humans were identified and developed in terms of the following: work 
methods and - procedures for preventing the exposure of workers in health 
care facilities, avian influenza control by vaccination, avian influenza control 
by antiviral drugs, avian influenza control by health education and legislative 
measures for the control of avian influenza. It was found that health care 
workers are generally the first line of workers at health establishments that 
come in contact with suspected or infected avian influenza patients. It was 
therefore important to develop work methods and - procedures on how to 
protect themselves against the hazards associated with the virus. 
 
To date no pandemic vaccine is in existence because it is impossible to 
predict accurately the genetic make - up of the next pandemic strain. 
However, the human H5N1 vaccine remains the only possible candidate strain 
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for the next pandemic. The World Health Organization identified five general 
options for considering the use of human H5N1 influenza vaccines. If an 
H5N1 pandemic appeared imminent, or was under way, the use of the H5N1 
influenza vaccines should be considered in order to: 
 
• Protect people at high risk of contracting zoonotic avian H5N1 influenza; 
• “prime” the immune systems of people in selected groups or populations in 
anticipation of a possible H5N1 influenza pandemic;  
• fully immunize people in selected groups or populations in anticipation of a 
possible H5N1 influenza pandemic; 
• help contain the initial and localized emergence of a potential H5N1 
influenza pandemic; and 
• immunize people in selected groups or populations following sustained 
human-to-human transmission of an H5N1 influenza virus. 
 
At present the two antiviral drugs, Oseltamivir and Zanamavir, are used in the 
treatment of influenza A. Both drugs are effective in reducing symptoms 
caused by the virus. It is important to note that neither of Oseltamivir or 
Zanamavir can fully eliminate symptoms caused by the virus. The use of 
antiviral drugs as prophylaxis in reducing transmission of avian influenza is 
only effective when given early enough following exposure or the development 
of symptoms. 
 
It was concluded that health education is a valuable strategy to change 
human behaviour to conform to the principles of avian influenza control. 
Prevention and control guidance for people living in areas affected by avian 
influenza was presented. These guidelines provide specific work procedures 
to be followed in an attempt to reduce the risk of H5N1 transmission. Avian 
influenza control can only be carried out and maintained effectively by 
legislative measures. Hence avian influenza control legislative measures were 
identified and discussed. 
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Control strategies for avian influenza in birds were also identified and 
discussed. These control strategies include work methods and - procedures 
for biosecurity as an avian influenza control strategy of birds, elimination of 
infected poultry; vaccination as an avian influenza control strategy in birds and 
education as a control strategy for avian influenza in birds. Control strategies 
aimed at eliminating the disease in birds will reduce the presence of the virus 
in the environment and thus reduce opportunities for human exposure and 
infections. 
 
Lastly discussed was the establishment of Communicable Disease Outbreak 
Response Teams. An avian outbreak investigation and its control is a 
multidisciplinary endeavour that needs close collaboration within the different 
spheres of government. When an avian influenza outbreak occurs, an Avian 
Influenza Outbreak Control Team should be set up immediately by the 
Outbreak Control Coordinator of the affected Health District. The said team 
should implement outbreak investigations and control measures in 
cooperation with relevant staff from the provincial and national health 
departments. The place and role of environmental health in the national, 
provincial, district and sub-district communicable disease outbreak response 
teams were identified and discussed. The success of avian influenza control 
strategies depend on the cooperation of relevant role players within these 
spheres of government. In the next chapter, a conclusion with emphasis on 
the findings of the study will be presented. Applicable recommendations will 
also be made. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The purpose and significance of this study were presented in Chapter One. 
The general purpose of this study was to develop a standardised set of 
Environmental Health work methods and - procedures, which will contribute to 
effective avian influenza surveillance and control in the Eastern Cape province 
– South Africa. More specifically, the purpose of this study was to:  
 
• Firstly, analyse the national health care system with specific reference to 
the place and role of environmental health practitioners at national, 
provincial and municipal spheres – in relation to avian influenza 
surveillance and control - with the purpose of identifying inadequacies and 
making appropriate recommendations;  
• Secondly, analyse and describe the epidemiology of avian influenza, with 
the focus on the distribution and characteristics of the disease in South 
Africa as a prerequisite for the development of work methods and -
procedures for the surveillance and control of the disease; and 
• Thirdly, to analyse relevant research that have been done globally and to 
use it, against the background of the above, to scientifically develop work 
methods and - procedures to be used by environmental health 
practitioners during the surveillance and control of avian influenza in the 
Eastern Cape province – South Africa. 
 
The researcher followed an explorative, descriptive, inductive and deductive 
research design. The methods of data collection were documentary research, 
telephonic as well as in-depth personal interviews. The research population 
used during this study comprised two groups (also referred to as the sample 
groups) as listed below.  
 
• Group 1: The nine Provincial Communicable Disease Outbreak Control 
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   Co-ordinators (a group of experts); and  
• Group 2: Managerial and line function personnel from two of the six District 
 (Category C) Municipalities and the only Metropolitan (Category 
 A) Municipality in the Eastern Cape province. 
 
A documentary research approach was employed as the primary method of 
data collection for the study. Relevant research data were collected from 
government legislation and publications, official national and international 
statistics, as well as other national and international publications. 
 
The researcher has used questions in a telephonic interview schedule to 
obtain relevant information from the participants in the group of experts. The 
purpose of using a telephonic questionnaire for participants in this group was 
to draw on their knowledge and experience of communicable disease 
surveillance and control in relation to avian influenza as well as their views on 
the role of the Environmental Health Practitioners in the Communicable 
Disease Outbreak Response Teams at the three different spheres of 
government.  
 
In order to obtain additional information (information such as the 
organisational structure of the health care system in the Eastern Cape 
province), the current status of avian influenza Outbreak Response Teams, 
functional and managerial problems), semi-structured personal interviews with 
relevant role-players in the municipal sphere of government were conducted, 
namely with managerial and line function personnel from two of the six District 
(Category C) Municipalities (Ukhahlamba District Municipality and Cacadu 
District Municipality) and managerial and line-function personnel from the 
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan (Category A) Municipality in the Eastern Cape 
province. 
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The process of qualitative data analysis was followed based on data reduction 
and interpretation; and was conducted as an activity simultaneously with data 
collection, data interpretation and narrative report writing. 
 
In Chapter Two, an attempt was made to define Environmental Health. It was 
deduced that Environmental Health is a science that not only studies how the 
environment influences human health, but also how the environment 
influences disease. The deduction was made that the environment (i.e., air, 
water and soil) has physical, chemical, biological and social features and that 
it is the influence that these features have on human health that the “science” 
of environmental health is studying. Furthermore, environmental health can be 
regarded as a facet of public health that involves the analysis (assessing, 
identification) of the said factors in the environment and the introduction of 
strategies (correcting, controlling and preventing) to rectify or prevent the 
occurrence of those factors that can potentially adversely affect the state of 
human health. 
 
The functional areas of the environmental health profession as practiced in 
South Africa can be deduce from Section 1 of the National Health Act, 2003 
(Act 61 of 2003). It was concluded that all the functional areas of the 
environmental health practitioner, including the scope of the profession as 
practiced in South Africa correlate with that of the international perspective. 
 
A number of legislative documents relevant to avian influenza surveillance 
and control were also presented. These included the: 
 
• Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act, 1965 (Act 45 of 1965); 
• Foodstuffs, Cosmetics and Disinfectants Act, 1972 (Act 54 of 1972); 
• Hazardous Substances Act, 1973 (Act 15 of 1973); 
• Health Act, 1977 (Act 63 of 1977); 
• Animal Diseases Act, 1984 (Act 35 of 1984); 
• Environment Conservation Act,1989 (Act 73 of 1989); 
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• Occupational Health and Safety Act, 1993 (Act 85 of 1993); 
• Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996); 
• Water Services Act, 1997 (Act 108 of 1997); 
• National Environmental Management Act, 1998 (Act 107 of 1998); 
• National Water Act, 1998 (Act 36 of 1998); 
• Meat Safety Act, 2000 (Act 40 of 2000); 
• National Health Act,  2004 (Act 61 of 2003); 
• Terrestrial Animal Health Code
• 
, 2005; and 
International Health Regulations
 
It was found that the right to health care services is well established within the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996). The 
South African government follows the primary health care philosophy of health 
care service delivery which includes personal and non-personal health care 
services (environmental health services). The Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996) is the supreme law and the foundation of 
the health care system in South Africa. It gives conspicuous expression to the 
fundamental right to health care for all; and also rules that the delivery of 
health care services is a concurrent function in all three spheres of 
government within a framework of cooperative governance. The development 
of environmental health work methods and - procedures for the surveillance 
and control of avian influenza can therefore be regarded as an attempt to fulfill 
a constitutional imperative. 
 
, 1969/2005. 
It was found that the promulgation of the National Health Act, 2004 (Act 61 of 
2003), provides the legislative basis for the state to unite the various elements 
of the national health system under a common umbrella and to actively 
promote and improve the national health system in South Africa. Furthermore, 
the said act defines the organisational framework for health care service 
delivery within each of the three spheres of government. The National Health 
Act, 2004 (Act 61 of 2003) is important legislation for the implementation of 
the constitutional rights on health. This act was promulgated to provide a 
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framework for a structured and uniform national health system. It delineates 
the health services in three spheres of government, namely national, 
provincial and municipal. From the said act, it can be deduced that avian 
influenza surveillance and control are functions of environmental health 
practitioners in the municipal sphere of government (‘surveillance and 
prevention of communicable diseases’ and ‘vector control’).  
 
The organisational structure of the national health system in South Africa was 
explained and discussed from national, provincial and municipal perspectives. 
Chapter Two has attempted to describe the national health care system and 
to identify the place and role of environmental health practitioners within the 
national, provincial and municipal spheres of government. 
An analysis of the national health care system enabled the identification of a 
number of decision-makers in all three spheres of government that can have 
an influence on environmental health service delivery. The said decision-
makers can play either a direct or an indirect role in the surveillance and 
control of avian influenza. The organisational analysis of the national sphere 
(National Department of Health) enabled the identification of the following 
decision - makers: 
 
• The Minister of Health and the Cabinet; 
• members of the National Health Council; 
• the National Health Advisory Committee; 
• the Director-General of Health; 
• the Deputy Director-General: Health Service Delivery; 
• the Director: Environmental Health; and 
• the National Consultative Health Forum. 
 
It was pointed out that the environmental health decision-makers within the 
provincial sphere of government (Provincial Department of Health in the 
Eastern Cape province) include the: 
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• Member of the Provincial Executive Committee responsible for health and 
the Provincial Legislature; 
• the Provincial Health Council; 
• the Chief Director: District Health Services;  
• the Director: Primary Health Care; and 
• the Deputy Director: Environmental Health. 
 
To be able to identify the environmental health decision-makers within the 
municipal sphere of government, it was essential to carry out an analysis of 
the organisational structure of the District Health System as it applies to local 
government in South Africa. It was therefore necessary to explain what is 
meant by a Health District, District Health Authority, District Health Council, 
Health Sub-district and a Local Municipality.  
 
It was stated that the district health system is a fundamental organisational 
framework of the health care system in South Africa. The Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996), prescribes three categories 
of municipalities, namely Category A (metropolitan municipalities), Category B 
(local municipalities) and Category C (district municipalities). The six 
metropolitan municipalities (Category A), together with 46 district (Category C) 
municipalities constitute the health districts (a total of 52) in South Africa. 
 
In the municipal sphere of government, health care service delivery can be 
divided into three tiers, namely health districts, health sub-districts and local 
municipalities. The responsibility for environmental health services is 
transferred from provinces to the Category A and C municipalities. 
Environmental health practitioners play an important role in avian influenza 
surveillance and control within municipal health services. 
 
What became evident from interviews conducted with environmental decision-
makers at the municipal sphere is that municipalities must be encouraged to 
budget appropriately for strategies of avian influenza surveillance and control. 
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The said municipalities must address avian influenza preparedness plans as 
an integral part of their annual integrated development plans. It was also 
found that all too often the value of an environmental health practitioner’s role 
is acknowledged only when disaster or disease strike, yet health budgets at all 
spheres of government can be reduced through preventative environmental 
health measures and timeous monitoring.  
 
From interviews conducted during the study it was found that a need exists for 
the education of all role players and the training of environmental health 
practitioners on detailed work methods and - procedures for the surveillance 
and control of avian influenza. Liaison and communication networks need to 
be strengthened between local municipalities in an attempt to identify and 
monitor avian influenza outbreaks at an early stage.  
 
In Chapter Three, the epidemiology of avian influenza was presented and 
discussed. It was found that influenza is a contagious respiratory illness 
associated with infection by the influenza virus of the virus family 
Orthomyxoviridae. The illness can present itself in humans and in animals. 
The influenza virus is genetically highly variable and it is this variability that 
gives rise to constant changes in the antigenicity of the virus. The antigenic 
changeability constantly gives rise to new strains of the virus resulting in 
recurring outbreaks or epidemics. 
 
The influenza virus can be classified into three types based on the antigenicity 
of the nucleoproteins which surround the RNA genome of the virus. The three 
types are Type A, Type B and Type C of which Type A is the most virulent and 
infects mammals and birds. There are two ways in which the influenza virus 
can change its antigenicity namely, antigenic shift and antigenic drift. 
 
Antigenic shift represents a sudden and major change in antigenicity that 
gives rise to a completely new subtype of virus (about once every 10-40 
years). This can cause dramatic and sudden classical pandemics such as the 
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1918/19 Spanish Flu, the 1957 Asian flu, and the 1968 Hong Kong flu. 
Antigenic drift represents a gradual but progressive change which can then 
spread throughout the human population, causing widespread epidemic 
activity approximately every three to five years. 
 
The fundamental differences between human seasonal influenza, avian 
influenza and human pandemic influenza were also presented. Avian 
influenza, also called fowl plague, avian flu and bird flu, is a highly contagious 
viral disease with up to 100% mortality in domestic fowl. The avian influenza 
(H5N1) virus may serve as the origin of a new "human" influenza virus 
subtype which might then be rapidly transmitted between people and cause a 
human influenza pandemic. An influenza pandemic (global epidemic) occurs 
when a new influenza virus subtype emerges that has not previously 
circulated in humans. 
 
Domestic fowl, ducks, geese, turkeys, guinea fowl, quail and pheasants can 
be regarded as natural hosts of the avian influenza virus. Ducks have the 
highest prevalence for the influenza A virus. It is generally accepted that 
migratory waterfowl, most notably wild ducks, are the natural reservoir of 
avian influenza viruses, which can be transmitted to domestic bird populations 
and to commercial poultry. Direct or indirect contact between domestic flocks 
and wild migratory waterfowl has been implicated as a frequent cause of 
epidemics in poultry populations. 
 
Transmission of avian influenza viruses to people remains relatively rare and 
in most cases occurs as a result of direct contact with infected poultry or other 
birds or their faeces. Normally, avian influenza viruses do not infect humans 
because of host barriers to infection, such as cell receptor specificities. 
However, they can occasionally cross the species barrier and directly infect 
humans, including highly pathogenic strains that have caused a fatal disease 
in humans. There is evidence that the H5N1 strain of the bird flu virus - which 
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has been circulating in birds - has a unique capacity to mutate and jump the 
species barrier causing a disease with a high mortality rate in humans. 
 
The widespread persistence of H5N1 in bird populations poses two main risks 
to human health. The first is the risk of infection when the virus spreads 
directly from birds to humans. The second risk, which is of even greater 
concern, is that there will be increased possibilities for the widely circulating 
virus to infect humans and possibly reassort into a strain that is both highly 
infectious for humans that may spread easily from humans-to-humans. 
Avian influenza has a worldwide occurrence and may occur as a low 
pathogenic strain (LPAI) or as a high pathogenic (virulent) strain (HPAI).The 
avian influenza A (H5N1) virus has proved to be especially tenacious. The 
avian influenza A (H5N1) animal outbreak in Asia and parts of Europe, the 
Near East, and Africa is not expected to diminish significantly in the short 
term.  
 
To date no cases of bird flu caused by the HPAI have been reported in South 
Africa. However, South Africa has had previous occurrences of the less 
virulent strain LPAI of H6N2 and H5N2. Firstly, in August 2004, H5N2 avian 
influenza virus was isolated on a farm in the Eastern Cape province and a 
second H5N2 outbreak was recorded during May 2006 in the Western Cape 
districts of Mossel Bay and Riversdale. Previously avian influenza viruses 
were found in ostriches in 1991, 1994 and 1995. LPAI (H6N2) was reported 
and confirmed for the first time in the commercial chicken industry in South 
Africa, following outbreaks of the disease in KwaZulu Natal in 2002 and 
subsequently in Gauteng, the Free State, North-West, Mpumulanga and the 
Western Cape provinces. The expanding geographic distribution of avian 
influenza A (H5N1) infections indicates that more human populations are at 
risk. 
 
The incubation period of the virus in humans is two to four days. Most patients 
have initial symptoms of high fever (typically a temperature of more than 
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38°C) and an influenza-like illness with lower respiratory tract symptoms. All 
countries have their own case definitions that will change as the disease 
evolves. Countries can use the case definition of the World Health 
Organization as a template in developing their own avian influenza case 
definitions. 
 
The impact of an outbreak of HPAI will have devastating consequences on the 
various sectors of the poultry industry and also for the Southern African 
region. There would be a simultaneous impact on all communities. The high 
strike rate would overwhelm health facilities. Socio-economic disruption would 
ensue. Given the scenario, a well coordinated strategy for preparedness is 
required at provincial and at district health level for a robust response and to 
mitigate a pandemic impact.  
 
For international planning purposes, the World Health Organization has 
defined six phases in the progression of an influenza pandemic from the first 
emergence of a new influenza virus, to the wide international spread. These 
phases allow a step wise escalating approach to preparedness planning and 
response. The Director-General of the World Health Organization has 
designated a global pandemic alert: Phase Three as of 16 March 2006. South 
Africa is designated as “not affected”, but is still required to implement 
measures for Phase Three.  
 
Work methods and - procedures for avian influenza surveillance were 
developed in Chapter Four. Basic principles of avian influenza surveillance 
were discussed. It was concluded in this chapter that avian influenza 
surveillance is a continuous and systematic process of standardized 
information collection, the analysis, the interpretation and dissemination of 
descriptive information of avian influenza monitoring activities. Surveillance 
was classified as active surveillance and passive surveillance; both of these 
can be combined within an avian influenza surveillance programme. Four core 
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strategies of human avian influenza surveillance were developed in Chapter 
Four under the following headings: 
 
• Human case detection; 
• Notifiable disease reporting; 
• Investigation of an avian influenza outbreak ; and  
• Human case confirmation. 
 
In South Africa, the current notification system is based on the National Health 
Act, 2004 (Act 63 of 2003). Each avian influenza surveillance case must be 
reported to the local Health Department and the Provincial Department of 
Health, who then report to the National Department of Health and 
subsequently to the World Health Organization. A public health surveillance 
system is dependent on a clear case definition of the health-related event 
under surveillance. Therefore a case definition for avian influenza was 
developed in Chapter Four. 
 
The early detection of an avian influenza outbreak is dependent on an 
effective avian influenza surveillance programme. Even a single confirmed 
case is the epidemic threshold for an avian influenza outbreak investigation. 
Once an avian influenza outbreak has been identified, routine passive 
surveillance should be replaced by active surveillance. This implies that the 
outbreak must be investigated immediately. 
 
Work methods and - procedures developed for the surveillance of human 
avian influenza in Chapter Four include: 
 
• Work procedures to report human avian influenza; 
• Response procedures during an avian influenza outbreak; 
• Active screening process for human avian influenza cases; 
• Initial diagnosis form for notifiable diseases: Form (GW17/5); 
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• An avian influenza notification form (Human cases) – Eastern Cape 
province; 
• Work methods and - procedures for human avian influenza specimen 
collection;   
• Avian influenza-like illness monitoring form; and 
• Avian influenza infection control measures during surveillance. 
 
The ability to efficiently control the spread of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian 
influenza is dependent upon the capacity to rapidly detect the pathogen once 
introduced. An avian influenza surveillance strategy should focus on the early 
detection of morbidity and mortality in birds, rapid reporting and the 
submission of appropriate biological specimens to approved diagnostic 
laboratories. 
 
The approach for the surveillance for avian influenza in birds should be in the 
form of a continuing programme with regular and frequent clinical inspection, 
serological and virological testing of high-risk groups of birds. The surveillance 
can be random or targeted especially at places where birds and poultry of 
different origins are mixed, such as live bird markets, poultry in close proximity 
to waterfowl or other sources of avian influenza.  
 
Work methods and - procedures developed for the surveillance of bird avian 
influenza include: 
 
• Work methods and - procedures for bird specimen collection during clinical 
surveillance; 
• Work methods and - procedures for specimen collection during serological 
testing of birds; and 
• Biosecurity measures to prevent the introduction of avian influenza in 
birds. 
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The objective of virological surveillance is to confirm clinically suspect cases, 
to follow up positive serological results, to monitor at-risk populations and to 
ensure early detection of infection in the face of vaccination or in 
establishments epidemiologically linked to an outbreak. A prerequisite for a 
successful bird surveillance programme should include a study of the local 
bird ecology and the concise mapping of bird avian influenza incidences. 
 
Work methods and - procedures for the different control strategies of avian 
influenza were developed in Chapter Five. These control strategies include: 
 
• Basic strategies  for avian influenza control; 
• control strategies  for avian influenza in humans; 
• control strategies for avian influenza in birds ; and 
• the role of  Avian Influenza Endemic Outbreak Response Teams. 
 
Basic strategies for avian influenza control are aimed at developing measures 
to protect people at risk, measures to interrupt the transmission of avian 
influenza and strategies to eliminate or reduce the source of infection. 
 
Work methods and - procedures for the control of avian influenza in humans 
were developed from the following perspectives: 
 
• Preventing the exposure of workers in healthcare facilities; 
• Avian influenza control by vaccination; 
• Avian influenza control by antiviral drugs; 
• Avian influenza health education; and  
• Legislative measures. 
 
It was found that health care workers are generally the first line of workers at 
health establishments that come into contact with suspected or infected avian 
influenza patients. It was therefore important to develop work methods and - 
procedures on how to protect them against the hazards associated with the 
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virus. Work methods and - procedures for health care workers providing care 
to avian influenza-infected patients at health facilities were developed under 
the following headings: 
 
• Work procedures at the arrival of suspected or confirmed avian influenza-
infected patients at a health care  facility;  
• Patient placement for suspected or confirmed avian influenza-infected 
patients in an isolation room; 
• Cohorting of avian influenza infected patients; 
• Placement and removal procedures of personal protective equipment 
when dealing with suspected or confirmed avian influenza-infected 
patients; 
• Procedures on leaving the isolation room; 
• Disposal of suspected avian influenza waste; and 
• Environmental cleaning and disinfection of rooms and surfaces. 
 
To date no pandemic vaccine for avian influenza is in existence because it is 
impossible to predict accurately the genetic make - up of the next pandemic 
influenza strain. The human H5N1 vaccine remains the only possible 
candidate strain for the next influenza pandemic. The World Health 
Organization identified five general options for considering the use of human 
H5N1 influenza vaccines. If an H5N1 pandemic appeared imminent, or was 
under way, the use of the H5N1 influenza vaccines should be considered in 
order to: 
 
• Protect people at high risk of contracting zoonotic avian H5N1 influenza; 
• “prime” the immune systems of people in selected groups or populations in 
anticipation of a possible H5N1 influenza pandemic;  
• fully immunize people in selected groups or populations in anticipation of a 
possible H5N1 influenza pandemic; 
• help contain the initial and localised emergence of a potential H5N1 
influenza pandemic; and 
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• immunise people in selected groups or populations following sustained 
human-to-human transmission of an H5N1 influenza virus. 
 
At present the two antiviral drugs, Oseltamivir - commercially known as 
Tamiflu, and Zanamavir - commercially known as Relenza, are used in the 
treatment of influenza A. These two antiviral drugs may reduce the severity 
and duration of illness, provided they are administered early in the course of 
the illness, i.e. within 48 hours after the onset of symptoms. The currently 
recommended doses for treatment of influenza A per mouth intake were also 
presented. 
 
Chapter 5 also addresses health education which is a strategy to change 
human behaviour to concur with the principles of avian influenza control. 
Prevention and control advice for people living in areas affected by avian 
influenza were developed under the following headings: 
 
• Key public messages and advice to prevent the spread of avian influenza 
in affected areas; 
• Proper handling of poultry; 
• Decontamination of premises; 
• Burying of dead birds and their faeces; 
• Handling/disposal of contaminated protective clothing; 
• Additional precautions when experiencing flu-like symptoms; 
• Precautions to be taken when visiting friends or relatives in health care 
facilities; 
• Precautions to be taken in neighbouring areas (next to the bird-flu affected 
areas) ; and 
• Precautionary measures to ensure that poultry and poultry products are 
properly prepared and safe to eat.  
 
Control strategies aimed at eliminating the disease in birds will reduce the 
presence of the virus in the environment and thus reduce the opportunities for 
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human exposure and infections. Work methods and - procedures for the 
control of avian influenza in birds were developed from the following 
perspectives: 
 
• Biosecurity (prevention or reduction to exposure); 
• elimination of infected poultry; 
• decreasing host susceptibility to the virus (vaccination); and  
• education. 
 
Biosecurity and monitoring in particular are important aspects of avian 
influenza control. Work procedures that describe the minimum biosecurity 
measures for poultry establishments to prevent the introduction of avian 
influenza were developed. Also developed in Chapter Five were work 
methods and - procedures for the elimination of infected poultry.  
 
From a South African perspective, vaccination is currently not considered as a 
possible control measure in the case of an outbreak of highly pathogenic 
avian influenza. Slaughter of all infected birds is the current control policy to 
be followed. Vaccination as a possible control measure will only be 
considered under the following conditions:  
 
• During an uncontrollable outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza in 
the country. This is where the disease is spreading very rapidly or where 
the disease is occurring on more than a single front, or in more than one 
province; and 
• if an area experiences continued and persistent avian influenza outbreaks. 
 
Also presented in Chapter Five is the role of avian influenza Endemic 
Outbreak Response Teams. When an avian influenza outbreak occurs, an 
Avian Influenza Outbreak Control Team should be set up immediately by the 
Outbreak Control Coordinator of the affected Health District. In practice, an 
Endemic Outbreak Response Team should be established before an outbreak 
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occurs. Members of the said team are normally performing their usual duties, 
but in the event of an outbreak of avian influenza, they come together to 
undertake special functions. The said team members must implement 
epidemiological investigations and control strategies with the coordination by 
relevant staff from the Provincial and National Departments of Health. Lastly 
discussed in Chapter Five was the place and role of environmental health in 
Avian Influenza Endemic Outbreak Response Teams from national, provincial, 
health district and health sub-district perspectives. It was found that the 
environmental health practitioners form part of Endemic Outbreak Response 
Teams at all spheres of government and plays a key role in epidemiological 
investigations and avian influenza control. 
 
Recommendations 
The work methods and - procedures for avian influenza surveillance and 
control as developed in this study provide numerous opportunities for further 
exploration. Recommendations include:  
 
1. The education of all role-players on the disease and the training of 
environmental health practitioners on detailed work methods and -
procedures for the surveillance and control of avian influenza. 
2. The establishment of an effective avian influenza surveillance and control 
strategy within the Eastern Cape province. Effective surveillance can 
facilitate timely action for the control of an avian influenza outbreak. 
Without adequate surveillance, local health officials will not be able to 
understand the true scope of an avian influenza outbreak and may not 
recognize a new pandemic until many people have been affected. 
3. Provincial Health Departments must encourage their respective 
municipalities to budget appropriately for strategies of avian influenza 
surveillance and control. Municipalities must address avian influenza 
preparedness plans as an integral part of their annual integrated 
development plans. 
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4. Liaison and communication networks need to be strengthened amongst all 
municipalities.  
5. From the analysis of the organizational structure of the provincial sphere of 
government the deduction was made that the time it takes for information 
to reach the relevant member of the Provincial Executive Council of Health 
(MEC) is problematic. The official lines of communication are very time 
consuming. Communication systems should be developed that allows the 
Deputy-Director: Environmental Health to communicate pressing 
environmental health issues directly to the member of the executive 
council.  
6. Unambiguous provincial guidelines need to be established for situations 
when emergencies arise. 
7. From the analysis of the organizational structure of the national sphere of 
government it was found that the time it takes for information to reach the 
Minister of Health is problematic. The formal lines of communication are 
very time consuming. Communication systems should be developed that 
allow the Director: Environmental Health to communicate urgent 
environmental health information directly to the said Minister. 
8. Clear national guidelines need to be established for situations when 
emergencies arise. 
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ANNEXURE ONE 
 
LETTER: REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT TELEPHONIC INTERVIEWS: 
EMPLOYERS OF THE PROVINCIAL COMMUNICABLE DISEASE OUTBREAK 
CONTROL CO-ORDINATORS OF THE NINE PROVINCES IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
18 Marche Street  
Rowallan Park 
Port Elizabeth 
6025 
15 September 2006 
 
The Head of Department 
Department of Health 
Eastern Cape / Western Cape / Northern Cape / KwaZaulu - Natal / Gauteng / Limpopo / 
Mpumalanga / Free State / North West - Province 
 
Dear Sir / Madam 
 
RESEARCH – M.TECH: ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH – REQUEST TO CONDUCT A 
TELEPHONIC INTERVIEW WITH THE PROVINCIAL COMMUNICABLE DISEASE 
OUTBREAK CO-ORDINATOR REGARDING THE SURVEILANCE AND CONTROL 
OF AVIAN INFLUENZA. 
 
I am currently registered at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (NMMU) for a 
Master’s Degree in Environmental Health. My dissertation is entitled “Environmental 
Health work methods and - procedures for the surveillance and control of Avian 
Influenza in the Eastern Cape province – South Africa”. 
 
To enable me to effectively execute this study, I will need to conduct a telephonic 
interview with the Provincial Communicable Disease Outbreak Co-ordinator within your 
province. I would like to conduct the telephonic interviews during November 2006. The 
 203 
duration of the interviews will be more or less twenty minutes. After permission is 
granted I will phone the said person to arrange for an appropriate time to conduct the 
interview. Dr. H.J. Maarschalk, the Head of the Department of Environmental Health at 
the NMMU, will be supervising the study and may be contacted at telephone number 
041 – 504 3273 should you have any questions. 
 
Your favourable consideration of this request would be appreciated. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
Sammy Elie 
 
M.Tech Environmental Health student 
Cell phone: 082 6688 487 
mwelies@telkomsa.net 
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ANNEXURE TWO 
 
TELEPHONIC QUESTIONNAIRE SCHEDULE: THE PROVINCIAL COMMUNICABLE 
DISEASE OUTBREAK CONTROL CO-ORDINATORS OF THE NINE PROVINCES IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Instructions: 1. Please make a cross in the boxes provided to indicate your selection. 
          2. Please write your response in the spaces provided where required. 
 
1. What is your gender?            Male              Female 
 
   
2. What is your age?                        yrs 
 
 
3. How many years of experience do you have relevant to your current job?              
 
                                                          yrs                    months 
 
 
4. How many years have you been the Provincial Communicable Disease Outbreak 
Co-ordinator for your province?  
 
                                                          yrs                   months 
 
5. Have you been a Provincial Communicable Disease Outbreak Co-ordinator for 
another province? 
 
Yes  
 
No 
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6. If yes, for how long have you been the Provincial Communicable Disease 
Outbreak Co-ordinator for that province? 
 
                                                          yrs                    months 
 
7. What are your qualifications?  
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       
8. Did you receive any training regarding the coordination of  an avian influenza 
outbreak?  
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
9. How long was the training? 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
10. Who offered the training? 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
11. In which of the following languages can you communicate? 
 
English            Afrikaans              IsiXhosa              IsiZulu  
 
IsiNdebele                 Northern Sotho               Sesotho 
 
Setswana                 SiSwati              Tshivenda             Xitsonga 
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Other 
If other, state the language(s). 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
12. Does your province have a contingency plan to deal with an avian influenza 
outbreak? 
                 
            Yes 
 
             No  
 
13. If yes, how can I get access to your provincial avian influenza outbreak 
contingency plan?  
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
14. Please rate the level of preparedness of your province to deal with an avian 
influenza outbreak? Levels of preparedness are: 
 
                   
           Poor  
 
Fair  
 
Good  
 
Excellent 
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15. Do you think there is a need for a single set of environmental health work 
methods and - procedures for the surveillance and control of avian influenza in 
South Africa?  
 
Yes   
 
No 
 
16. How important do you consider a contingency plan with detailed environmental 
health work methods and - procedures for the surveillance and control of avian 
influenza in your province? 
 
      High importance               
       
      Moderate importance  
 
      Low importance               
 
      No importance 
 
17. Please indicate below the sectors at the provincial sphere that serves on the 
Communicable Disease Outbreak Response Team for the control of avian 
influenza. 
 
Sectors at the provincial sphere 
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18. Please indicate below the sectors at the municipal sphere that serves on the 
Communicable Disease Outbreak Response Team for the control of avian 
influenza. 
 
Sectors at the municipal sphere 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19. Please list below the sectors at provincial sphere responsible for epidemiological 
investigations for the surveillance and control of avian influenza.  
 
Sectors at the provincial sphere 
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20. Please list below the sectors at the municipal sphere responsible for 
epidemiological investigations for the surveillance and control of avian influenza.  
 
Sectors at the municipal sphere 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21. Does your province have a specific plan in place to deal with waste resulting from 
infected and dead birds due to avian influenza contamination? 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
22. What is the place and function of your Communicable Outbreak Response Team 
regarding avian influenza? 
 
          ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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23. Do you receive regular updates regarding avian influenza? 
 
Yes     
 
No  
 
     If yes, from whom? 
 
         -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
         -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
24. How often do you receive updates regarding the disease? 
 
Daily  
 
Weekly 
 
Monthly 
 
Quarterly 
 
Six monthly 
 
Annually  
 
Never  
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25. How often do you have meetings in your province to discuss the status of the 
disease? 
 
Daily  
 
Weekly 
 
Monthly 
 
Quarterly 
 
Six monthly 
 
Annually  
 
Never  
 
26. Who are the people that attend the meetings? 
 
     ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
27. To whom does the Provincial Communicable Disease Outbreak Co-ordinator 
report to at provincial sphere? 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
28. To whom does the Provincial Communicable Disease Outbreak Co-ordinator 
report to at national sphere? 
 
           ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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29. Do you have any comments or recommendations that you think can be useful in 
developing detailed environmental health work methods and - procedures for the 
surveillance and control of avian influenza in your province? 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
           ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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ANNEXURE THREE  
 
DATA ANALYSIS OF THE TELEPHONIC INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED AMONGST 
PROVINCIAL COMMUNICABLE DISEASE OUTBREAK CO-ORDINATORS  
(THE GROUP OF EXPERTS)* 
 
1. Interview response rate 
Table One below, reflects the total population of provincial communicable disease 
outbreak co-ordinators that were interviewed.  The table reflects also the interview 
response rate. 
TABLE 1 
TELEPHONIC INTERVIEW RESPONSE RATE 
Total number of provincial 
communicable outbreak co-
ordinators 
Total number of provincial 
communicable disease co-
ordinators interviewed 
Response 
rate 
% 
9 7 78 
 
The seventy-eight percent (78%) response rate can be regarded as representative of all 
provincial communicable disease outbreak co-ordinators in South Africa. The deduction 
can thus be made that the responses of the above seven provincial communicable 
disease outbreak co-ordinators are a reflection of the current situation in South Africa 
regarding the arrangements for the surveillance and control of avian influenza. 
 
2. Gender 
One (1) of the seven (7) respondents was male.  An analysis of the data reveals that 
86% of the responds are female and 14% are male. The deduction can be made that 
the majority of provincial communicable disease outbreak co-ordinators in South Africa 
are female. 
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3. Age 
Figure Four below, reflects the ages of the seven respondents. 
FIGURE 4
AGE OF THE RESPONDENTS
56
52
42
52 50 53 53
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
RESPONDENTS
A
G
E
 IN
 Y
E
A
R
S
 
 
 
The average age of all the respondents was fifty (51) years. Only one (1) of the 
respondents was younger than fifty (50) years.  Six (6) of the respondents were above 
fifty (50) years of age which is 86% of the provincial communicable disease outbreak 
co-ordinators. Except for one (1) respondent that is fifty six (56) years old, all the other 
provincial communicable disease outbreak co-ordinators were twelve (12) years or more 
from the official retirement age which is sixty five (65) years. 
 
4. Years of experience relevant to current job. 
Figure Five below is a graphical representation of the respondent years of experience 
relevant to their current jobs. 
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FIGURE 5 
RESPONDENTS YEARS OF WORK EXPERIENCE
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The average years of experience are twelve (12) years and two (2) months.  Four (4) of 
the respondents have ten (10) and more years of experience relevant to their current 
jobs.  Only one of the respondents has less than five (5) years experience. 
 
5. Years   of   experience   as   provincial   communicable   disease   outbreak   co-       
     ordinators for own province. 
Figure Six below reflects the respondents years of experience as provincial 
communicable disease co-ordinators in their own provinces. 
FIGURE 6 
RESPONDENTS YEARS OF EXPERIENCE AS PROVINCAL 
COMMUNICABLE DISEASE OUTBREAK COORDINATOR IN THEIR 
OWN PROVINCES
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The average years of experience as provincial communicable disease co-ordinators are 
three (3) years and five (5) months. Two (2) of the respondents have five (5) to ten (10) 
years of experience as provincial communicable disease co-ordinators in their own 
province, while the other five (5) respondents have between one (1) month and four (4) 
years of experience. The deduction from the above is that most of the provincial 
communicable disease co-ordinators in South Africa have been appointed within the last 
five (5) years. 
 
6. Experience   as  provincial   communicable  disease   co-ordinators   in  another 
    province. 
None (0) of the respondents indicated that they had worked as provincial communicable 
disease co-ordinators for another province. All the respondents (7) indicated that they 
had been involved before as a communicable disease co-ordinator in either a health 
district, or at the National Department of Health. 
 
7. Educational attainment 
Five (5) of the respondents have a National Diploma in Nursing or Public Health which is 
71 % of the respondents.  Four (4) of the respondents, have a Masters degree in Public 
Health. Three (3) of the respondents have a B.Cur. degree and one has a B.Sc. Hons. 
degree in Medicine. One (1) respondent has a MBChB degree. One (1) of the 
respondents has a National Diploma in Environmental Health. The deduction can thus 
be made that all the respondents have a level of educational attainment that equips 
them to participate effectively in this survey. A further deduction that can be made is that 
most (more than 50%) of the provincial communicable disease co-ordinators are from 
curative primary health care services. Figure Seven hereunder represents this 
information 
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FIGURE 7
 EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF REPONDENTS
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8. Language proficiency  
All the respondents (100%) were able to communicate in English.  Four (4) of the 
respondents were able to communicate in both Afrikaans and English, and one (1) in 
three (3) African languages. Two (2) can only communicate in English. Figure Eight 
below represents this information. 
 
FIGURE 8
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Two (2) of the respondents indicated that they can also communicate in languages other 
than the languages indicated in the graph above. One (1) speaks German and the other 
respondent speaks Hindi. 
 
9. Training received by provincial communicable disease co-ordinators 
       regarding the coordination of an avian influenza outbreak.  
Table Two below reflects the training received regarding an avian influenza outbreak. 
 
TABLE 2 
 
TRAINING RECEIVED BY PROVINCIAL COMMUNICABLE DISEASE CO-
ORDINATORS ON THE CO-ORDINATION OF AN AVIAN INFLUENZA OUTBREAK 
 
Total number of 
provincial communicable 
disease co-ordinators 
interviewed 
Total number of provincial 
communicable outbreak co-
ordinators  that received 
training 
Percent of provincial 
communicable 
outbreak co-
ordinators  that 
received training 
7 5 71% 
 
From the above it can be deduced that two (2) of the Provincial Communicable 
Outbreak Co-ordinators did not receive training. This represents 29% of the said co-
ordinators. The five (5) respondents that received training indicated that the training was 
provided by the National Institute for Communicable Diseases (NICD).   
 
10. Presence of a contingency plan to deal with an avian influenza outbreak. 
Six (6) (86%), of the respondents (7) indicated that they do have contingency plans in 
place to deal with an avian influenza outbreak. Figure Nine below indicates the presence 
of contingency plans in place to deal with an avian influenza outbreak.       
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FIGURE 9
PRESENCE OF A PROVINCIAL CONTINGENCY PLAN TO 
DEAL WITH AN AVIAN INFLUENZA OUTBREAK 
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As far as the availability of the above avian influenza contingency plans are concerned, 
four (4) of the five (5) provinces indicated that they can make available copies of their 
avian influenza contingency plans for the purpose of this study. 
 
11. Levels of preparedness of provinces to deal with an avian influenza outbreak. 
From Figure Ten below it can be seen that 57% (4) of the provinces in South Africa 
indicated their level of preparedness to deal with an avian influenza outbreak can be 
regarded to be fair. Only one (1) province is confident (level good) about their 
preparedness level to deal with an avian influenza outbreak. 
FIGURE 10 
LEVEL OF PREPAREDNESS OF PROVINCES TO DEAL WITH 
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12. The  need  for  a  single  set  of  environmental  health  work  methods   and  –  
      procedures for the surveillance and control of avian influenza in South Africa 
All the respondents (7) (100%) indicated that there is a need to develop a single set of 
environmental health work methods and - procedures for the surveillance and control of 
avian influenza in South Africa. 
             
13. The importance of a contingency plan with detailed environmental health  
       work methods and - procedures for the surveillance and control of avian 
       influenza in provinces 
All seven (100%) of the respondents indicated that a contingency plan with detailed 
environmental health work methods and - procedures for the surveillance and control of 
avian influenza in a province must be considered as high importance. 
 
14. The sectors that should serve on the Provincial Avian Influenza Outbreak 
       Response Team 
A list of all the sectors that should serve on a Provincial Avian Influenza Outbreak 
Response Team was compiled from the responses of all seven (7) respondents. The list 
is indicated in Annexure 32. 
 
15. The sectors that should serve on a Municipal Avian Influenza Outbreak 
       Response Team 
A list of all the sectors that should serve on a Municipal Avian Influenza Outbreak         
Response Team was compiled from the responses of the 7 respondents (See indicated 
Section 5.5.3 in Chapter 5). 
 
16. Sectors at the provincial sphere that should be responsible for epidemio- 
       logical investigations  
All the respondents indicated that the following sectors should be responsible for 
epidemiological investigations at the provincial sphere: 
 
• Communicable Disease Control Unit; 
• Clinical Care Unit; 
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• Surveillance Unit 
• Epidemiology Unit; 
• Environmental Health ; 
• Health Promotion Unit; and 
• Department  of Agriculture.  
 
17. Sectors at the municipal sphere responsible for epidemiological investi- 
       gations 
The responses from the respondents to the above were similar to that in 1.16 above. 
 
18. Plans in place by provinces to deal with waste resulting from infected and 
       dead birds due to avian influenza 
Four (4) (57%) of the respondents (7) are of the opinion that provinces should have a 
specific plan in place to deal with waste resulting from infected and dead birds due to 
avian influenza contamination. 
 
19. The place and role of environmental health in an Avian Influenza Communi- 
        cable Outbreak Response Team 
The place and role of environmental health in the Communicable Outbreak Response 
Teams regarding avian influenza was discussed in section 5.5 of Chapter 5. 
 
 
20. The receiving of regular updates regarding avian influenza 
Six (6) of the seven (7) respondents indicated that they received regular updates 
regarding the diseases from the National Institute for Communicable Diseases (NICD). 
The seventh (7th) respondent indicated that her province received regular updates from 
both the NICD and the National Health Laboratory Services (NHLS). 
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21. The frequency of updates received regarding the disease. 
Five (5) of the seven (7) respondents received updated information on a monthly basis 
from the National Institute for Communicable Diseases. One (1) of the seven (7) 
respondents received information from the National Institute for Communicable 
Diseases on a quarterly basis.  One (1) of the respondents indicated that her province 
has never received any updates regarding avian influenza.  
 
22. The people that attended the Provincial Communicable Disease Outbreak 
        Response meetings. 
All respondents (100%) indicated that the said meetings were attended by members of 
the provincial outbreak response teams. 
 
23. The person to whom the Provincial Communicable Disease Outbreak Co- 
        ordinator reports to at the provincial sphere 
All the seven (7) 100% respondents indicated that the Provincial Communicable 
Disease Outbreak Co-ordinator reports to the person in charge of health services in their 
provinces which is either the Director of Health or the Head of the Department. The post 
description or designation for the said person differs from province to province.  
 
24. The person to whom the Provincial Communicable Disease Outbreak Co- 
        ordinator reports to at the national sphere. 
All seven (7) 100% of the respondents indicated that they reported to the National 
Director of Communicable Disease Control (National CDC). 
 
25. Other comments or recommendations that respondents thought to be useful 
       in developing detailed environmental health work methods and - procedures 
       for the  surveillance and control of  avian  influenza in the Eastern Cape pro- 
       vince 
The comments of the respondents are listed below: 
• All seven (7) (100%) of the respondents indicated that there should be more training 
for members of outbreak response teams, especially for environmental health 
practitioners at the municipal sphere 
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• Two (2) of the respondents (7) indicated that the training should be of a practical 
nature and of the same standard throughout the country. 
• One respondent indicated that the level of preparedness can be increased by a 
simulation of the actual preparedness plan. 
• Avian influenza hygiene training of the public, especially of farm workers, should be 
done. 
 
∗ Information obtained in this annexure was used in the development of work methods 
and - procedures for the surveillance and control of avian influenza in the Eastern Cape 
province. All the work methods and - procedures developed during this study were 
accepted by the Provincial Communicable Disease Outbreak Control Co-ordinators 
(group of experts) on 31 August 2008.  
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ANNEXURE FOUR 
 
PERSONAL INTERVIEW SCHEDULE: MANAGERIAL AND LINE FUNCTION 
PERSONNEL FROM TWO OF THE SIX DISTRICT (CATEGORY C) MUNICIP ALITIES 
AND THE ONLY METROPOLITAN (CATEGORY A) MUNICIPALITY IN THE 
EASTERN CAPE PROVINCE. 
 
• What is the current organisational structure for environmental health service delivery 
in the NMMM / Ukhahlamba / Cacadu District Municipality?  
• Which Unit / Section is responsible for avian influenza surveillance and control in the 
NMMM / Ukhahlamba / Cacadu District Municipality? 
• What are the current organisational arrangements in response to avian influenza 
outbreaks in the NMMM / Ukhahlamba / Cacadu District Municipality? 
• Which Unit / Section is responsible for the training of the environmental health 
practitioners regarding avian influenza surveillance and control in the NMMM / 
Ukhahlamba / Cacadu District Municipality? 
• Which Unit / Section is responsible for educating the public regarding the disease in 
the NMMM / Ukhahlamba / Cacadu District Municipality? 
• What is the level of communication between the NMMM / Ukhahlamba / Cacadu 
District Municipality and other municipalities in response to avian influenza 
surveillance and control? 
• Do you have standardised report forms for avian influenza surveillance and control in 
the NMMM / Ukhahlamba / Cacadu District Municipality? 
• What are the challenges of the NMMM / Ukhahlamba / Cacadu District Municipality to 
respond effectively and efficiently to an avian influenza outbreak? 
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ANNEXURE FIVE  
 
LETTER: REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH  
 
18 Marche Street 
Rowallan Park 
Port Elizabeth 
6025 
15 September  
 
The Municipal Manager 
• Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality 
• Ukhahlamba District Municipality 
• Cacadu District Municipality 
 
Dear Sir 
 
RESEARCH – M.TECH: ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH – REQUEST TO INTERVIEW 
PERSONNEL RESPONSIBLE FOR COMMUNICABLE DISEASE CONTROL  
 
I am currently registered at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (NMMU) for a 
Master’s Degree in Environmental Health. My dissertation is entitled “Environmental 
Health work methods and - procedures for the surveillance and control of avian 
influenza in the Eastern Cape province – South Africa”. 
 
To enable me to effectively execute this study, I will need to visit the surveillance and 
control personnel responsible for communicable diseases within the Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan Municipality / Ukhahlamba District Municipality / Cacadu District 
Municipality to conduct interviews on existing work methods and - procedures. I would 
like to conduct the interviews during November 2006. The interviews should not take 
more than half an hour. Dr. H.J. Maarschalk, the Head of the Department of 
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Environmental Health at the NMMU, will be supervising the study and may be contacted 
at telephone number 041 – 504 3273 should you have any questions. 
 
Your favourable consideration of this request would be appreciated. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
Sammy Elie 
 
M.Tech Environmental Health student 
Cell phone: 082 6688 487 
mwelies@telkomsa.net 
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ANNEXURE SIX 
 
INFORMATION AND INFORMED CONSENT FORM: 
MANAGERIAL AND LINE FUNCTION PERSONNEL FROM TWO OF THE SIX 
DISTRICT (CATEGORY C) MUNICIPALITIES, THE ONLY METROPOLITAN 
(CATEGORY A) MUNICIPALITY IN THE EASTERN CAPE PROVINCE AND 
THE PROVINCIAL COMMUNICABLE DISEASE OUTBREAK CO-ORDINATORS 
(GROUP OF EXPERTS) 
 
TITLE OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT: 
 
Environmental health work methods and - procedures for the surveillance and 
control of avian influenza in the Eastern Cape province - South Africa. 
 
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: Sammy Abraham Elie 
 
STUDENT NUMBER: 20380839 
 
ADDRESS: 18 March Street 
  Rowallan Park 
  Port Elizabeth 
  6025 
 
CONTACT CELL PHONE NO.: 082 66 88 487 
 
 
 
DECLARATION BY PARTICIPANT: 
 
I, the undersigned, ……………………….………………..……… (name) 
[I.D. No:……………………………….] the participant, in my capacity as 
environmental health practitioner hereby confirm as follows: 
 
 
 
Initial 
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1. I, the participant, was invited to participate in the above mentioned 
research project which is being undertaken by Mr. Sammy Elie, a 
student of the Department of Environmental Health of the Nelson 
Mandela Metropolitan University in Port Elizabeth. 
 
2. The following aspects have been explained to me, the participant: 
Aim: The investigator is undertaking this study to develop a 
standardised set of environmental health work methods and -
procedures which should contribute to effective avian influenza 
surveillance and control in the Eastern Cape province.  
 
Initial 
 
I understand the : 
• Risks: There are no risks involved in the research study. The 
researcher will ensure that the participants are not subjected to 
any harm. 
 
 
Initial 
 
• Possible benefits:   As a result of my participation in this study, I 
will contribute to a body of knowledge that will assist the 
researcher in developing a standardised set of environmental 
health work methods and - procedures which may contribute to 
effective avian influenza surveillance and control in the Eastern 
Cape province.  
 
 
• Confidentiality: My identity will not be revealed in any discussion, 
description or scientific publications by the investigator. 
Initial 
 
 
• Access to findings:  Any new information / benefit that develop 
during the course of the study will be shared with me by the 
principal investigator. 
 
 
Initial 
 
• Voluntary participation / refusal / discontinuation: My participation 
is voluntary. I reserve the right to refuse or discontinue to 
 
Initial 
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participate at any stage. 
 
 
3. The information above was explained to me, the participant by 
Sammy Abraham Elie (ID. No. …………………………………..) in 
………………………………… and I am in command of this language.  
 
 
 
Initial 
 
4. No pressure was exerted on me to consent to participation and I 
understand that I may withdraw at any stage without penalization. 
 
 
Initial 
 
5. Participation in this study will not result in any additional cost to 
myself. 
 
 
Initial 
 
I AM A VOLUNTARY PARTICIPANT IN THE ABOVEMENTIONED 
PROJECT. 
 
Signed at ……………………………..on………………..…………..  
                            (place)                                        (date) 
 
……………………………                                   
Signature of participant 
 
 
 
    Source: Adapted from Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (2005). 
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ANNEXURE SEVEN 
 
ORGANOGRAM OF THE NATIONAL DEP ARTMENT OF HEALTH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Minister of Health 
Deputy Minister of Health 
Director General 
Cluster: 
Strategic Planning 
Deputy Director 
General 
Human Resources 
Deputy Director 
General 
Corporate Services 
Human Resources Legal Services 
International Health 
Liaison 
Communications 
Directorate: Information 
Communication  
Technology 
Deputy Director 
General 
Strategic Health 
Programmes 
 
Deputy Director 
General 
Health Service 
Delivery 
Bargaining Council & 
Employment Relations 
Communicable Diseases 
Directorate: Support 
Services 
Health Information 
Research & 
Evaluation 
HIV, AIDS & STI’s 
Gender Focal Point 
Sub-Directorate: 
Human Rights 
Medicine Regulatory 
Authority 
Primary Health Care, 
Districts & 
Development 
Hospital Services 
Office of Standards 
Compliance 
Health Economics 
Non-Communicable 
Diseases Pharmaceutical Policy & Planning 
Maternal, Child & 
Woman’s Health and 
Nutrition 
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Clusters and their divisions 
 
Deputy Director-General: Health Service Delivery 
 
• Health Economics  
o Social Health Insurance  
o Public Private Partnerships  
o Health Financial Planning and Economics 
  
• Hospital Services  
o Facilities Planning  
o Hospital Management  
o Emergency Medical Services  
o Revitalization Project  
 
• Primary Health Care, District & Development  
o Environmental Health  
o Health Promotion  
o District & Development  
o Integrated Primary Health Care 
  
• Health Information, Evaluation, Epidemiology and Research 
o National Health Information Systems  
o Epidemiology and Surveillance  
o Health Systems Research  
o Monitoring and Evaluation 
  
• Non-Communicable Disease  
o Chronic Diseases, Disabilities and Geriatrics  
o Mental Health & Substance Abuse  
o Oral Health  
o Forensic Pathology Services [including Forensic Laboratory Services]  
o Forensic Chemistry Laboratories 
  
• Office of Standards Compliance  
o Radiation Control  
o Quality Assurance  
 
 
Source: Adapted from National Department of Health (2007). 
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ANNEXURE EIGHT 
LIST OF MATTERS THAT THE PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE SHARES 
CONCURRENT POWERS WITH PARLIAMENT  
Part A  
• Administration of indigenous forests;  
• Agriculture;  
• Airports other than international and national airports;  
• Animal control and diseases;  
• Casinos, racing, gambling and wagering, excluding lotteries and sports pools;  
• Consumer protection;  
• Cultural matters;  
• Disaster management ; 
• Education at all levels, excluding tertiary education;  
• Environment ; 
• Health services;  
• Housing;  
• Indigenous law and customary law, subject to Chapter 12 of the Constitution;  
• Industrial promotion;  
• Language policy and the regulation of official languages to the extent that the 
provisions of Section 6 of the Constitution expressly confer upon the provincial 
legislatures legislative competence;  
• Media services directly controlled or provided by the provincial government, 
subject to section 192 of the Constitution; 
• Nature conservation, excluding national parks, national botanical gardens and 
marine resources;  
• Police to the extent that the provisions of Chapter 11 of the Constitution confer 
upon the provincial legislatures legislative competence;  
• Pollution control;  
• Population development;  
• Property transfer fees;  
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• Provincial public enterprises in respect of the functional areas in Schedule and 
Schedule 5 of the Constitution;  
• Public transport;  
• Public works, only in respect of the needs of provincial government departments 
in the discharge of their responsibilities to administer functions specifically 
assigned to them in terms of the Constitution or any other law;  
• Regional planning and development;  
• Road traffic regulation;  
• Soil conservation;  
• Tourism;  
• Trade;  
• Traditional leadership, subject to Chapter 12 of the Constitution ; 
• Urban and rural development;  
• Vehicle licensing; and  
• Welfare services.  
 
Part B  
The following local government matters to the extent set out in section 155(6) (a) and (7) 
of the Constitution:  
• Air pollution;  
• Building regulations;  
• Child care facilities;  
• Electricity and gas reticulation;  
• Firefighting services;  
• Local tourism;  
• Municipal airports;  
• Municipal planning;  
• Municipal health services;  
• Municipal public transport; 
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• Municipal public works, only in respect of the needs of municipalities in the 
discharge of their responsibilities to administer functions specifically assigned to 
them under the Constitution or any other law;  
• Pontoons, ferries, jetties, piers and harbours, excluding the regulation of 
international and national shipping and matters related thereto;  
• Stormwater management systems in built-up areas;  
• Trading regulations; and 
• Water and sanitation services limited to potable water supply systems and 
domestic waste-water and sewage disposal systems. 
Source: Schedule 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 (Act 
108 of 1996). 
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ANNEXURE NINE 
 
ORGANOGRAM OF THE EASTERN CAPE PROVINCIAL HEALTH DEPARTMENT  
 
   Source: Eastern Cape Department of Health (2007). 
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ANNEXURE TEN 
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF UKHAHLAMBA DISTRICT MUNICIPALITY  
 
 Source: Agenbag (2005, p.63). 
EHP = Environmental Health Practitioner 
EHA = Environmental Health Assistant 
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ANNEXURE ELEVEN 
 
DIAGRAM THAT ILLUSTRATES THE EVENTS DURING AN ANTIGENIC 
SHIFT  
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DIAGRAM THAT ILLUSTRATES THE EVENTS DURING AN ANTIGENIC DRIFT 
 
 
Source: Adopted from National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (2007)  
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ANNEXURE 12 
INSTANCES OF AVIAN INFLUENZA INFECTIONS IN HUMANS: 1997-2006 
Confirmed instances of avian influenza viruses infecting humans since 1997 to 
2006 include:  
• H5N1, Hong Kong, Special Administrative Region, 1997: Highly 
pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) infections occurred in both poultry and 
humans. This was the first time an avian influenza A virus transmission 
directly from birds to humans had been found. During this outbreak, 18 people 
were hospitalized and six of them died. To control the outbreak, authorities 
killed about 1.5 million chickens to remove the source of the virus. Scientists 
determined that the virus spread primarily from birds to humans, though rare 
person-to-person infection was noted.  
• H9N2, China and Hong Kong, Special Administrative Region, 1999: Low 
pathogenic avian influenza A (H9N2) virus infection was confirmed in two 
children and resulted in an uncomplicated influenza-like illness. Both patients 
recovered, and no additional cases were confirmed. The source is unknown, 
but the evidence suggested that poultry was the source of infection and the 
main mode of transmission was from bird to human. The possibility of person-
to-person transmission could not be ruled out. Several additional human 
H9N2 infections were reported from China in 1998-99.  
• H7N2, Virginia, 2002: Following an outbreak of H7N2 among poultry in the 
Shenandoah Valley poultry production area, one person was found to have 
serologic evidence of infection with H7N2.  
• H5N1, China and Hong Kong, Special Administrative Region, 2003: Two 
cases of highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) infection occurred 
among members of a Hong Kong family that had traveled to China. One 
person recovered, the other died. How or where these two family members 
were infected was not determined. Another family member died of a 
respiratory illness in China, but no testing was done.  
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• H7N7, Netherlands, 2003: The Netherlands reported outbreaks of influenza 
A (H7N7) in poultry on several farms. Later, infections were reported among 
pigs and humans. In total, 89 people were confirmed to have H7N7 influenza 
virus infection associated with this poultry outbreak. These cases occurred 
mostly among poultry workers. H7N7-associated illness included 78 cases of 
conjunctivitis (eye infections); 5 cases of conjunctivitis and influenza-like 
illnesses with cough, fever, and muscle aches; 2 cases of influenza-like 
illness ; and 4 cases that were classified as “other.” There was one death 
among the 89 total cases. It occurred in a veterinarian who visited one of the 
affected farms and developed acute respiratory distress syndrome and 
complications related to H7N7 infection. The majority of these cases occurred 
as a result of direct contact with infected poultry; Dutch authorities reported 
three possible instances of transmission from poultry workers to family 
members. Since then, no other instances of H7N7 infection among humans 
have been reported.  
• H9N2, Hong Kong, Special Administrative Region, 2003: Low pathogenic 
avian influenza A (H9N2) infection was confirmed in a child in Hong Kong. 
The child was hospitalized and recovered.  
• H7N2, New York, 2003: In November 2003, a patient with serious underlying 
medical conditions was admitted to a hospital in New York with respiratory 
symptoms. One of the initial laboratory tests identified an influenza A virus 
that was thought to be H1N1. The patient recovered and went home after a 
few weeks. Subsequent confirmatory tests conducted in March 2004 showed 
that the patient had been infected with avian influenza A (H7N2) virus.  
• H7N3, Canada, 2004: In February 2004, human infections of highly 
pathogenic avian influenza A (H7N3) among poultry workers were associated 
with an H7N3 outbreak among poultry. The H7N3-associated, mild illnesses 
consisted of eye infections.  
• H5N1, Thailand and Vietnam, 2004: In late 2003, outbreaks of highly 
pathogenic influenza A (H5N1) in poultry in Asia were first reported by the 
World Health Organization. Human infections with H5N1 were reported 
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beginning in 2004, mostly resulting from contact with infected poultry. In 
Thailand one instance of probable human-to-human spread is thought to have 
occurred.  
• H5N1, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam, 2005: Human 
infections with H5N1 occurred in association with the ongoing H5N1 epizootic 
in the region. At least two persons in Vietnam were thought to have been 
infected through consumption of uncooked duck blood.  
• H5N1, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, China, Djibouti, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, 
Thailand, Turkey, 2006: Human infections with H5N1 occurred in association 
with the ongoing and expanding epizootic. While most of these cases 
occurred as a result of contact with infected poultry, in Azerbaijan, the most 
plausible cause of exposure to H5N1 in several instances of human infection 
was thought to be contact with infected dead wild birds (swans). 
Source: World Health Organization (2006a). 
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ANNEXURE 13 
 
MAP OF AREAS WITH CONFIRMED HUMAN CASES OF H5N1 AVIAN INFLUENZA SINCE 2003 
 
       
Source: World Health Organization (2007e). 
 
 243 
ANNEXURE 14 
 
MAP OF AREAS REPORTING CONFIRMED OCCURRENCE OF H5N1 AVIAN INFLUENZA IN POULTRY AND WILD BIRDS 
SINCE 2003  
 
Source: World Health Organization (2007e). 
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ANNEXURE 15 
 
PHASES OF PANDEMIC INFLUENZA 
 
For international planning purposes, the World Health Organization has defined phases in the 
progression of an influenza pandemic from the first emergence of a novel influenza virus, to 
its wide international spread.  These phases allow a stepwise escalating approach to 
preparedness planning and response.  They are global classifications based on the overall 
international situation and are used internationally for planning purposes. Table Three below, 
reflects the phases of pandemic influenza. 
TABLE 3 
PHASES OF P ANDEMIC INFLUENZA 
PHASE                             PERIODS 
INTER-P ANDEMIC 
PHASE 
(New virus  in  an imals , 
no  human cas es ) 
1 Low ris k o f human cas es  
2 Higher ris k o f human cas es  
P ANDEMIC ALERT 
PHASE 
(New virus  caus es  
human d is eas e) 
3 No or very limited  human -to -human trans mis s ion  
4 Evidence  o f inc reas ed  hu man-to -human trans mis s ion  
5 Evidence  o f s ign ifican t h uman-to -human trans mis s ion  
 
P ANDEMIC PHASE 
 
6 Effic ien t and  s us ta ined  h uman-to -human trans mis s ion  
 
 
A. Interpandemic phase 
• Period 1 
No new influenza virus subtypes have been detected in humans. An influenza virus subtype 
that has caused human infection may be present in animals. If present in animals, the risk of 
human infection or disease is considered to be low. 
Strengthen influenza pandemic preparedness at the global, regional, national and sub-
national levels. 
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• Period 2 
No new influenza virus subtypes have been detected in humans. However, a circulating 
animal influenza virus subtype poses a substantial risk of human disease.  
Minimize the risk of transmission to humans; detect and report such transmission rapidly if it 
occurs. 
 
B. Pandemic Alert Phase 
• Period 3 
Human infection(s) with a new subtype, but no human-to-human spread, or at most rare 
instances of spread to a close contact.  
Ensure rapid characterization of the new virus subtype and early detection, notification and 
response to additional cases. 
 
• Period 4 
Small cluster(s) with limited human-to-human transmission, but spread is highly localized, 
suggesting that the virus is not well adapted to humans. 
Contain the new virus within limited foci or delay spread to gain time to implement 
preparedness measures, including vaccine development. 
 
• Period 5 
Larger cluster(s) but human-to-human spread still localized, suggesting that the virus is 
becoming increasingly better adapted to humans, but may not yet be fully transmissible 
(substantial pandemic risk).  
Maximize efforts to contain or delay spread, to possibly avert a pandemic, and to gain time to 
implement pandemic response measures.  
 
C. Pandemic Phase 
• Period 6 
Pandemic: increased and sustained transmission in general population. 
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Minimize the impact of the pandemic. 
The distinction between Period1 and Period 2 is based on the risk of human infection or 
disease resulting from circulating strains in animals. The distinction is based on various 
factors and their relative importance according to current scientific knowledge. Factors may 
include pathogenicity in animals and humans, occurrence in domesticated animals and 
livestock or only in wildlife, whether the virus is enzootic or epizootic, geographically localized 
or widespread, and/or other scientific parameters. The distinction between Period 3, Period 4 
and Period 5 is based on an assessment of the risk of a pandemic. Various factors and their 
relative importance according to current scientific knowledge may be considered. Factors may 
include the rate of transmission, geographical location and spread, severity of illness, 
presence of genes from human strains (if derived from an animal strain), and/or other 
scientific parameters. 
 
Source: Adapted from World Health Organization (2006e).  
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ANNEXURE 16 
 
CLINICAL FEATURES OF HUMAN AVIAN INFLUENZA* 
 
1. Clinical Features 
The clinical spectrum of influenza A (H5N1) in humans is based on descriptions of 
hospitalised patients. The frequency of milder illnesses, sub-clinical infections and atypical 
presentations like encephalopathy and gastroenteritis have not been determined, but case 
reports indicate that each occurs.  
 
i) Incubation period: 
The incubation period (IP) for classic human influenza viruses is 2–3 days (range 1–7 days). 
The incubation period of human influenza A (H5N1) is currently uncertain but may be longer. 
Current data indicate an IP ranging from 2 - 8 days and possibly as long as 17 days. The 
current World Health Organization recommendation of 7 days is useful for field investigations 
and the monitoring of patient contacts. 
 
ii) Symptoms:  
High fever (≥ 38 oC) and influenza like illness (muscle pains, malaise, sore throat) with lower 
respiratory tract symptoms like cough and shortness of breath are the usual initial presenting 
features. Although uncommon, watery diarrhoea without blood or inflammatory changes 
appears to be more common than in classic human influenza A and may precede respiratory 
symptoms by up to one week.  Other less common initial symptoms reported include 
vomiting, abdominal pain, pleuritic pain, bleeding from nose and gums and encephalopathy. 
 
iii) Signs: 
The patient may be tachypnoeic and may have inspiratory crackles present on auscultation of 
the chest. Sputum production is variable and may even be bloody. 
 
iv) Chest X-ray changes: 
Almost all patients have clinical apparent primary viral pneumonia and although radiographic 
changes are non-specific, they may include diffuse, multifocal or patchy infiltrates, interstitial 
infiltrates’ segmental or lobular consolidation with air bronchograms. 
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Radiographic changes are present on average 7 days after the onset of symptoms in most 
patients. 
 
v) Common laboratory findings:  
- Lymphopenia (<1 x 109/litre); and  
- Mild to moderately raised aminotransferase levels may occur. 
 
vi) Clinical course: 
The illness rapidly progresses to respiratory distress and respiratory failure within one week of 
the onset of symptoms. Multi-organ failure, including renal failure and cardiac compromise are 
common. Death occurs on average 9-10 days after the onset of symptoms and most patients 
die due to respiratory failure. Mortality rate in hospitalized patients is high (±50%), despite 
adequate ventilatory support. The mortality rate in those younger than 15 years old in 
Thailand was 89%.  
 
vii) General considerations: 
Early recognition of cases is confounded by the non-specificity of the initial symptoms and 
high rates of acute respiratory illnesses from other causes. It remains important to include the 
diagnosis of H5N1 infection in the differential diagnosis of patients presenting with severe 
acute respiratory illness, especially in countries where highly pathogenic avian influenza 
viruses have been identified as a cause of illness in animal populations. 
 
∗ In developing the clinical features of human avian influenza in this annexure the resources 
listed below were consulted. The clinical features for human avian influenza were confirmed 
by the Provincial Communicable Disease Outbreak Control Co-ordinators (group of experts) 
on 31 August 2008.  
• World Health Organization. (2007c). Influenza, Including Influenza A (H5N1), in Humans: 
WHO Interim Infection Control Guideline for Health Care Facilities. Retrieved May 15, 
2008, from http://www.who.int/csr/diseaseavian_influenza/guidelines/infection control1/ 
• Yuen, K.Y., Chan, P.K. & Peiris, M. (1998). Clinical features and rapid viral diagnosis of 
human disease associated with avian influenza A H5N1 virus. Lancet, 351 (1) 467-71. 
• Western Cape Department of Health. (2006). Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Plan for 
the Western Cape. Cape Town. Government printer. 
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ANNEXURE 17 
 
ACTIVE SCREENING PROCESS FOR HUMAN AVIAN INFLUENZA CASES  
 
 
Screening questions to be asked of patients as part of an active screening for avian 
influenza are listed below. 
 
Question 1: Do you have new / a worse cough or shortness of breath? 
                   • if ‘no’, stop here (no further questions) 
                   • if ‘yes’, continue with next question 
 
Question 2: Are you feeling feverish, have you had shakes or chills in the last 24 
                   hours? 
                  • if ‘no’, take temperature; if >38 °C, continue with next question, 
                    otherwise stop (no further questions) 
                  • if yes, take temperature and continue with next question. 
 
• Initiate droplet precautions if “yes” to question one and question two. 
•  if ‘no’, take temperature; if higher than 38 °C, continue with next question, otherwise 
stop (no further questions). 
 
Question 3: Is any of the following true? 
                   • Have you lived in or visited China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
                    Thailand or Viet Nam within the last 30 days? 
 
• For updates on affected countries visit: www.who.int/csr/disease/avian influenza/en/ or 
http://www.oie.int/eng/en_index.htm 
 
Question 4:  Have you had any contact in the last 30 days with a sick person who 
                    has travelled to these areas? 
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• Patients with fever and respiratory symptoms and answered ‘yes’ to any of these 
exposures / conditions may potentially have severe respiratory illness. 
• Initiate droplet precautions and notify infection control if “yes” to 1, 2 and 3. 
• Infection control to notify the public health authority. 
 
Additional questions to be asked of all admitted patients: 
 
Question 4: Do you work for a health care agency or organization? 
 
Question 5: Are you a resident of a long-term care institution? 
 
• Initiate droplet precautions and notify local health authority if “yes” to questions 1, 2 and 
either 4 or 5. 
• The local health authority must notify the health district authority. 
 
• Droplet precautions: 
Droplet precautions include the use of surgical masks and eye protection or face shields 
on the part of health care workers when encountering patients who have respiratory 
infections, especially if associated with coughing or sneezing. Transmission is principally 
by large respiratory droplets particularly when within one metre of such a patient. Surgical 
masks are also used where appropriate to protect the mucous membranes of the eyes, 
nose and mouth of the health care worker during patient care activities likely to generate 
splashes or sprays of blood, body fluids, secretions or excretions (e.g., airway suctioning). 
 
Source: Adapted from Canadian Ministry of Health (2003) and confirmed by the   Provincial   
Communicable Disease Outbreak Control Co-ordinators (group of experts) on 31 August 
2008. 
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ANNEXURE 18 
 
INITIAL DIAGNOSIS FORM FOR NOTIFIABLE DISEASES: FORM (GW 17/5) 
 
Notification of medical condition 
(Section 32, 47 of Act 63 of  1977) 
Department of National Health 
Please print: Where appropriate, mark the correct box with a cross ( x ) 
Complete in duplicate. Original to be sent to local authority where patient was 
diagnosed: 
Copy to remain in book 
DETAILS OF PATIENT 
Surname First Name 
Age Sex        Male  
              Female 
Ethnic Group      Asian        Coloured 
                           Back          White  
 
 
Residential address:  
Telephone no.: 
DETAILS OF MEDICAL CONDITION 
Medical condition: 
Date of onset:  DD / MM / YY Date of death (if applicable): DD / MM / YY 
Possible place of infection: 
Diagnosis was based on:          Clinical history and examination only 
                                                  Clinical and other investigations    
 
RESULTS OF INVESTIGATIONS 
Investigation Results 
  
  
REFERRED TO 
Name of hospital or clinic: 
Patient registration number: Date of admission: DD / MM / YY 
NOTIFIED BY 
Name: 
Address: 
Tel. no.: 
Profession:                                    Medical practitioner                        Other 
                                                      Nurse 
Signature: Date: DD / MM / YY 
 
Source: Adapted from Health Systems Trust (1998) and confirmed by the Provincial    
Communicable Disease Outbreak Control Co-ordinators (group of experts) on 31 August 
2008. 
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ANNEXURE 19 
 
HUMAN AVIAN INFLUENZA NOTIFICATION FORM  
INFORMATION OF REPORTING HEALTH FACILITY 
Name of reporting health facility:  
Health district: 
Address of the health facility: 
Telephone of health facility: Fax of health facility: 
Name of reporter, Job title, Telephone: 
Name and telephone of person who clinically confirmed the case:  
Confirmed laboratory:  
                               
Telephone of confirmed laboratory: 
DETAILS OF PATIENT 
Name of patient: 
Address of patient: 
CLINICAL DATA OF PATIENT 
Symptoms on day of onset : 
Days of illness before initial presentation:  
Onset of  illness during antiviral prophylaxis : 
Hospitalization, including first date of admission and duration: 
Pre-existing conditions:  
Additional comments, (e.g. exposure history to confirmed human and animal cases etc): 
Signature:                                                                                          Date: DD / MM / YY 
   
  Source: Own research findings and confirmed by the Provincial Communicable Disease 
  Outbreak Control Co-ordinators (group of experts) on 31 August 2008. 
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ANNEXURE 20 
 
WORK METHODS AND - PROCEDURES FOR HUMAN AVIAN INFLUENZA 
SPECIMEN COLLECTION* 
 
 
1.  The number of specimens required 
• For each type of specimen two specimens should be taken in separate specimen 
tubes each occasion that sampling is undertaken. One can be used for immediate 
analysis and the other retained for reference purposes, retesting, etc. 
• Each patient specimen must be assigned a unique identification number and 
accompanied by a data collection form (see Section 14 of Annexure 20). 
• This identification number should be used on all documentation concerning the 
specimen from that source. 
 
2. The type of specimens to collect from suspect cases 
• Specimens for diagnosis of suspect cases of human avian influenza A (H5N1) can be 
collected from the: 
• Upper respiratory tract; 
• Lower respiratory tract; and 
• Blood. 
 
These are listed and discussed below. Firstly discussed are the upper respiratory tract 
samples. 
 
Upper respiratory tract samples 
• Throat swabs (posterior-pharyngeal ) are the preferred upper respiratory tract 
specimen for detecting A(H5N1);  
• Nasal swabs with nasal secretions (from the anterior turbinate area) or naso-
pharyngeal aspirates or swabs are also appropriate specimens. 
 
A swab collected from each nostril, and a throat swab pooled into the same container of 
viral transport medium is the specimen of choice. Sampling from the respiratory tract is 
hazardous as the operator is very close to the patient (Fig. 11). 
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3.  Performing a posterior pharyngeal swab (throat swab) 
• Hold the tongue out of the way with a tongue depressor; 
• Use a sweeping motion to swab the posterior pharyngeal wall and tonsilar pillars. 
Have the subject say "aahh" to elevate the uvula. Avoid swabbing the soft palate and 
do not touch the tongue with the swab tip as this can induce the gag reflex; 
• Put the swab into viral transport medium. 
 
 
FIGURE 11: 
 
TAKING OF A THROAT SAMPLE 
 
 
(the operator is close to the patient) 
 
 Source: Adapted from the World Health Organization (2006b). 
 
• The above sampling procedures can generate aerosols and droplets. Full personal 
protective equipment is therefore essential and the correct swab techniques must be 
adhered to as illustrated in Figure 12 below. 
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FIGURE 12: 
 
SWAB TECHNIQUES 
 
 
Swab held correctly 
 
 
 
 
 
Swab held incorrectly 
 
 
 
 
 
Correctly held swab can slide out of the way 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Incorrectly held swab can injure patient 
 
 
   Source: Adapted from the World Health Organization (2006b). 
 
4. Performing nasopharyngeal swabs 
• Nasopharyngeal swabs may be collected instead of nose and throat swabs. Swabs 
pose a lower risk of infection of staff than do nasopharyngeal aspirates (NPA) or nasal 
washes, both of which may generate aerosols. They are suitable for testing by 
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) which is a rapid, sensitive laboratory test.   
•  Insert a flexible, fine-shafted polyester swab into the nostril and back to the 
nasopharynx. 
• The swab should be slid straight into the nostril with the patient’s head held slightly 
back (Fig. 3). The swab is inserted following the base of the nostril towards the 
auditory pit and will need to be inserted at least 5–6 cm in adults to ensure that it 
reaches the posterior pharynx. Do not use rigid shafted swabs for this sampling 
method —a flexible shafted swab is essential. 
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• Leave the swab in place for a few seconds. 
• Withdraw slowly with a rotating motion. 
• Put the swab into viral transport medium. 
• A second swab should be used for the other nostril and put into a second tube. This 
can serve as the second sample from the patient. 
• Note: Nasopharyngeal sampling is an invasive process that can cause considerable 
distress to the patient. 
 
FIGURE 13: 
 
TAKING A NASOPHARYNGEAL SWAB 
 
 
 
 
      Source: Adapted from the World Health Organization (2006b). 
 
5. Performing a nasopharyngeal aspirate 
• A nasopharyngeal aspirate is an easier and safer swab procedure for infants and 
young children. 
• Use an aspiration trap. Insert silicon catheter in the nostril towards the auditory pit and 
aspirate secretion gently by suction (Fig. 14). 
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FIGURE 14: 
 
NASOPHARYNGEAL ASPIRATION 
 
 
 
 
       Source: Adapted from the World Health Organization (2006b). 
 
6. Anterior nasal swab 
• Use the same type of rigid swab as for sampling from the throat. Advance the swab tip 
past the vestibule (anterior nares) to the nasal mucosa (approximately 2–3 cm from 
the nostrils in adults. 
• Gently rotate to collect nasal secretions from the anterior portions of the turbinate and 
septal mucosa (Fig .15). 
 
 
FIGURE 15: 
 
ANTERIAL NASAL SWAB 
 
 
 
      Source: Adapted from the World Health Organization (2006b). 
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7. Lower respiratory tract 
• In addition to swabs from the upper respiratory tract, invasive procedures such as 
bronchoalveolar lavage or a lung biopsy can be performed for the diagnosis of virus 
infections of the lower respiratory tract where clinically indicated. If the patient is 
intubated, take a tracheal aspirate or collect a sample during bronchoalveolar lavage. 
Post mortem samples may also be submitted. In all cases these procedures must be 
performed within a controlled environment using suitable respiratory precautions.  
 
8. Special precautions required when collecting blood specimens 
• Standard precautions should always be observed when taking and handling blood 
specimens because the patient may be infected with a blood – born pathogen (for 
example HIV or Hepatitis B). 
• Use personal protective equipment — at least gloves; plus face-shields, masks and 
gowns if splashes are anticipated. 
• Remove and discard personal protective equipment items immediately after 
completion of the task. 
• Perform hand hygiene every time gloves are removed.  
• An acute-phase serum specimen (7-10 ml clotted blood) should be taken soon after 
onset of symptoms (not later than seven days). A convalescent-phase serum 
specimen should also be collected 14 days after the onset of symptoms to 
demonstrate seroconversion. Where patients are near death, a second ante-mortem 
specimen should be collected even if 14 days has not elapsed.  
 
9. Taking of a blood specimen 
• Label the tubes, including the unique patient identification number, using an indelible 
marker pen.  
• Always check to ensure that the correct tubes are used for each patient. 
• Place a tourniquet above the venepuncture site, palpate and locate the vein (Fig. 16). 
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FIGURE 16: 
 
PUTTING ON A TOURNIQUET TO PALPATE AND LOCATE THE VEIN     
 
 
Source: Adapted from the World Health Organization (2006b). 
 
• Disinfect the venepuncture site meticulously with 70% isopropyl alcohol (an alcohol 
swab) or 10% polyvidone iodine by swabbing the skin concentrically from the centre of 
the venepuncture site outwards (Fig. 17). 
 
 
FIGURE 17: 
 
DISINFECTION OF THE VENEPUNCTURE SITE 
 
 
 
   Source: Adapted from the World Health Organization (2006b). 
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• Let the disinfectant evaporate.  
• Do not re-palpate the vein. 
• Performing a venepuncture. (Fig. 18) 
• If withdrawing blood with conventional disposable syringes, withdraw 3–5 ml of whole 
blood from adults and older children and 1ml from infants. 
•  Under asepsis, transfer the specimen to appropriate transport tubes. 
•  Secure caps tightly. 
• If withdrawing blood with a vacuum system (e.g. Vacutainer), withdraw the desired 
amount of blood directly into each transport tube (Fig 19). 
 
FIGURE 18: 
 
Performing a venepuncture 
with venepuncture system      
 
FIGURE 19: 
 
Drawing blood into a 
Vacutainer 
serum-separator tube 
FIGURE 20: 
 
Applying pressure to the 
venepuncture 
site 
 
 
  
       Source: Adapted from the World Health Organization (2006b). 
 
• Remove the tourniquet. Use a cotton swab to apply pressure to the venepuncture site 
until bleeding stops (Fig. 20) and apply a band-aid. 
• Never recap used sharps. 
• Discard directly into a suitable container (a proper sharps disposal container if 
available or a container such as a coffee cup or other metal can which should be 
appropriately labelled before use). 
• Recheck that the tubes used for sampling have been correctly labelled. 
• After taking all the samples, complete the appropriate field data sheets or case 
investigation forms and the required laboratory request forms using the same 
identification numbers used on the tubes. 
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10. Secondary specimens (these are not essential but can be useful if materials are  
      available) 
• Use plasma in ethylenediaminetetraacetic acid (for detection of viral RNA). 
• Rectal swab — especially if the patient has diarrhea 
• Spinal fluid if meningitis is suspected and a spinal tap is to be performed for 
diagnostic/therapeutic purposes. 
 
 11. Storing specimens 
• Repeated freezing and thawing of specimens must be avoided to prevent loss of 
infectivity. 
• Note that certain types of freezer are designated "frost free" and these should not be 
used for specimen storage as the temperature cycling involved in keeping them free of 
ice accumulation can damage specimens. 
• If specimens in viral transport medium (or blood sera/plasma) for viral isolation can be 
taken to the laboratory within four days, they may be kept at +4 °C . 
• Freezing at -20 °C is not recommended because the virus does not survive well at this 
temperature, particularly in frost-free freezers. 
• In the absence of freezers (or of viral transport medium), ethanol-preserved swabs are 
a possible alternative. 
• Storage of such specimens at +4 °C (in a standard refrigerator) is better than at room 
temperature. 
• Blood serum samples should be frozen at -70 °C for polymerase chain reactions and 
at -20 °C or lower for antibody determination but they can be stored at +4 °C for 
approximately one week. 
• Specimens for influenza virus isolation should not be stored or transported in dry ice 
(solid carbon dioxide) unless they are sealed in glass or sealed, taped and double 
plastic-bagged. 
• Carbon dioxide can rapidly inactivate influenza viruses if it gains access to the 
specimens. 
• (Note: Take care not to place dry ice in a hermetically sealed container as it could 
cause an explosion). 
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 12.  Monitoring of medical or surveillance personnel 
• If an incident that could lead to infection occurs during a sampling procedure (such as 
a breakdown of protective procedures) the staff member(s) involved should be 
monitored for signs of illness for a week (including daily temperature measurement).  
• Post-exposure chemoprophylaxis with a neuraminidase inhibitor for 5 to 10 days is a 
consideration under such circumstances.  
• All staff working with human or animal cases of avian influenza should monitor their 
own health (see Annexure 23 for avian influenza-like illness monitoring form) and any 
evidence of influenza-like illness within ten days of exposure to a confirmed or 
suspected human case or to a potential avian source should be viewed as suspected 
avian influenza and treated appropriately by a medical doctor. 
 
 13. Packaging of specimens 
• Use appropriate precautions at all times when handling blood or other body fluids. 
• Wrap blood tubes and viral transport medium (containing the swabs) separately in 
absorbent material, e.g. cotton wool.  
• Place the specimens in a secondary container, preferably sturdy plastic or stainless 
steel with a well - fitting lid.  
• Wrap the above in absorbent material and place in another container. 
• Attached the patient details on the outside of this container including: 
• Patient name and hospital number; 
• Doctor and contact number; 
• Laboratory name and contact person; and 
• Clinical details and results of any tests already performed. 
• The above package must be address to the following address: 
Dr. Terry Besselaar: National Influenza Unit, National Institute for Communicable    
Diseases, 1 Modderfontein Road, Sandringham, Johannesburg, 2059. 
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14. Completion of the data collection form during an avian influenza investigation of       
humans (see Figure 21 below). 
 
FIGURE 21 
DATA COLLECTION FORM: AVIAN INFLUENZA INVESTIGATION OF HUMANS  
Information of specimen collector 
Name of specimen collector: 
Contact detail of specimen collector (address, telephone and e-mail): 
 
 
Date of specimen collection: DD / MM / YY  
Locality (with coordinates) 
Country: Municipality: 
 
Health  district: 
 
Province: 
Locality (GPS reference ): Place where specimens were collected: 
 
Place where specimens were taken to ( name, address and telephone of laboratory): 
 
 
Information of patient 
Name of patient : 
 
Contact detail of patient (address and telephone): 
 
Specimen information 
Unique specimen identification number: 
 
Specimen type (specify): 
Date specimen sent to laboratory:                
DD / MM / YY 
Date results  received:                                                
DD / MM / YY 
Laboratory results/comments: 
Diagnosis 
Tentative diagnosis/comments: 
Final diagnosis (diagnosing officer and date of diagnosis) comments: 
 
Health of patient when specimen was collected: Apparently healthy, sick or dead: 
 
Actions and treatment 
List of actions (quarantine, etc.): 
 
List of treatments (antiviral drugs, etc.) 
 
 
Source: Own research findings and confirmed by the Provincial Communicable Disease 
Outbreak Control Co-ordinators (group of experts) on 31 August 2008. 
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∗ In developing the work methods and - procedures in this annexure the resources listed 
below were consulted. The work methods and - procedures were confirmed by the Provincial    
Communicable Disease Outbreak Control Co-ordinators (group of experts) on 31 August 
2008. 
• World Health Organization. (2006d). Guidelines for the collection of clinical specimens 
during field investigation of outbreaks. Retrieved April 10, 2007, from http://www.who. 
int/emc 
• World Health Organization. (2005b). Guidelines for global surveillance of influenza A/H5. 
Retrieved April 15, 2006, from http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avianinfluenza/guidelines/ 
globalsurveillance/en/ 
• Western Cape Department of Health. (2006). Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Plan for 
the Western Cape. Cape Town. Government Printer. 
• World Health Organization. (2006b). Collecting, preserving and shipping specimens for the 
diagnosis of avian influenza A(H5N1) virus infection: Guide for field operations. Retrieved 
February 10, 2007, from http://www.who.int/emc 
• World Health Organisation. (2007b). Guidelines for investigation of human cases of avian 
influenza A (H5N1). Retrieved March 17, 2007, from http://www.who.int/emc 
• United States Department of Health. (2003). Guidelines for Environmental Infection 
Control in Health-Care Facilities - Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory 
Committee. Atlanta: USA Government Printer. 
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ANNEXURE 21 
 
AVAIN INFLUENZA INVESTIGATION KIT 
 
The equipment listed below should be included in the avian influenza investigation kit. These 
are: 
• standard size, disposable boot covers; 
• antifog spray; 
• alcohol based hand wash; 
• reusable clear screen goggles; 
• face masks (N95/FFP2, cup and folded models); 
• overalls with head cover (Cat III CE 0120 overalls that are resistant to penetration by 
liquid); 
• bio-packaging (inner and outer unit) 1.5L with ice pack; 
• tubes  for viral transport media; 
• sterile pernasal swabs (with plastic shafts); 
• sterile dacron swabs ( plastic shafts); 
• reliable transport; 
• latex or nitrile gloves; 
• face shields; 
• local maps or aerial pictures; 
• a global positioning system (GPS) instrument; 
• note pads, pencils, watches; and 
• disposable particulate respirators with valves. 
 
Source: Modified from the World Health Organization (2007b, p.60). 
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ANNEXURE 22 
 
AVIAN INFLUENZA INFECTION CONTROL MEASURES  
 
Standard infection control precautions: 
 
• Transmission of human influenza is by droplets, fine droplet nuclei (airborne) and 
direct or indirect contact.  
• Reinforce standard infection control precautions with droplet and contact 
precautions. 
• Isolate the patient to a single room. If a single room is not available, cohort patients 
separately in designated multi-bed rooms or wards; beds should be placed more 
than 1 metre apart and preferably be separated by a physical barrier (e.g. curtain, 
partition). 
• Wearing gloves during any contact with the patient is essential. 
• Wash hands thoroughly and dry after each patient contact and particularly after 
removing gloves. (Alcohol-based hand disinfection alone is not sufficient) 
 
 
If the diagnosis of influenza A (H5N1) infection is being considered on the basis of clinical 
features, additional precautions (including airborne precautions) should be implemented until 
that diagnosis can be ruled out. 
 
Additional infection control precautions 
 
Airborne precautions: 
• During the 1997 H5N1 outbreak in humans in Hong Kong SARS, droplet and contact 
precautions successfully prevented nosocomial spread of the disease. So far there 
has also not been any evidence to suggest airborne transmission of the disease in 
the current outbreaks in Thailand, Vietnam and Turkey.  
• Due to the high mortality of the disease and the possibility of a pandemic, the World 
Health Organisation is currently recommending airborne precautions in addition to 
droplet and contact precautions – this includes the use of high efficiency (N95) 
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masks and where available negative pressure isolation rooms. 
• Appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) - when entering patient’s room: 
• High - efficiency (N95) mask, gown, face shield / goggles and gloves 
• Limit patient contact. 
• Limit the number of health care workers and other hospital employees (e.g. 
cleaners, laboratory personnel) who have direct contact with the patient(s). 
• Health care workers should not look after other patients. 
• Restrict the number of visitors and provide them with appropriate personal protective 
equipment. 
 
Use designated health care workers:  
• Ask health care workers with direct patient contact to monitor their own temperature 
twice daily and report any febrile event.  
• Health care workers who are unwell should not be involved in direct patient care.  
 
Household contacts: 
• Ask household contacts to monitor their own temperature twice daily and report  the 
findings to the local health authorities. 
• Self - quarantine for a period of 1 week after the last exposure to an infected person 
is probably appropriate. 
 
Disposal of waste: 
• Place waste in sealed, impermeable bags (clearly labelled “Biohazard” and 
incinerate).  
• Linen and reusable materials that have been in contact with patients should be 
handled separately and disinfected by washing in hot water. 
 
Immunisation: 
• Countries or territories experiencing outbreaks of HPAI in poultry should vaccinate 
health care workers and poultry workers at risk with the World Health Organization’s 
recommended seasonal vaccine. H5N1 vaccines for humans are currently not 
commercially available. 
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Hospital Infection control : 
• As influenza is a well - known nosocomial pathogen, existing infection control 
measures include the application of standard infection control precautions (droplet 
and contact precautions) to all patients receiving care. 
 
Source: Adapted from National Department of Health (2006), Western Cape Department of 
Health (2006) and confirmed by the Provincial Communicable Disease Outbreak Control Co-
ordinators (group of experts) on 31 August 2008. 
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ANNEXURE 23 
 
AVIAN INFLUENZA-LIKE ILLNESS MONITORING FORM 
 
Information of health care worker 
Where appropriate, mark your selection with a cross (x). 
Name : 
Job title: 
Home telephone number: 
Name of health facility: 
Address of health facility: 
Telephone: Fax : 
Health District Province: 
Date of exposure: DD / MM /YY 
Exposure history of health care worker 
Type of contact with avian influenza patient, patient environment, or virus: 
 
 
 
Was personal protective equipment (PPE) used: No ______ Yes ______ 
If yes, list PPE used (e.g., gown, gloves, particulate respirator, surgical mask, eye 
protection, etc): 
 
 
 
List any non-occupational exposures (i.e., exposure to birds or persons with severe 
acute respiratory illness): 
 
 
Please check your temperature twice a day for 10 days after providing care for an 
avian influenza-infected patient, including 10 days after your last exposure, and also 
monitor yourself for any of the following influenza-like illness (ILI) symptoms: 
• Fever > 38° C; 
• Cough; 
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• Acute onset of respiratory illness; 
• Sore throat; 
• Arthralgia; 
• Myalgia or prostration; and 
• gastrointestinal symptoms (e.g., diarrhea, vomiting, abdominal pain). 
 
If any symptoms of influenza-like illness occur, immediately limit your interactions with 
others, public areas, and notify the local health authority immediately. 
 
Temperature monitoring of health care worker for ten days 
Day Date Temperature in degrees celsius 
List any influenza-like illness 
symptoms 
Day 1 DD / MM / YY Morning: Evening:          
Day 2 DD / MM / YY Morning: Evening:                           
Day 3 DD / MM / YY Morning: Evening:                          
Day 4 DD / MM / YY Morning: Evening:                        
Day 5 DD / MM / YY Morning: Evening:                       
Day 6 DD / MM / YY Morning: Evening:                     
Day 7 DD / MM / YY Morning: Evening:                     
Day 8 DD / MM / YY Morning: Evening:                     
Day 9 DD / MM / YY Morning: Evening:                 
Day10 DD / MM / YY Morning: Evening:             
 
Source: Own research findings and confirmed by the Provincial Communicable Disease 
Outbreak Control Co-ordinators (group of experts) on 31 August 2008. 
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ANNEXURE 24 
 
WORK METHODS AND - PROCEDURES FOR SPECIMEN COLLECTION DURING 
CLINICAL SURVEILLANCE OF BIRDS*  
 
1. Sampling strategy for birds 
• Specimens for isolation of H5N1 and other respiratory viruses and for the direct 
detection of viral antigen or nucleic acids from animals should generally be taken 
during the first three days after onset of clinical symptoms of influenza. 
• For each affected species, select up to three each of: 
• dead birds (dead less than 24 hours) 
• sick birds  
• apparently normal birds in direct contact with the currently sick birds. 
• Priority should be given to birds that share wetlands with affected birds since there is 
evidence that the main mode of transmission of avian influenza between wild birds is 
probably faecal contamination of the environment (water or shore areas). 
 
2. Required specimen for live birds 
Sampling of live birds for influenza infection should include: 
• tracheal swab (the primary sample for domestic and intensively reared poultry) 
• cloacal swab 
• faecal specimen 
 
3. Preparing for sampling 
• Before collecting samples, personnel should put on the appropriate personal protective 
equipment (see avian influenza sample kit in Annexure 21). These include latex or 
nitrile gloves and face shields, and if it is determined to be necessary, powered air-
purifying respirators. 
• Label plastic whirl pack bags with the necessary information including date, location 
(GPS coordinate if possible), species (if possible), investigator and sample 
identification code. Record all required information on data sheets. See Section 9 of 
Annexure 24 (Data collection form for an avian influenza investigation). 
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4. Applying restrain during live bird specimen collection 
• The key to obtaining good samples from animals is proper restraint.  
• At least two operators are needed for each live bird sampled.  
• Three and sometimes four operators are needed for larger birds (swans, large geese, 
storks, etc). 
• To obtain the sample with minimal distress to the live bird, one assistant should hold 
the bird against their chest with the wings folded (helped by other assistants if 
required). 
• Cloacal samples can also be taken with the bird restrained in this way.  
• An apron that cannot easily be ripped by the bird’s claws should be used. Do not use 
the wings or neck to restrain the bird, nor hold the legs and do not hold the bird upside 
down while carrying it. 
 
5. Procedures for the collection of tracheal / cloacal swab samples 
• Firstly prepare the sample vials. 
• Samples must be placed in tubes containing viral transport medium or brain-heart 
infusion broth. 
• Thaw appropriate number of pre-labelled tubes of viral transport medium or brain-heart 
infusion broth at refrigerator temperature (4 °C) overnight. Keep chilled with wet/blue 
ice packs in a cooler during the day of collection. 
• When tracheal / cloacal swab samples are taken unwrap a dacron swab from the stem-
end of the packaging. 
• Remove the swab and insert the entire head of the swab into the trachea or cloaca.  
• Use gentle pressure and in a circular motion, swab the inside circumference of the 
trachea/cloaca two or three times. 
• For cloacal swabs, shake off large pieces of feces. 
• Inserting the swab into the tube containing viral transport medium or brain-heart 
infusion broth. 
• With the swab in the media, swirl the stem end of the swab between fingers vigorously. 
Lift the swab approximately half a centimeter from the bottom of the vial and bend the 
stem over the edge of the vial to break off the stem so that the swab remains in the vial 
and the cap can be screwed tight.  
• The entire swab end and a portion of the stem will be left in the tube. 
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• If the stems are unable to be broken (some small swabs will have metal stems) then 
they can be cut with scissors. Scissors should be wiped with 70% alcohol each time 
they are used to cut a stem. 
• Record the sample tube number on the banding sheet or the Sample History Sheet 
along with the date, species, age, sex, and location data (GPS coordinates if possible).  
• Replace the tube into the cooler for transport back to the base camp.  
• Samples should be kept cold (<4 °C, frozen if possible) and out of direct sunlight. 
• At the sampling site, transfer the tubes into liquid nitrogen shippers or into a freezer as 
soon as possible. 
• Place the tubes into a hard plastic transport container with enough frozen gel (dry ice) 
packs to keep samples cold for at least two days. 
• Notify the laboratory that the samples are being shipped. 
 
6. Taking of blood samples from birds. 
• Live birds should first be euthanised. 
• Birds suspected of suffering from HPAI should be killed by cervical dislocation (neck 
wringing) only. Other methods present safety risks. 
• Immediately after the bird is dead, perform a cardiac bleed to collect blood for serum 
separation. 
• Select the size of needle used in proportion to the size of the bird.  
• For duck-sized birds, aim a three centimetre long needle just below the keel (breast 
bone),  
• withdraw the blood with minimal negative pressure  
• When a sufficient volume (1ml) of blood is obtained, put pressure on the plunger and 
withdraw the needle from the chest cavity.  
• Without removing the needle, slowly expel the blood into a labelled vacutube and 
dispose of the needle and syringe in the sharps container without replacing the plastic 
needle cover. 
 
7. Sampling dead birds and other animals 
• If dead birds/mammals are found during the investigation, and highly pathogenic avian 
influenza virus is suspected, representative internal organs should be sampled as well 
as the respiratory and intestinal tracts. 
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• The specimens to be collected from dead animals should include the tracheal swab, 
cloacal swab, tissue (including trachea and lung). The specimen should also include a 
piece of spleen and any obviously abnormal tissue. 
• Tracheal swabs from dead animals, including animals at slaughter houses, can be 
taken after removal of the lungs and trachea from the carcasses. The trachea is held in 
a gloved hand and the swab inserted to its maximal length with vigorous swabbing of 
the wall. The swab is then placed in viral transport medium. 
• Tissue specimens should ideally be frozen immediately, without transport medium, and 
transported frozen (-70 °C or below). 
• Alternatively such specimens can be preserved in 100% ethanol or in a commercially 
available non-toxic RNA preservative if no cold chain is available. 
 
8. Taking faecal samples during the surveillance of avian influenza  
• Faecal specimens from the cages of live poultry in bird markets, from poultry houses or 
from wild birds in the field should, if possible, be collected from freshly deposited wet 
faeces.  
• The swab should be heavily coated with faeces and then placed in viral transport 
medium 
• It is important to note that faecal specimens collected from cages or from the 
environment    are often the only specimens available, but they cannot be assigned 
with certainty to the species of origin. 
• Faeces must be less than 24 hours old. 
• Faeces should appear moist. 
• For collection, turn a sterile Whirl-Pak inside out and pick up faeces using the Whirl-
Pak as a glove. Then turn the bag right side in with the faeces inside the closed bag.  
• Release as much air from the inside of the bag as possible. 
• Label the Whirl-Pak using an indelible ink marker. The sample should be labelled with 
the sample number, date, time, collector's name, location, and quality assurance 
number (Protocol Number).  
• Place the Whirl-Paks with faecal samples into a large zip-lock bag, tape (e.g. duct tape 
or packaging tape) the opening and label the outer bulk bag with name, date, location, 
and protocol number. 
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• Pack samples with enough ice or frozen gel packs to keep samples cold for at least 
two days.  
• This precaution is for maximizing the chances for subsequent viral isolation 
• Maintain the temperature of samples as constant as possible.  
• Change gloves if it is soiled or contaminated. 
• When finished collecting the sample, wash the hands with a suitable antibacterial 
agent. 
• Notify the laboratory that the samples are being shipped. 
 
9. Completion of the data collection form during an avian influenza investigation of 
birds 
• The data form as below should be completed during the investigation of avian 
influenza amongst birds. 
FIGURE 22 
DATA COLLECTION FORM: AVIAN INFLUENZA INVESTIGATION OF BIRDS  
General information 
Name of reporting institution: 
Name of health official: 
Type of observation: Initial / Follow-up: 
Date of observation: DD / MM / YY 
Date of first case: DD / MM / YY Date of end of outbreak: DD / MM / YY 
Source of information: 
 
Sensitivity ( High/Low ):  
Public / private comments: 
 
Locality (with coordinates) 
Country: Municipality: 
 
Health  district: 
 
Province: 
Locality (GPS reference ): Name of farm: 
 
Farming System:  
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Birds affected 
(Specify eg. chickens, ducks, etc.) 
If uncertain of name, take a digital photograph 
Species/signs : 
 
Species/lesions: 
 
 
Samples 
Species: Sample type (specify) 
Sample identification code: 
 
Type of test: 
 
Date sample sent to laboratory:                 
DD / MM / YY 
Date result received:                               
DD / MM / YY 
Laboratory results/comments: 
 
Diagnosis 
Tentative diagnosis (differential diagnosis) comments: 
 
Final diagnosis (diagnosing officer and date of diagnosis) comments: 
 
Health of bird: Apparently healthy, sick or dead: 
 
Actions and treatment 
List of actions (eg. destruction, vaccination, 
quarantine, stamping-out, etc ): 
 
List of treatments [trace-back and trace-
forward activities]: 
 
      
Own research findings and confirmed by the group of experts on 31 August 2008. 
 
*In developing the work methods and - procedures in this annexure the resources listed below 
were consulted. The work methods and - procedures were confirmed by the Provincial    
Communicable Disease Outbreak Control Co-ordinators (group of experts) on 31 August 
2008. 
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• World Health Organization. (2006b). Collecting, preserving and shipping specimens for the 
diagnosis of avian influenza A(H5N1) virus infection: Guide for field operations. Retrieved 
February 10, 2007, from http://www.who.int/emc 
• Pienaar, A.C.E. & Horner, R.F. (2005). Contingency plan in case of an outbreak of 
notifiable Avian influenza in poultry in South Africa. Pretoria: Government Printer. 
• World Health Organization. (2005b). Guidelines for global surveillance of influenza A/H5. 
Retrieved April 15, 2006, from:http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/guidelines/ 
globalsurveillance/en/ 
• Yuen, K.Y., Chan, P.K. & Peiris, M. (1998). Clinical features and rapid viral diagnosis of 
human disease associated with avian influenza A H5N1 virus. Lancet, 351 (1) 467-71. 
• United States Department of Agriculture. (2007). An Early Detection System for Highly 
Pathogenic H5N1 Avian Influenza in Wild Migratory Birds- U.S. Interagency Strategic 
Plan. New York: USA Government Printer. 
• World Health Organisation. (2002). Manual on Animal Influenza Diagnosis and 
Surveillance. Retrieved January 21, 2005, from http://www.who.int/emc 
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ANNEXURE 25 
 
WORK METHODS AND - PROCEDURES FOR SPECIMEN COLLECTION DURING 
SEROLOGICAL SURVEILLANCE OF POULTRY  
 
1. Sample strategy 
All serological testing has to be designed to detect the presence of the exposure of 
ostriches/chickens to H5 and H7 avian influenza subtypes (NAI) at >10% prevalence with 
95% confidence in every epidemiological unit on each farm or site, i.e. the number of 
poultry to be tested depends on the size of each group on every farm. Table Four below, 
reflects the sample strategy for poultry.  
 
TABLE 4 
SAMPLE STRATEGY FOR POULTRY  
Size of the epidemiological group 
(population) 
Number of poultry to be sampled 
(Chickens, ostriches, ducks etc.) 
≤ 10 10 
≤ 20 16 
≤ 50 22 
≤ 100 25 
≤ 200 27 
≤ 900 28 
> 900 29 
 
2. Selection of the sample site 
• As many randomly selected epidemiological units as possible should be tested bi-annually 
(6 monthly) with a minimum of 50 flocks/units per province. 
• Properties to be selected must be on a random geographical basis. This includes the 
identification of a site (point) in a random fashion, with sampling carried out on the 
property with chickens that are closest to the identified site (be it a rural site or a 
commercial poultry farm). 
• Samples must be submitted for H5 and H7 testing to one of the official laboratories as 
detailed in section six below. 
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 Applying restraint during live poultry specimen collection 
• The key to obtaining good samples from animals is proper restraint.  
• At least two operators are needed for each live chicken sampled.  
• Three and sometimes four operators are needed for larger birds (swans, large geese, 
storks, etc.). 
• To obtain the sample with minimal distress to the live bird, one assistant should hold the 
bird against his/her chest with the wings folded (helped by other assistants if required). 
• An apron that cannot easily be ripped by the bird’s claws should be used. Do not use the 
wings or neck to restrain the bird nor hold the legs and do not hold the bird upside down 
while carrying it. 
 
3. Taking of  blood samples 
• Blood samples must be taken in red-topped tubes (tubes without any anti-coagulant). 
• If possible, draw serum off after the blood has clotted. 
• Poultry suspected of suffering from HPAI should be killed by cervical dislocation (neck 
wringing) only. Other methods present safety risks. 
• Immediately after the bird is dead, perform a cardiac bleed to collect blood for serum 
separation. 
• Select the size of needle used in proportion to the size of the bird.  
• For duck-sized birds, aim the needle just below the keel (breast bone).  
• Withdraw blood with minimal negative pressure.  
• When a sufficient volume (1ml) of blood is obtained, release the negative pressure on the 
plunger and withdraw the needle from the chest cavity.  
• Without removing the needle, slowly expel the blood into a labelled red-topped tube and 
dispose of the needle and syringe in the sharps container without replacing the plastic 
needle cover. 
 
4. Shipping specimens 
• Requirements determined by national authorities and commercial carriers must be 
complied with. 
• The address label on a package should display the sender as well as the laboratory name 
with complete addresses and telephone numbers of both the sender and the receiver. 
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• A package should also contain the appropriate biohazard labels and as well as the 
stoarage temperature requirements. 
• Copies of letters, forms, permits and other identifying/shipping documents for the receiving 
laboratory should be placed together in a plastic bag and taped onto the outer transport 
packaging. 
• The receiving laboratory should receive a copy of these documents in advance. 
 
5. Submission of serum samples 
• Submit serum samples only to one of the following official laboratories: 
• For the Eastern Cape province: Onderstepoort Veterinary Institute, Virology Section, 
Onderstepoort, 0110 (Tel: 012 – 529 9111). 
• Allerton Veterinary Laboratory, 458 Townbush Road, Montrose, Pietermaritzburg, 3201 
(Tel: 033 – 347 6204) 
• Stellenbosch Veterinary Laboratory, Helshoogte Road, Stellenbosch, 7600  
(Tel: 021 – 887 0324). 
 
6. Investigation form to be completed. 
    See Section 9 of Annexure 24. 
 
7. Submission of serological reports 
• A serological report must be submitted to the Provincial Health Department every six 
months. Full records of sampling dates, sites, laboratory result sheets, etc, must by kept in 
the Health District for auditing purposes. 
• The report should include the following information: name of farm or establishment, owner 
of farm (name and initials), magisterial district, geographical reference points, date of 
sampling results and laboratory where tested. 
 
*In developing the work methods and - procedures in this annexure the resources listed below 
were consulted. The work methods and - procedures were confirmed by the Provincial    
Communicable Disease Outbreak Control Co-ordinators (group of experts) on 31 August 
2008. 
• Pienaar, A.C.E. & Horner, R.F. (2005). Contingency plan in case of an outbreak of 
notifiable Avian influenza in poultry in South Africa. Pretoria: Government Printer. 
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• United States Department of Agriculture. (2007). An Early Detection System for Highly 
Pathogenic H5N1 Avian Influenza in Wild Migratory Birds- U.S. Interagency Strategic 
Plan. New York: USA Government Printer. 
• World Health Organisation. (2002). Manual on Animal Influenza Diagnosis and 
Surveillance. Retrieved January 21, 2005, from http://www.who.int/emc 
• World Organization for Animal Health. (2007a). Avian influenza – Contingency Manual. 
Retrieved April 16, 2008, from www.oie.int/eng/Avian_influenza/Contingency%20 Manual 
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ANNEXURE 26 
SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION OF LABORATORY TESTS FOR DETERMINING 
EVIDENCE OF AVIAN INFLUENZA INFECTION OF POULTRY FLOCKS 
 
• Schematic representation of laboratory tests for determining evidence of avian influenza 
infection of poultry flocks using virological methods. 
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Schematic representation of laboratory tests for determining evidence of avian influenza 
infection of poultry flocks using serological surveys. 
 
 
Key:    
AGID Agar gel immunodiffusion 
DIVA    Differentiating infection from vaccinated animals 
ELISA    Enzyme-linked immunosorbant assay 
HA    Haemagglutinin 
HI    Haemagglutination inhibition 
NA    Neuraminidase 
NP/M    Nucleoprotein and matrix protein 
NSP Nonstructural protein  
S No evidence of NAIV 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Pienaar and Horner (2005, p.52) and confirmed by the group of experts 
on 31 August 2008. 
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ANNEXURE 27 
 
WORK METHODS AND - PROCEDURES FOR HEALTH CARE WORKERS PROVIDING 
CARE TO AVIAN INFLUENZA INFECTED PATIENTS AT HEALTH CARE FACILITIES 
 
1. Work procedures at the arrival of suspected or confirmed avian influenza- infected 
 patients at a health care facility 
• Health care workers must start immediately with droplet precaution measures when a 
patient with symptoms of acute respiratory illness enters the facility. 
• Health care employees should use facial protection (surgical/procedure mask, goggles 
/ face shield). 
• Place a surgical/procedure mask on the patient when in the waiting room. If no masks 
are available, ask the patient to cover his/her mouth and nose with a tissue (to be 
provided) when sneezing or coughing. 
 
2. Patient placement for suspected or confirmed avian influenza -infected patients in 
an isolation room 
• Place the patient in a negative pressure room (airborne infection isolation room).  
• If a negative pressure room is not available or cannot be created with mechanical 
manipulation, place the patient in a single room. 
• Place patients that are avian influenza-infected and those that are suspected of being 
avian influenza -infected together in the same room if single rooms are not available.  
• If possible, try not to place patients with seasonal influenza and those with avian 
influenza in the same room. Although the risk is relatively small, the sharing of the 
same room by such patients would increase the chances of co-infection of patients 
with the two viruses and this could lead to viral reassortment of genes and the possible 
emergence of a new pandemic virus. 
• Doors to any room or area, housing suspected or confirmed avian influenza-infected 
patients must be kept closed when not being used for entry or exit. 
• To facilitate cleaning and to reduce the potential for virus aerosolisation via vacuuming, 
place avian influenza-infected patients in uncarpeted rooms/areas, if possible. 
• When possible, isolation rooms should have their own hand-washing sink, toilet and 
bath facilities. 
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• The number of persons entering the isolation room should be limited to the minimum 
number necessary for patient care and support. 
• Ensure infection control precautions through appropriate signage on the door. 
 
3.  Cohorting of avian influenza-infected patients  
• If single rooms are not available, patients infected with the same organisms can be 
cohorted (share rooms). These rooms should be in a well-defined area that is clearly 
segregated from other patient care areas used for uninfected patients. 
• The distance between beds should be more than one metre. Increasing spatial 
distance between patients may theoretically be helpful in preventing transmission of 
respiratory aerosols. 
• Whenever possible, health care workers assigned to avian influenza - infected patient 
care units should be experienced house staff and should not “float” or otherwise be 
assigned to other patient care areas. 
• The number of persons entering the ward should be limited to the minimum number 
necessary for patient care and support. 
• Consider having portable x-ray equipment available. 
• Healthcare workers assigned to avian influenza - infected patient care units should be 
aware that avian influenza-infected patients may be concurrently infected or colonised 
with other pathogenic organisms (e.g., Staphylococcus aureus, Clostridium difficile) 
and should use standard and applicable transmission-based infection control 
precautions to prevent transmission of health care associated infections. 
 
4.   Placement and removal procedures of personal protective equipment when dealing 
      with suspected or confirmed avian influenza-infected patients 
In addition to hand hygiene, all individuals providing care for patients with respiratory 
illness or suspected or confirmed avian influenza infection should use personal protective 
equipment as described below: 
• If possible, have an observer present outside the isolation room to monitor the 
placement and removal of personal protective equipment. 
• Before entering the isolation room, collect all personal protective equipment needed. 
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• The following equipment should be kept on a trolley (outside the isolation room) at all 
times so that personal protective equipment is always available for health care 
workers: 
• Face shield/visor/goggles; 
• Single use gloves for clinical use (sizes: small, medium, and large); 
• Gloves (reusable for environmental cleaning); 
• Hair covers (optional for high-risk procedures, but should be available); 
• Particulate respirators (N95, FFP2, or equivalent); 
• Surgical or procedure masks; 
• Single-use long sleeved fluid-resistant gowns; 
• Single-use plastic aprons (compulsory if splashing is anticipated); 
• Alcohol-based hand rub or alternative method for washing hands in clean water; 
• Plain soap (liquid if possible); 
• Disinfectant; 
• Clean single-use towels; 
• Appropriate disinfectant for environmental cleaning; 
• Large plastic bags; 
• Appropriate clinical waste bags; 
• Linen bags; and 
• Collection container for used equipment. 
• Perform hand hygiene with an alcohol-based hand rub (preferably) or soap and water. 
• Put on personal protective equipment as in Figure 23. 
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Figure 23: 
 
Placement of personal protective equipment, including surgical mask and 
goggles 
 
 
 
    Source: Adapted from the World Health Organization (2007c). 
 
• Put on personal protective equipment as described in the sequences below: 
• Put on fluid-resistant gown; 
• Put on disposable particulate respirator; 
• Perform user seal check of particulate respirator; 
• Put on hair cover (if used, e.g. during an aerosol generating procedure); 
• Put on face shield or goggles; 
• Put on gloves (make sure gloves cover cuff of gown sleeves); and 
• Enter the isolation room and close the door. 
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5. Procedures on leaving the isolation room 
• Remove personal protective equipment in a manner that prevents self-contamination or 
self-inoculation with contaminated personal protective equipment or hands. If possible, 
have an observer monitor to the removal of personal protective equipment by health care 
workers in order to minimize further risks. 
• When leaving the isolation room, remove personal protective equipment either in the 
anteroom or if there is no anteroom make sure that neither the environment outside the 
isolation room, nor other persons can get contaminated. 
• Remove protective eyewear and discard in a rubbish bin. If reusable, place face shield in 
container for decontamination. 
• If worn, remove hair cover and discard in a rubbish bin. 
• Remove gown and discard in a rubbish bin. 
• Remove gloves and discard in a rubbish bin (gloves may be peeled from hands when 
gown is removed). 
• Perform hand hygiene with an alcohol-based hand rub (preferably) or soap and water. 
• Remove particulate respirator by grasping elastic bands; do not touch the front of the 
particulate respirator (front of particulate respirator may be contaminated) and discard in a 
rubbish bin. 
• Perform hand hygiene with an alcohol-based hand rub (preferably) or soap and water. 
 
6. Disposal of suspected avian influenza waste 
• All waste generated in the isolation room should be removed from the isolation room in 
suitable containers or bags that do not allow for spillage or leakage of the contents. 
• Waste from avian influenza-infected patients is classified as infectious. All waste from an 
isolation room should be treated as clinical waste and should be treated and disposed of 
as per facility policy and in accordance with national regulations pertaining to such waste. 
• One waste disposal bag is usually adequate, providing waste can be placed in the bag 
without contaminating the outside of the bag. If the outside of the bag is contaminated, two 
bags should be used (double bagging). If additional bags are not available, clean and 
disinfect the outside of the bag before removing it from the isolation room. 
• When transporting waste outside the isolation room, use gloves followed by hand hygiene. 
• Although the possibility of transmission of avian influenza infection via human faeces is 
unknown, faeces of avian influenza-infected patients should be handled with caution. 
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Possible aerosolisation of faeces should be avoided (e.g. removal of faeces from bedpan, 
commode, clothing, or reusable incontinence pads by spraying with water). 
• Liquid waste, such as urine or faeces, can be flushed into the sewer system if there is an 
adequate sewage system in place. Close toilet cover after flushing. 
 
7.   Environmental cleaning and disinfection of rooms and surfaces 
Environmental cleaning and disinfection is intended to remove pathogens from 
contaminated surfaces and items, thus breaking the chain of transmission. Disinfection is 
a process of killing microorganisms without complete sterilization. Cleaning must precede 
disinfection. Items and surfaces cannot be disinfected if they are not first cleaned of any 
kind of organic matter (patient excretions, secretions, dirt, soil, etc.). The environmental 
cleaning and disinfection methods that are in general considered effective in the 
inactivation of influenza A viruses are presented below: 
 
The avian influenza virus can be inactivated by a range of disinfectants, including: 
• phenolic disinfectants; 
• quaternary ammonium compounds; 
• peroxygen compounds; 
• sodium hypochlorite (household bleach);  
• ethanol; 
• other germicides with a tuberculocidal claim on the label; 
• other registered/licensed disinfectants; 
• any germicide with a tuberculocidal claim on the label (i.e., an intermediate-level); 
• Most disinfectants are considered capable of inactivating influenza; 
• Use manufacturer’s recommendations for use/dilution, contact time, and handling of 
disinfectants; 
• Patient rooms/areas should be cleaned at least daily and terminally cleaned at 
discharge;  
• In addition to daily cleaning of floors and other horizontal surfaces, special attention 
should be given to cleaning and disinfecting frequently touched surfaces (e.g., medical 
equipment, bedside and over-bed tables, TV controls, call buttons, safety/pull-up bars, 
doorknobs, commodes and ventilator surfaces). 
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• To avoid possible re-aerosolisation of the avian influenza virus, damp, rather than dry 
dusting or sweeping should be performed, whenever possible. Wet-dust horizontal 
surfaces by moistening a cloth with a small amount of disinfectant. 
• During wet cleaning, cleaning solutions and equipment quickly become contaminated; 
therefore clean less heavily contaminated areas first and change cleaning solutions, 
cleaning cloths, and mop heads frequently. 
• Double bucket method (i.e., one bucket for cleaning solution, one for rinsing) is 
recommended. 
• Equipment used for cleaning and disinfection must be cleaned and dried between 
uses. 
• Mop heads should be laundered daily and dried thoroughly before storage or re-use. 
• Carpeted areas should not be designated for avian influenza-infected patients.  
• Keep areas around the patient free of unnecessary supplies and equipment to facilitate 
daily cleaning. 
• Paper sheeting that is changed between patients is appropriate for patient examination 
tables in outpatient areas;  
• Use disinfectant to wipe down tables between patients; 
• Do not spray (i.e., fog) occupied or unoccupied rooms with disinfectant. This is a 
potentially dangerous practice that has no proven disease control benefit. 
• It is furthermore important to note the following: 
• Chemical inactivation is only effective after physical removal of bulk contamination; 
• The hazards associated with chemical decontaminants can be avoided if 
instructions for their use are followed closely and appropriate personal protective 
equipment is worn. 
• Apart from the methods listed above, there are many other methods that can 
effectively kill these viruses. One should use the safest method possible when 
disinfecting areas known or suspected to be contaminated with the virus. 
 
 
*In developing the work methods and - procedures in this annexure the resources listed below 
were consulted. The work methods and - procedures were confirmed by the Provincial    
Communicable Disease Outbreak Control Co-ordinators (group of experts) on 31 August 
2008. 
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• Australian Department of Health and Ageing. (2006). The Australian Health Management 
Plan for Pandemic Influenza. Retrieved June 12, 2007, from http://www. 
health.gov.au/internet/ main/publishing.nsf/content/phd-pandemic-resources.Htm 
• Canadian Ministry of Health. (2006). Canada Pandemic Influenza Plan. Retrieved June 
12, 2007, from http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/cpip-pclcpi/ 
• World Health Organization. (2006a). Avian Influenza, including Influenza A (H 5 N1) in 
Humans: World Health Organization Interim Infection Control Guideline for Health Care 
Facilities. Retrieved March 15, 2006, from http://www.who.int/csr/diseaseavian_in 
fluenza/guidelines/infectioncontrol1/ 
• United States Department of Health. (2003). Guidelines for Environmental Infection 
Control in Health-Care Facilities - Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory 
Committee. Atlanta: USA Government Printer. 
• United States of America Department of Health. (2006b). United States of America 
Pandemic Influenza Plan. Retrieved June 12, 2007, from http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicf 
lu/plan/ 
• United Kingdom. (2006). United Kingdom influenza pandemic contingency plan. Retrieved 
June 12, 2007, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/ pdfs/19_10 _ 05 _ bird_flu.pdf 
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ANNEXURE 28 
 
PREVENTION AND CONTROL ADVICE FOR PEOPLE LIVING IN AREAS AFFECTED BY 
AVIAN INFLUENZA* 
 
1. Key public messages and advice to prevent the spread of avian influenza in affected 
areas 
• People should avoid contact with chickens, ducks or other poultry unless absolutely 
necessary. This is the best way to prevent infection with the avian influenza virus. 
• Children are at high risk because they may play where poultry are found. It is therefore 
important to teach children the following basic guidelines: 
• Avoid contact with any birds, their feathers, faeces and other waste; 
• Do not keep birds as pets; 
• Wash hands with soap and water after any contact with birds; and 
• Do not to sleep near poultry. 
• Do not transport live or dead chickens, ducks or other poultry from one place to another 
even if you think your birds are healthy. 
• Handling of poultry in affected areas should be done within the area without transporting 
them to other areas. 
• Do not prepare poultry from affected areas as food for your family or animals. The 
slaughter and preparation of such birds for food is dangerous. 
• If you unintentionally come into contact with poultry in an affected area, such as touching 
the bird's body, touching its faeces or other animal dirt, or walking on soil contaminated 
with poultry faeces: 
• Wash your hands well with soap and water after each contact; 
• Remove your shoes outside the house and clean them of all dirt; and 
• Check your temperature for 7 days at least once daily. If you develop a high    
temperature (>37.5°C), visit a doctor or the nearest healthcare facility    
immediately. 
 
2. Proper handling of poultry 
• Make sure to keep children away from dead or sick poultry. 
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• If you need to handle dead or sick poultry, make sure you are protected. Wear protective 
clothing such as a mask, goggles, gown, rubber boots and gloves. If these are not 
available, cover your mouth with a piece of cloth, wear glasses, use plastic bags to cover 
hands and shoes and fix these tightly around wrists and ankles with a rubber band or 
string. Wear overalls that can be washed. 
• If you encounter sick and/or dead poultry for the first time and are unsure of the   situation, 
inform the health authorities immediately and leave the handling of the poultry to 
experienced personnel. 
 
3. Decontamination of premises  
Decontamination of an infected bird premises will help control the spread of the disease. 
• If possible, ask experienced health personnel to help you decontaminate the premises. 
If this is not possible and you have to do it yourself, wear protective gear to protect 
      your eyes, hands, feet and other exposed parts of your body as described above. 
• Dead birds should be buried safely (see next section). 
• Effective cleaning results in no visible feathers or faeces remaining on the premises. 
• Influenza viruses can survive for some time in organic material, so thorough cleaning with 
detergents is an important step during decontamination.  
• As outdoor areas used by poultry can be difficult to clean or disinfect, poultry should be 
excluded from these areas for a minimum of 42 days of decontamination to allow natural 
ultraviolet radiation to destroy any residual viruses. The period of exclusion should be 
longer in cold weather. 
• Spraying of disinfectants on vegetated outdoor areas or soil is of limited value due to the 
inactivation of these chemicals by organic material. Removal of surface soil is not normally 
recommended unless it is heavily contaminated with faeces. 
 
4. Buring of dead birds and their faeces 
• As far as is possible, seek assistance from your local environmental health or agriculture 
authority on how to bury dead animals safely; 
• When burying dead birds or their faeces, try to avoid generating dust. Spraying or sprinkle 
water to dampen the area first. Bury bird carcass and faeces at a depth of at least 1 metre.  
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• When the dead birds and their faeces have been properly disposed, clean all areas very 
well with detergent and water. Influenza viruses are relatively susceptible to a variety of 
detergents and disinfectants. 
 
5. Handling/disposal of contaminated protective clothing 
• After the area has been cleaned, remove all the protective materials and wash your hands 
with soap and water. 
• Wash clothes in hot or warm soapy water. Hang them in the sun to dry. 
• Put used gloves and any other disposable materials in a plastic bag for safe disposal. 
• Clean all reusable items such as rubber boots and glasses/goggles with water and 
detergent, but always remember to wash your hands after handling these items. 
• Items that cannot be cleaned properly should be destroyed; 
• Shower/wash body using soap and water. Wash your hair and take care not to re-
contaminate yourself or the cleaned area by avoiding contact with dirty, contaminated 
clothes and items. 
• Wash your hands every time after handling any contaminated items. 
• Footwear should also be decontaminated. 
• After walking around areas that may be contaminated (such as farms, markets or   
backyards with poultry), clean your shoes as carefully as possible with soap and water. 
• When cleaning shoes, make sure that you do not flick any particles into your face or on 
your clothes. Wear a plastic bag over your hands, shield your eyes by wearing glasses or 
goggles, and cover your mouth and nose with a cloth. 
• Leave dirty boots and shoes outside the home until they have been thoroughly cleaned. 
 
6. Additional precautions for people with flu-like symptoms 
• The World Health Organization believes it is very important to prevent human influenza 
from spreading in areas affected by bird flu. Where the avian influenza viruses and human 
influenza viruses come in contact with each other, there is a risk that genetic material will 
be exchanged and a new virus could emerge. 
• Anyone with flu-like illnesses should therefore be careful with secretions from the nose 
and mouth when around other people, especially small children, in order not to spread the 
human influenza viruses. 
• Cover your nose and mouth when coughing or sneezing. Teach children to do this as well. 
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• Always wash your hands with soap and water after any contact with secretions from the 
nose or mouth as these can carry a virus. 
• Children are especially prone to touching their face, eyes and mouth with unwashed 
hands. Teach children the importance of hand washing after coughing, sneezing and 
touching dirty items. 
• Inform the health authorities immediately and seek medical advice from a health 
professional if you develop signs of illness, such as fever and/or flu-like symptoms. 
 
7. Precautions to be taken when visiting friends or relatives in health-care 
      facilities 
• When visiting  a patient who has bird flu, visitors must follow the advice from the hospital 
staff to wear protective clothing, including a mask, gown, gloves and goggles. 
• Such special protective clothing is required when visitors have direct contact with the 
patient and/or the patient's environment. 
• It is important that the protective mask should fit properly. If it doesn't, seek advice from 
the hospital staff. 
• When visitors leave the patient's room they must remove these items and wash their 
hands with soap and water. 
 
8. Precautions need to be taken in neighbouring areas (next to the bird-flu affected 
area) 
• Only apparently healthy poultry should be prepared for food. 
• For killing, use a method that does not contaminate you or the environment of your 
household with blood, dust, faeces and other animal dirt. Seek advice from the local 
environmental health authority about the proper procedure. 
• For plucking, use a method that does not contaminate people or households with dust, 
faeces and other animal dirt. It is best to put poultry in boiling water before plucking 
feathers. 
• For degutting, use a method that does not contaminate people or households with blood, 
dust, faeces and other animal dirt. 
• People should not touch other items or their face (e.g. rubbing your eyes) during the 
degutting procedure, unless they have washed their hands with soap and water. 
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9. Precautionary measures to ensure that poultry and poultry products are properly 
     prepared and safe to eat 
• In affected areas it is advisable not to use dead and sick chicken or other poultry for 
preparing food for humans and/or animal consumption. Even healthy-looking poultry of 
any kind from a bird-flu affected area should not be used for food. 
• Chicken prepared hygienically and cooked thoroughly, i.e. no pink juices should be 
observed, can be considered safe to eat. If the bird has a transmittable disease, such as 
bird flu, the person preparing the food is at risk of becoming infected and the environment 
may become contaminated. 
• Eggs, too, may carry pathogens, such as the bird-flu virus inside or on their shells. Care 
must be taken in handling raw eggs and shells. Wash shells in soapy water and wash 
hands afterwards. Eggs, cooked thoroughly (hard boiled, 5 minutes, 70°C) will not infect 
the consumer with bird flu. 
• In general, all food should be thoroughly cooked to an internal temperature of 70°C or 
above. 
 
*In developing the work methods and - procedures in this annexure the resources listed below 
were consulted. The work methods and - procedures were confirmed by the Provincial    
Communicable Disease Outbreak Control Co-ordinators (group of experts) on 31 August 
2008. 
• World Health Organization. (2004a). Avian influenza control. Retrieved May 12, 2007, 
from http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/ 
• Goldmann, D. (2000). Transmission of viral respiratory infections in the home. Pediatric 
Infectious Disease Journal, 19 (S), 97–102. 
• Douglas, R.G. (2006). Influenza in man. New York City: Academic Press. 
• Suarez, D. (2003). The effect of various disinfectants on detection of avian influenza virus 
by real time RT-PCR. Avian Diseases, 47 (1), 1091–1095. 
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ANNEXURE 29 
 
WORK PROCEDURES FOR BIOSECURITY OF POULTRY TO PREVENT THE 
INTRODUCTION OF AVIAN INFLUENZA 
 
The following minimum biosecurity measures are recommended for poultry establishments: 
 
1. Fencing 
• The poultry house/s or production site/s should be fenced off, ideally with electric 
fencing. 
2. Access control for visitors and vehicles (i.e. feed trucks etc.) should be provided: 
• A security gate, preferably an electric gate, should prevent unauthorized entry to the  
establishment. 
• The access road to the establishments should run as far away from the site/s or 
house/s as possible, with dedicated smaller access road/s to each site. 
• Visitors should not be allowed inside the poultry houses, unless they have not had 
access to the poultry for at least the last three days or have taken a shower (removal of 
all clothes and including the washing of hair. 
• Feed trucks should be cleaned/disinfected at the feed depot and leave directly from the 
depot to the establishments.  
• Multiple deliveries of feed should be avoided at all times. 
• Feed silos should be erected with access by the feed truck from outside the fence. 
 
3. Workers 
• Workers should have dedicated, specific jobs/tasks; 
• Enforce the wearing of protective clothing for all workers (at least overalls and 
gumboots for poultry houses and hatcheries. 
• Workers should be prohibited from keeping their own poultry, either at dwellings on the 
establishments itself or at their houses away from the establishments; and 
• Workers should not be allowed to bring poultry meat for consumption onto the 
premises. 
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4. Foot baths 
• Properly administered foot baths should be placed at the entrance to all poultry 
houses. Foot baths should contain disinfectant that is replaced at regular intervals (as 
soon as dirty) and no entry or exit by workers if by-passing the foot bath. 
 
5. Wild birds 
• There should be no contact between wild birds and poultry. 
• Houses should be constructed in such a way that wild birds cannot gain entry. 
• No surface water should be allowed in the vicinity of the chicken houses. This includes 
open dams, ponds and furrows. 
• Spilt feed must be removed immediately. 
 
6. Rodents 
• An effective rodent control programme should be followed. 
• Rats and mice should not have access to poultry feed or poultry houses. 
 
7. Traceability 
• All poultry farms/holdings must be identified and registered with the local health 
authority. It is essential that all poultry/ostrich farms/holdings in the country, 
irrespective of size and whether the poultry or ostriches are kept for the export of meat, 
must be registered with the local health authorities. The said registration is essential to 
facilitate good record-keeping. 
• Full geographical details of the location of the farm have to be obtained. The data 
should also include up-to-date figures on the number and age groups or type of birds 
on the establishment. 
• All ostriches above the age of 3-4 months have to be tagged, but definitely before any 
movement occurs. 
• A tag that is located under the wing is not the most practical identification method, as it 
can be read only once the ostrich has been caught and restrained. 
• A tag that is located on the neck is more practical and should be used. 
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8. Disinfection 
• Drinking water should be disinfected with a suitable disinfectant to inactivate any 
possible influenza virus without harming the ostriches. Registered disinfectants that 
could be used include: Virukill, Virkon or standard water chlorination methods. 
• The supply of water for ostriches should consist of structured water troughs in properly 
constructed and dedicated areas that supply water without attracting wild birds.  
 
9.  Irrigation canals 
• In areas where camps are linked by means of irrigation canals, these canals have to 
be fenced off. This will prevent faecal material from ostriches from being transported to 
neighbouring camps along the route of the canal system. 
• The supply of water for poultry should consist of structured water troughs in properly 
constructed and dedicated areas that supply water without attracting wild water birds.  
 
Source: Modified from Pienaar & Horner (2005, p.58), Swane & Akey (2003, p.120) and 
confirmed by the Provincial Communicable Disease Outbreak Control Co-ordinators (group of 
experts) on 31 August 2008. 
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ANNEXURE 30  
 
WORK METHODS AND - PROCEDURES FOR THE ELIMINATION OF INFECTED 
POULTRY* 
 
1. Staff and equipment necessary for depopulation and disposal of infected birds 
• Wooden poles to cordon of the infected premises. 
•  Red-and white-tape to identify the infected premises and the entrance/exit to the farm. 
• Mobile disinfection units. 
• Night-time illumination devices. 
• Sufficient staff (depopulation crews and other staff) to avoid overworking. 
• Local maps for the identification of the route for the vehicles carrying the dead birds. 
• Policemen or other social security service to escort the trucks to the disposal area. 
• Gas, drugs or devices to contain, sedate, stun and depopulate flocks (in case of ostriches 
a captive bullet revolver may be used); and 
• Appropriate containers for disposing infected material. 
 
2. Disinfectants which are effective against avian influenza virus  
A list of disinfectants which are active against the avian influenza virus, their concentration 
and recommended use is presented below: 
• Sodium hypochlorite: 2% active chlorine solution (disinfection of equipment). 
• Quaternary ammonium salts: 4% solution (treatment of walls, floors, ceilings and 
equipment). 
• Potassium peroxomonosulphate + sulphamic acid + sodium alkyl benzene sulphonate  as 
a ready-to use product (treatment of floors, walls, ceilings and equipment). 
• Calcium Hydroxide: 3% solution (treatment of walls and floors). 
• Cresolic acid 2.2% solution: (treatment of floors). 
• Synthetic phenols 2% solution: (treatment of floors). 
• Formalin and permanganate: fumigation. 
 
2. Euthanasia of poultry 
During euthanasia, controlled atmospheric killing is performed by exposing animals to a 
predetermined gas mixture, either by placing them in a gas-filled container or apparatus 
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(Method 1) or by the gas being introduced into a poultry house (Method 2). Method 2 should 
be used whenever possible, as it eliminates welfare issues resulting from the need to 
manually remove live birds. The usage of carbon-dioxide gas is the preferred method for 
euthanasia. Inhalation of carbon dioxide (CO2) induces respiratory and metabolic acidosis 
and hence reduces the pH of cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) and neurons thereby causing 
unconsciousness and, after prolonged exposure, death. 
 
Method 1  
• The animals are placed in a gas-filled container or apparatus. 
• With caged layers, individual birds must be removed from cages and manually placed in 
large airtight containers and CO2 added. 
• The containers or apparatus should allow the required gas concentration to be maintained 
and accurately measured. 
• When animals are exposed to the gas individually or in small groups in a container or 
apparatus, the equipment used should be designed, constructed, and maintained in such 
a way as to avoid injury to the animals and allow them to be observed. 
• Gassing: CO2 (use 17,5 kg/1000 m3). Birds need to be exposed to an atmosphere of at 
least 30% carbon dioxide to ensure loss of consciousness and then at least 70% carbon 
dioxide to kill the birds. This concentration must be maintained for at least 3 minutes until 
death is confirmed. 
• Team members should ensure that there is sufficient time allowed for each batch of 
animals to die before subsequent ones are introduced into the container or apparatus. 
• Containers or apparatus should not be overcrowded and measures are needed to avoid 
animals from climbing on top of each other. 
 
The advantages of Method 1 are that CO2 is readily available and the application methods are 
simple. The disadvantages include the following: 
• The gas container or apparatus should be properly designed; 
• The aversive nature of high CO2 concentrations; 
• No immediate loss of consciousness; 
• The risk of suffocation due to overcrowding; and 
• Difficulty in verifying death while the animals are in the container or apparatus. 
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From the above it can be concluded that Method 1 is suitable where small numbers of birds 
needs to be euthanised, The portable, self-contained euthanasia chambers can be 
constructed and moved to the site for use. 
 
Method 2  
• During this method the gas is introduced into a poultry house. 
• Prior to introduction of the CO2, the poultry house should be appropriately sealed to allow 
control over the gas concentration. 
• Small house: Seal house or remove birds into containers for gassing or dislocation of 
necks. 
• The house should be gradually filled with CO2 so that all birds are exposed to a 
concentration of more than 40% until they are dead; a vaporiser may be required to 
prevent freezing. 
• Devices should be used to accurately measure the gas concentration at the maximum 
height accommodation of birds. 
 
The advantages of Method 2 are that by applying gas to birds in situ eliminates the need to 
manually remove live birds, CO2 is readily available and the gradual raising of CO2 
concentration minimises the unpleasantness of dealing with unconscious birds. The 
disadvantage is that it is difficult to determine the volume of gas required to achieve adequate 
concentrations of CO2 in some poultry houses. It is also difficult to verify death while the birds 
are in the poultry house. 
 
From the above it can be concluded that Method 2 is suitable for use with the poultry in an 
enclosed-environment. It is also suitable for broilers, layers and breeders. The section below 
discusses drugs that may be used for depopulation of large flocks of birds. 
 
3. Drugs that may be used for depopulation of large flocks of birds 
• Alfa chloralose, mixed with feed in concentration of 2%-6%, causes loss of consciousness. 
Death can also be obtained by suffocating birds in plastic bags. This method can be used 
only if the birds are clinically ill and do not exhibit any loss of appetite. 
• Sodium fenobarbital, dissolved in drinking water (80 mg in 55 mls), causes loss of 
consciousness in four hours. 
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4. Disposal of dead birds 
Disposal of dead birds can be done through various methods including: 
• On-farm burial; 
• Incineration;  
• Composting; and 
• Landfill disposal. 
 
The following section discusses on-farm burial of dead birds: 
• On-farm burial of dead birds is preferred to the other methods listed above. In areas which 
allow burial as a means of disposal, a pit must be prepared as soon as the diagnosis is 
confirmed. The size of the pit must be at least two metres wide by two metres deep, and 
this enables disposal of 300 birds (medium weight 1.8 kg) per 1.3 meters of surface. The 
number of birds can be doubled, each metre deeper the pit is made (3-6 metres). The 
bottom of the trench must be at least 1 metre above the water table to prevent 
contamination of the ground water. 
• Non-disinfectable biodegradable material must be buried with the birds 
• Cover the birds with a layer of calcium hydroxide (quicklime). 
• The excavated area must be protected against theft (e.g. razor wire). 
• All non-disinfectable, biodegradable material (wood, cardboard) must be buried with the 
animals.  
 
5. Disposal / destruction of infected materials 
All organic waste and all other non-disinfectable material must be destroyed. In particular, the 
destruction of litter, eggs, egg products, hay, animal feedstuffs, feathers and egg-trays must 
be planned for. 
• Litter - Depending on the amounts of litter present and on the characteristics of it, litter can 
be either buried in the pit with the animal carcases or piled in heaps to ensure maturation. 
The heap must be covered with a water resistant sheet of plastic. In all cases, infected 
litter should not be moved from the infected farm prior to maturation. 
• Eggs and egg products - May be buried in the pit with the bird carcasses. 
• Straw - Straw may be decontaminated by spraying its surface with an active disinfectant 
and covering up the stacks with a water resistant sheet of plastic. Covered stacks must be 
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left to decontaminate for at least 42 days. For time reasons, it could be more convenient to 
incinerate it. 
• Animal feed -Animal feed present on the site must be decontaminated by fumigation and 
subsequently incinerated. 
 
7. Disinfection of infected premises  
• All units which are physically or functionally connected to the establishment (i.e. hatchery, 
egg storage rooms, packaging rooms, egg trolleys, egg product plants) must be properly 
disinfected. Vehicles, used for transporting live animals, eggs and animal feed must also 
be disinfected; 
• Washing and disinfection of walls, floors and ceilings of the infected establishments must 
be performed aiming at the removal of all organic material; metal structures such as cages 
may be decontaminated by heat treatment; 
• All equipment inside the house such as drinkers and food hoppers must be washed and 
treated with a disinfectant; 
• Water reservoirs must be emptied, washed and disinfected; 
• Feed tanks (silos) need to be emptied, washed with a hot water-pressure pump and 
subsequently fumigated; and 
• After washing and disinfecting, all units must be fumigated twice with at least two weeks 
between fumigations. 
 
*In developing the work methods and - procedures in this annexure the resources listed below 
were consulted. The work methods and - procedures were confirmed by the Provincial    
Communicable Disease Outbreak Control Co-ordinators (group of experts) on 31 August 
2008. 
• Pienaar, A.C.E. & Horner, R.F. (2005). Contingency plan in case of an outbreak of 
notifiable Avian influenza in poultry in South Africa. Pretoria: Government printer. 
• Swayne, D.E. & Akey, B.L. (2003). Avian influenza control strategies in the United States 
of America. New York: USA Government Printer. 
• World Organisation for Animal Health. (2007b). Terrestrial Animal Health Code. Retrieved 
July 16, 2007, from http://www.oie.int/eng/OIE/en_about.htm 
• World Organization for Animal Health. (2008). Avian influenza - Prevention and control of 
avian influenza. Retrieved June 12, 2008, from www. oie.int/eng/Avian_influenza/ 
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ANNEXURE 31 
 
SECTORS THAT SHOULD SERVE ON THE NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA OUTBREAK 
RESPONSE TEAM 
 
The sectors below form the National Department of Health are the sectors that should serve 
on the National Avian Influenza Outbreak Response Team.  
 
1. Directorate: Communicable Disease Control  
2. Directorate: Epidemiology  
3. Directorate: Health Promotion  
4. Directorate: Environmental Health 
5. Directorate: Food Control  
6. Cluster: Communication  
7. Directorate: Human Resources 
8. Directorate: Health Information Systems 
9. Directorate: Pharmaceutical Policy and Planning  
10. Directorate: Emergency Medical Services and Disaster Management  
11. Directorate: Financial Management  
12. Directorate: Facilities Planning  
13. South African Military Health Services 
14. Department of Finance  
15. Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 
16. Department of Provincial and Local Government 
17. Department of Agriculture 
18. Department of Social Development  
19. Department of Safety and Security 
20. Department of Education 
21. Department of Foreign Affairs 
22. Department of Correctional Services 
23. Private Health Sector 
24. International Organisations (World Health Organization, etc) 
25. Southern African Development Community (SADC)  
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Source: National Department of Health (2007, p.16) and confirmed by Provincial    
Communicable Disease Outbreak Control Co-ordinators (group of experts) on 31 August 
2008. 
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ANNEXURE 32 
 
SECTORS THAT SHOULD SERVE ON THE PROVINCIAL AVIAN INFLUENZA 
OUTBREAK RESPONSE TEAM IN THE EASTERN CAPE PROVINCE 
 
The sectors below from the Provincial Department of Health are the sectors that should serve 
on the Provincial Avian Influenza Outbreak Response Team of the Eastern Cape province.  
 
1. Director: Primary Health Care Service 
2. Deputy-Director: Environmental Health 
3. Human Resources Unit 
4. Health Promotion Unit 
5. Communication Unit 
6. Infection Control Unit 
7. Legal Services  
8. Emergency Medical and Rescue Services (EMRS) 
9. Hospital Services 
10. Food Control Unit 
11.  Pharmacies Unit 
12.  Surveillance Unit 
13.  Defence Force 
14.  Port Health 
15.  Provincial Call centre 
16.  Expanded Programme for immunisation  
17. Geographical Information System Unit 
18.  Epidemiology Unit 
19.  Informatics Unit 
20.  Community health worker programme manager 
21. Representative from private health sector 
22.  South African Military Health Services (SAMHS) 
23. Safety and Security Unit 
24. Water Affairs and Forestry 
25. Correctional Services 
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26. Foreign affairs 
27. Agriculture and veterinary science 
28. Disaster management 
29. South African Police Services 
30.  Telkom 
31. Business 
32. NGOs 
 
Source: Nagpal (2006, p.15) and confirmed by Provincial Communicable Disease Outbreak 
Control Co-ordinators (group of experts) on 31 August 2008. 
 
